# Strategic Concept DA 2.0 --- BFHR

## Top Shelf

### 1NC --- Concept DA Shell

#### A---NATO Strategic Concept shifted to a defense and deterrence posture driven by increased spending and troop commitments in support of Ukraine --- Failure to commit and stay unified risks overstretch and alliance collapse

Arnold 7/1/22

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Operationally, NATO has announced a significant hardening of its defence and deterrence posture to be able to ‘defend every inch of Allied territory’ and recommitted to a 360-degree approach to security through several enhancements. First, there is a doubling from four to eight multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe, which has already led to a near-tenfold increase in troops deployed to the Eastern flank. Moreover, these battlegroups will soon include brigade headquarters to rapidly scale up posture if necessary, with associated NATO reinforcement plans at ‘short and no notice’. Second, the NATO Response Force (NRF) has been expanded from 40,000 to over 300,000 troops, to be held at higher levels of readiness. Third, in a complete antithesis to President Vladimir Putin’s intent, Sweden and Finland will now be able to join the Alliance, after Turkey withdrew its objections in time for Madrid, significantly enhancing political unity. The eventual accession of Finland and Sweden will expand the Supreme Allied Commander Europe’s (SACEUR) land area of operations by over 866,000 square kilometres. It also changes the European security architecture in more subtle ways. For example, it means that seven out of eight Arctic Council members will also be NATO members, changing the dynamic at a time when NATO needs to cooperate with Russia on climate security, which is also heavily stressed in the new Strategic Concept. Moreover, NATO and the EU are now more closely aligned in terms of their membership – only Austria, Cyprus, Ireland and Malta are members of the EU but not NATO – at exactly the moment when European states need to step up defensively. These announcements are politically momentous, but also entail a huge risk. The big troop increases will be very expensive as member states experience increasing spending pressures. If these statements are not backed up (there are a total of 71 ‘we will’ commitments across 11 pages), the Alliance could lose trust and credibility, and therefore effective deterrence. There is also the real possibility of opening old wounds on burden sharing, especially between the US and European allies, which could further destabilise the Alliance, especially if a Trump-like character is able to secure election to the White House in 2024. European security documents and communiques, both from NATO and the EU, are graveyards of unrealised rapid reaction force ambitions which were luckily never tested by the security environment. It is politically unacceptable to Eastern members to continue to tolerate this risk. There are already reports that cast real doubt on the ability to realise the new force model. How Much Does the Strategic Concept Actually Matter? Politically, the Strategic Concept and the unity it represents are very important. However, militarily and operationally, it is less significant. The 2010 Strategic Concept had been moribund since at least 2014, following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, but of course NATO has still been operating effectively since. While a lot of effort has gone into building consensus for Madrid, in many ways the hard work starts now. There is a coherence issue. The Strategic Concept, as NATO’s strategy, comes after the two main plans – SACEUR’s Concept for the Deterrence and Defence of the Euro-Atlantic Area and the future NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept – have already matured. There was tacit acknowledgement at the Madrid summit that many underlying operational plans would have to be revised. However, with NATO’s strategy transforming, mere tweaks to plans do not seem sufficient, and their core assumptions should be revisited. For NATO’s Warfighting Capstone Concept – how it fights in the future – it is imperative that analysis of Russia’s military performance in Ukraine now becomes the backbone for its development. Moreover, despite the collective might of NATO, it cannot do everything, and the commitment at the 2015 Warsaw summit to a ‘360-degree approach’ to security – both thematically and geographically – risks overstretch. In a hardening world, the Alliance must take the opportunity to go back to its roots and seek support from other actors, such as the EU. It is still expected that a NATO–EU joint declaration will materialise before the end of the year. NATO’s Russia Problem The new Strategic Concept identifies and defines the Russian threat for the remainder of the decade. But threat identification is only half of the job, and ‘threat mitigation’ – or the actual activity – is the priority. In this regard, the document lacks the vision and a realistic timeframe for understanding the parameters of the NATO–Russia confrontation. This is not just a NATO issue, but its self-declared ‘unique, essential and indispensable’ role in European security is important in influencing and managing Russian behaviour. The Strategic Concept states that ‘Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our security’. To achieve this, it is first critical to understand which key tenets of European security, or parts thereof, are still in play; what can be built on; and what must be discarded. This applies to the Washington Treaty 1949; the Helsinki Final Act 1975; the Charter of Paris for a New Europe 1990; the NATO-Russia Founding Act 1997; the OSCE Istanbul Document 1999; and the Vienna Document 2011. Moreover, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe 1990, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 1987, the Treaty on Open Skies 1992, and the Chemical Weapons Convention 1993 all appear moribund, albeit for different reasons. It is important that future engagement with Russia is designed in a way that incentivises cooperation and builds a structure for dialogue that reflects the future strategic environment, rather than the context of the Cold War. The fundamental problem is a lack of trust on both sides, and therefore a low likelihood of compliance if an agreement could be achieved. Collective security is not necessarily dead, but it might have to take a back seat for a while as we return to balance-of-power politics for the foreseeable future. NATO members need to be prepared for the consequences. In for the Long Haul Despite Ukraine not being a member of the Alliance, the outcome of the war is critical to NATO, European security, and the principle that aggressors cannot redraw international borders by force. NATO has now stated that ‘A strong, independent Ukraine is vital for the stability of the Euro-Atlantic area’, and it must follow through with action. However, the announced enhancements to NATO’s defence and deterrence posture will come at an eyewatering cost to NATO common funding, which will fall on national defence ministry budgets that are already under strain when it comes to delivering extant equipment budgets. Moreover, with economies hit by the coronavirus pandemic, the cost of living, and inflationary pressure, the ability to sustain political will on NATO funding will diminish. Critical to this will be the ability of governments to communicate the Russian threat to their populations clearly and transparently. They need to effectively bring to life national security risk assessments to make the case for sustained higher spending, and ‘Putin equals bad’ messaging is insufficient. This struggle goes beyond Putin, and we need to ensure we don’t make the mistake of assuming that what comes next is automatically better. Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea was a wakeup call that the Alliance didn’t fully grasp. Some modest transformation did occur, such as the creation of the NRF and Enhanced Forward Presence, as well as the recommitment to spending 2% of GDP on defence by 2024 at the 2014 Wales summit. However, the political rhetoric was not backed by commitment, which weakened NATO deterrence and might have inadvertently influenced Putin’s decision-making calculus towards Ukraine. If NATO fails to translate words into action now, it could be fatal for the Alliance.

#### B --- The plan pushes the alliance outside of its core tasks --- undermines the concept strategy and guts NATO focus and cohesion

Larsen 22 [Henrik Larsen, Ph.D., is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich.; “NATO Must Get Resilience Right to Withstand Russia and China”; Lawfare; May 22, 2022; https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china]//eleanor

NATO’s main task in the foreseeable security environment is to adapt to the threat posed by Russia while also trying to reach a precise understanding of the challenge posed by China. At the planned Madrid Summit in June 2022, NATO will adopt a new Strategic Concept to guide the alliance’s future political and military development, which is the right starting point for a new strategy to manage renewed great power competition. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has prompted NATO to eliminate any doubts about its ability and resolve to defend its eastern territory against a Russian attack. NATO is at arguably the most important juncture in its post-Cold War history. NATO must adapt not only its military preparedness but also its approach to the nonmilitary—and specifically illiberal—challenges that Russia and China pose to its resilience and cohesion. To advance their geopolitical interests, Russia and China exploited the openness of society in NATO allies and the divisions between them over the past decade. NATO must always be wary of external challenges that could undermine its unity. This was true during the Cold War in the face of an ideological rival seeking to undermine confidence in Western democratic governments, and it remains true in the face of Russia and China today. Conversely, NATO needs to navigate its adaptation to its illiberal challenge while avoiding functional over-extension. The alliance is at risk of maladaptation, whereby it extends its own activities unnecessarily into civilian areas of security in which it lacks necessary expertise and legacy. Strong voices in the expert community call for NATO to specify resilience as a core task in the forthcoming Strategic Concept, in principle elevating it to a task of equal importance to collective defense. An influential report commissioned by Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg to inspire the Strategic Concept recommends that NATO reinvent itself as a “liberal bulwark” against Russia and China and extend the alliance’s responsibilities into the realm of democratic resilience. NATO must steer clear of the temptation to take on too many tasks and instead enhance resilience only in areas that can be reconciled with its mandate as a security and defense alliance. The encounter with illiberal powers strengthens NATO’s unity, but that does not necessarily mean that NATO is the right institution to meet the illiberal challenges that Russia and China pose. So far, the alliance’s record of responding to these threats has been uneven, and the perspectives about its role have diverged at times between the United States and its European partners. But there is a way forward, if NATO can clearly delineate what should and should not fall within its remit, be clear-eyed about its strategic environment, and prioritize international partners that share NATO’s interests and values. Containing Russia, Watching China NATO’s adaptation to Russia’s revisionist foreign policy has so far focused mostly on the military threat that the country poses. In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO enhanced its capacity for rapid reaction and placed multinational battlegroups in Poland and each of the Baltic states as a “tripwire” to remind Russia of NATO’s collective defense guarantee. In response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, NATO will likely aim to demonstrate its ability and resolve to repel an attack by Russia’s forces stationed near allied territory by improving its reinforcement capability to deter major Russian military buildups like the one around Ukraine. NATO already boosted its existing forward deployments, while the rise in European defense expenditure will enable the alliance to shoulder a broader deterrence effort. Conversely, NATO has not fully found its foothold when it comes to Russia’s political warfare, by which it has attempted to diminish the alliance’s ability to act cohesively. The digital age has enhanced the opportunities for Russia to engage in information and psychological warfare, including hack-and-leak operations to influence and discredit elections. The polarization of the political landscapes on both sides of the Atlantic over the past decade has made countries more receptive to Russian disinformation and narratives seeking to discredit the democratic process. Moreover, Russian assassination and sabotage operations on NATO territory have contributed to a public sense of vulnerability to heavy-handed authoritarian methods and doubt about the coping power of democratic institutions. China does not compare to the direct threat that Russia poses but has nevertheless appeared on NATO’s strategic radar as an economic great power with a high-tech edge that Russia is unlikely to ever match. Chinese 5G network provider Huawei remains a pertinent topic for NATO, as several European countries, including Germany, Austria, Spain, the Netherlands and Hungary, are still undecided about relying on its potentially compromised technology or de facto allowing their national operators to use Chinese providers. Moreover, Chinese investments in continental Europe without conditionalities attached and targeting critical infrastructure (railway stations, ports and airports) raise suspicions about Beijing’s underlying political and military motives. Moreover, China is pressing ahead with military applications of artificial intelligence (AI), and its space ambitions are growing. Since 2014, NATO has become increasingly aware of the nonmilitary challenges to its unity and resilience but has adapted only in certain respects. It adopted the so-called baseline requirements in 2016, against which it can measure individual allies’ level of resilience regarding their provision of essential services to their domestic populations. These basics that would be necessary to withstand a crisis include access to food, water and energy supplies; maintenance of core functions of government; and resilient civil transportation systems. However, the baseline requirements are technical measurements that do not adequately grasp the political nature of the challenges that Russia and China pose to alliance unity. Moreover, their focus on civil preparedness, resource management and infrastructure does not seem to fit squarely within the competencies of a defense alliance. NATO may be on a slippery slope with the scope of its resilience concept drifting further away from its defense capabilities. NATO, as an organization and as an alliance of states, is aware of the challenges to transatlantic resilience and cohesion that Russia and China pose, but the alliance has not been able to agree on the issues to which it can bring added value. The situation today stands in contrast to the situation during the Cold War when NATO successfully calibrated resilience to the ability to resist an armed attack by focusing on civil emergency planning. Russia and China are illiberal challengers that add new meaning to transatlantic security cooperation, but NATO’s adaptation will depend on the extent to which the United States and Europe can find agreement on investment in transatlantic security.

#### C --- Failing to contain Ukraine conflict escalates to wider Euro war, prolif, collapses U.S. cred and alliances in Asia and causes China adventurism

Graham ‘22

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The Russian military intervention in Ukraine could easily escalate into a larger conflict stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea and further west into Europe. Although Russia, wielding massive military superiority, might overrun Ukrainian forces in a matter of weeks, stabilizing and pacifying the country will likely prove to be a grueling and costly affair. A significant Ukrainian resistance movement is almost certain to emerge. With sustained Western support, it could prolong the warfare for months, if not years. The first wave of sanctions that Washington has levied on Moscow could be followed by others in a continuing effort to raise the cost to Moscow and force it to yield. A negotiated end to the conflict will not come easily, since Washington has framed it in Manichean terms as a world historical struggle between the democratic West and the aggressive, malevolent, and autocratic Russia. Anything short of “victory” will be decried as surrender or appeasement in the West, while Russia will not capitulate on a matter it considers vital to its security and prosperity. The stage is thus set for an escalating cycle of violence, with Moscow seeking to stamp out a Ukrainian insurgency and retaliate against Western efforts to stop Russia’s advance. If the conflict wears on, Moscow could be increasingly tempted to expand its military operations further into Europe to achieve its goals. As a first option, Russia could intensify pressure on states neighboring Ukraine (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia) that could provide safe havens for insurgents or the inevitable government-in-exile. It will doubtless reinforce its military presence in Kaliningrad and elsewhere in the Baltics and patrol the Baltic Sea more aggressively. It could deploy hybrid-war tactics—cyberattacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic sabotage—to destabilize countries providing safe havens. If those actions did not sufficiently degrade the resistance, Moscow could even launch direct attacks on insurgents and their supporters outside Ukraine, as well as attempt to assassinate leading figures in the government-in-exile, akin to the attacks it has made on Chechen rebels and Federal Security Service (FSB) defectors in Europe in recent years. Such steps could, at a minimum, draw frontline NATO states directly into the military conflict with Russia, obligating the United States and other allies to come to their defense. To build up further pressure, Moscow could also “weaponize” the inevitable refugee flows into neighboring states. Refugees, who would likely number in the millions, would move first into unoccupied Ukrainian territory but eventually into adjacent European states, which have shown little tolerance for outsiders. Moscow could use harsh military and police tactics that would increase the number of refugees and seek to guide them into countries where they would create the greatest socioeconomic stress, such as Moldova. In addition, Moscow could increase the tension by pushing Belarusian President Aleksandr Lukashenko to again seek to push thousands of Middle Eastern migrants across the borders into Poland and Lithuania. That could lead to border clashes, as it almost did on occasion last fall, with Russia supporting its ally, Belarus, and NATO states coming to the defense of allies under attack. A second option Moscow could pursue is opening up a second front in the Balkans. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of destabilizing actions in the region, seeking to weaken Montenegro after its accession to NATO, exacerbate tensions between Serbs and Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and undermine relations between Serbia and Kosovo. As it fought in Ukraine, Russia could encourage Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik to press for separation from Bosnia, threatening to reignite the bitter wars of the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia. A Balkans war would complicate the security calculus of all countries in the region, as well as that of Germany and France, which have significant interests there. To quell the fighting, NATO countries could decide to use military force against Bosnian Serb forces enjoying Russian support. A third, riskier, option would be to directly attack the United States, the country that Moscow believes is orchestrating a larger anti-Russia campaign. In response to Western sanctions designed to crater Russia’s financial system and undermine critical industries, Moscow could launch major cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure. If a cyberattack were to take down a major financial institution or corrupt its records, the ensuing havoc in U.S. markets could prompt overwhelming public and congressional pressure for a forceful response. The U.S. and NATO response to Russian actions will impact Moscow’s decisions on the conduct of the conflict. Both a weak response and an excessively harsh one could lead to escalation. In the first case, Moscow could be tempted to press militarily even further into Europe to enlarge its sphere of influence. Vladimir Putin has demanded that NATO withdraw its forces back to the lines they held in 1997, when the NATO-Russia Founding Act was signed and the first wave of post−Cold War expansion remained in the future. His remarks announcing the start of hostilities against Ukraine hinted at a broader effort to restore Russia’s control over all of the former Soviet Union. That could include military action against the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, through which Moscow could try to carve out a land corridor to Kaliningrad, a Russian exclave on the Baltic Sea. NATO would have little choice but to provide military aid to those states if it did not want to forfeit its role as the central pillar of European security. Crippling sanctions, meanwhile, could provoke Putin to lash out with greater violence. If Putin felt cornered, he could escalate the conflict either horizontally to other countries or vertically to the nuclear level in a desperate effort to save himself, his regime, and, in his mind, Russia itself. And he could find considerable public support for such a reaction. Already, some Russians believe that U.S. and EU sanctions are aimed not simply at the leaders behind the war but, by cratering the economy, at all Russians. Warning Indicators As is the case with the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s intentions will remain ambiguous. The indicators of an approaching escalation in the conflict beyond Ukraine are likely to fall into three categories. The first indicators that political and military conditions are increasing the risk of broader conflict include a breakdown in channels of communication with Moscow. The absence of active diplomatic ties would preclude a negotiated resolution of the conflict in Ukraine. An end to U.S.-Russian military-to-military channels would undermine any effort to avoid direct military conflict between the two countries. Another indicator would be major insurgent successes that dramatically increase Russian casualties. Moscow would be tempted to move more aggressively against insurgent safe havens rather than capitulate on what it considers to be its vital interest in Ukraine. Second are the indicators that Moscow is preparing for a broader conflict, which it would undoubtedly argue had been forced by Western actions. Such signs include Kremlin efforts to prepare the Russian public for a wider conflict, which could entail official statements, greater media focus on escalating Western “aggression,” an increased pace of civil defense drills, and mobilization of reserves. Another indicator includes the massing of Russian forces in the Baltic region. It could include such moves as aggressive hybrid actions to destabilize Poland and the Baltic states, coupled with efforts to rally indigenous ethnic Russian communities against their governments. Third are the indicators that Moscow is intentionally seeking to widen the conflict. This could include greater support for Bosnian Serb leader Dodik, such as diplomatic and financial backing, and provision of weapons. They could also encourage Serb leaders to more assertively pursue their grievances against Kosovo. Implications for the United States A wider European conflict would pose the stiffest challenge to the global standing of the United States since the end of the Cold War and to the international system it has built and underwritten for decades longer. It would test the durability of its global system of alliances and the efficacy of international regimes and institutions that have guarded world peace, security, and prosperity. The challenge would come at a time when the United States itself is in immense disarray, as a deeply polarized polity confronts massive domestic problems—the pandemic, inflation, racial justice, and cultural wars—that leave less time and fewer resources for foreign matters. The United States will be tested to see whether it can muster the will, energy, and creativity to execute an effective policy toward the unfolding crisis in Europe. At home, public attention has been focused on developments in and around Ukraine, but the Joe Biden administration cannot ignore the home front. In response to U.S.-levied sanctions, Russia can be expected to step up its cyber operations against the United States. It will more actively sow disinformation, seek to exacerbate domestic tensions, and paralyze critical infrastructure. The severity of the attacks will likely rise in proportion to the harshness of the sanctions Washington levies on Moscow. Abroad, the fate of the transatlantic community, a central pillar of U.S. security and prosperity, would be a stake. One of the Biden administration’s priorities, as laid out in the Interim National Security Strategy Guidance released in March 2021, is repairing U.S. alliances—especially with Europe—after four disruptive years under President Donald Trump. Although relations are more cordial, significant substantive differences remain and the willingness of allies to align behind a common purpose for the long haul remains questionable. The United States’ allies have rallied behind a harsh set of sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, but preserving unity as the conflict drags on remains a challenge, especially if sacrifice is spread unevenly across NATO, as will most likely be the case. Putin will seek to exploit divisions through differentiated levels of pressure on NATO members, targeted energy cutoffs, offers of negotiation, and the like to advance two long-standing Russian goals: the end of NATO as a collective defense organization and the erosion of the foundations of the EU. Should he succeed, the new order that would emerge in Europe is far from certain. But Russia would undoubtedly play a central role in its formulation, and almost any conceivable new order would diminish the power and role of the United States on the continent. A similar situation obtains in the Indo-Pacific region. The Biden administration spent 2021 bolstering relations with its allies and partners—energizing the Quad (the United States, Australia, India, and Japan), and cutting a submarine deal with the United Kingdom and Australia—to meet the growing strategic challenge posed by China. A major, prolonged European distraction could undo further efforts to pivot to Asia, raise doubts among allies and partners about the credibility of the U.S. commitment, and free China to pursue its objectives with greater vigor. The United States could avoid this outcome by pursuing lesser goals in Europe—leading to the quicker development of a new order less favorable to American interests—or by a massive buildup of its military capabilities that would enable it to play a major, perhaps decisive, role in both regions. The latter would have to come at the cost of the Biden administration’s domestic priorities. Whether the Biden administration could muster sufficient domestic political support, if it decided to move in this direction, is far from certain. In addition to regional challenges, a major European conflict would also stress critical international regimes and institutions. One of the first victims would likely be the arms control regime that has served as the foundation of strategic nuclear stability for the past fifty-plus years. The United States withdrew from some central elements—including the Anti-Ballistic Missiles (ABM) and the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaties—but two critical elements have remained in place: the New START treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). A wider conflict in Europe would all but guarantee that the United States and Russia could not agree to a follow-on treaty to the New START treaty before it expires in 2026, and the NPT review conference tentatively scheduled for August 2022 would fall by the wayside. As a consequence, the incipient arms race now underway, fueled by new technologies—hypersonics, cyber tools, and artificial intelligence—would accelerate. A new wave of nuclear proliferation could ensue, especially if U.S. allies and partners lose faith in America’s commitment to extended deterrence. Mutually assured destruction, which for better or worse has anchored strategic stability since the early 1970s, would be severely stressed in a multipolar nuclear landscape with Russia and the United States fighting at least a proxy war.

#### Wider European War causes extinction

Jeffrey M. Elliot 7, North Carolina Central University and Robert Reginald, California State University, San Bernandino, The Arms Control, Disarmament, and Military Security Dictionary, p. 19-20

Escalation of War (15)

Increasing, enlarging, or intensifying the nature, magnitude, or parameters of a war. Escalation may entail an increase in troops, additional third party involvement, the use of deadlier weapons, or a change in political or military objectives. Escalation may be likened to a ladder, in that the level of coercion and force tends to increase as the war becomes more costly and uncertain. In a limited war, states can employ sundry military measures to challenge one another’s resolve and capabilities. in such conflicts, the goal of escalation may be to defeat or force the surrender of an adversary, or to mete out increased punishment to pressure a foe to negotiate or terminate the action that originally precipitated the conflict. In a limited war, military objectives tend to escalate rapidly. In a nuclear confrontation, however, the stakes are far greater—rapid escalation must be avoided, as it could spell instant disaster or extinction. In a nuclear age, most experts believe there is no such thing as a “limited” nuclear war. For example, if one side initiated a war in Europe, even with conventional weapons, it is highly likely that it would escalate inevitably to a global strategic nuclear war, since neither side would be willing to accept defeat in such a critical arena. See also BALANCE OF POWER, 4; CONFLICT, 10; ESCALATION, 71; LIMITED WAR, 20; TOTAL. WAR. 32.

### 2NC --- Impact Overview

#### Collapse of Allied Conventional Deterrence causes full-scale nuclear war with Russia

Kroenig ‘21

(Dr. Matthew Kroenig is a professor of government and foreign service at Georgetown University and the director of the Scowcroft Strategy Initiative at the Atlantic Council, “Will Emerging Technology Cause Nuclear War?: Bringing Geopolitics Back In,” pg online @ https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-15\_Issue-4/D-Kroenig.pdf)

If Moscow or Beijing attacked a vulnerable US Ally or partner in their near abroad, therefore, there would be a risk of major war with the potential for nuclear escalation. The United States has formal treaty commitments with several frontline states as well as an ambiguous defense obligation to Taiwan. If Russia or China were to attack these states, it is likely, or at least possible, that the United States would come to the defense of the victims. While many question the wisdom or credibility of America’s global commitments, it would be difficult for the United States to simply back down. Abandoning a treaty ally could cause fears that America’s global commitments would unravel. Any US president, therefore, would feel great pressure to come to an Ally’s defense and expel Russian or Chinese forces. Once the United States and Russia or China are at war, there would be a risk of nuclear escalation. As noted previously, experts assess the greatest risk of nuclear war today does not come from a bolt- out- of- the- blue strike but from nuclear escalation in a regional, conventional conflict.53 Russian leaders may believe it is in their interest to use nuclear weapons early in a conflict with the United States and NATO.54 Russia possesses a large and diverse arsenal, including thousands of nonstrategic nuclear weapons, to support this nuclear strategy. In the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington indicates it could retaliate against any Russian nuclear “de- escalation” strikes with limited nuclear strikes of its own using low- yield nuclear weapons.55 The purpose of US strategy is to deter Russian strikes. If deterrence fails, however, there is a clear pathway to nuclear war between the United States and Russia. As Henry Kissinger pointed out decades ago, there is no guarantee that, once begun, a limited nuclear war stays limited.56

#### Overstretching the alliance turns the case --- results in allies pulling funds from the aff and withdrawing from NATO altogether

Bazin ‘18

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Political and economic factors. The group of political and economic factors points to the risks of severe disagreements among the allies, which could lead to the weakening of the transatlantic bond, disintegration tendencies within the European Union, or even withdrawal of a NATO nation from the Alliance. At the level of political elites, the participants identified the crisis of political leadership in NATO nations among the most probable causes of weakening alliance cohesion in the future. Particularly, populist leaders who prefer narrow, short-term political gains at home and who are prepared to “undermine an international institution to gain consensus internally” represent a serious threat to multilateralism, on which the Alliance has depended. Oftentimes, national leaders “use NATO as a scapegoat for their domestic political games,” while “NATO does not [and cannot] fight its own nations.” At the level of domestic population, the support for the Alliance in member states can decline due to NATO’s unclear purpose. This could become an acute problem, especially if national leaders continue to frame security problems exclusively in domestic terms instead of treating them as NATO-wide. Particularly, concerns over sovereignty could override the relative value of the Alliance’s collective good and make governments pull limited funds away from NATO.

#### United NATO focused on Deterrence prevents war with Russia and China

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/micahw> [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole.

#### Prolif causes nuclear conflict

Sam **Kleiner** 6/3/**16** — postdoctoral fellow at Yale Law School, “With His Finger on the Trigger,” The Atlantic, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2016/06/donald-trump-nuclear-weapons/485504/>

A new nuclear-arms race, moreover, could be even riskier than the one Reagan and others worked so hard to end. In retrospect, the Cold War standoff between two massive, nuclear-armed superpowers offered some stability; among other things, the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union could destroy each other, or any other challenger, in a nuclear confrontation ended up preventing either side from using nuclear weapons. Global alliances were structured in a bipolar system, with smaller powers picking one side or the other, which meant fewer possible avenues for conflict. But that world came to an end when the Cold War finished. We now live in a multipolar world that is, in many ways, a more dangerous one. Former Secretaries of State Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry, and Senator Sam Nunn warned in 2011 that “the growing number of nations with nuclear arms and differing motives, aims and ambitions poses very high and unpredictable risks and increased instability.” One particularly risky and region right now is East Asia, where competing territorial claims and an unpredictable North Korea threaten to flare into conflict. If Japan, which is revising its pacifist post-World War II foreign policy toward a more assertive one, or South Korea, where there is broad popular support for weaponization, go nuclear, the chances grow for a regional arms race—and for nuclear war. One possibility, as Mark Fitzpatrick of the International Institute for Strategic Studies noted: “North Korea might be tempted to launch a preemptive attack at a time when the U.S. defense commitment [to South Korea] might no longer apply.” But even “short of this worst-case scenario, rather than negotiate disarmament, North Korea more likely would claim the South’s actions as a justification for stepping up its own nuclear program.” These are by no means the only risks. There is, for example, the risk of an accidental firing or a rogue officer deciding that he or she wants to launch a nuclear weapon. There is the risk of “loose nukes” falling into the wrong hands, and the risk that individual scientists will be willing to transfer nuclear technology to the highest bidder, as Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan did in selling nuclear technology to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. When the nuclear bomb was first being developed, Secretary of War Henry Stimson offered a poignant warning about how devastating the weapon would be. He told President Henry Truman that “such a weapon may be constructed in secret and used suddenly and effectively with devastating power by a willful nation or group against an unsuspecting nation or group of much greater size and material power.” Today, America’s “greater size and material power” can’t necessarily stop a nuclear strike, particularly if the materials fall into the hands of terrorists.

# UNIQUENESS

### 2NC --- UQ Wall

#### \*\*\*NATO is unified from the Concept and has bolstered its deterrence and collective defense --- *CONTINUED* implementation is CRITICAL to prevent Ukraine spill-over

Kochis 7/5/22

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Now that the summit is over and the dust has begun to settle, it’s possible to say that, by and large, the summit delivered. President Biden and the other NATO leaders came together to take many, though not all, of the steps necessary to stand up to Russian President Vladimir Putin. The transatlantic community, including the United States, will be stronger and more secure as a result. There was remarkable unity, capped by Turkey dropping its de facto veto of Finnish and Swedish NATO accession with the surprise signing of the trilateral memorandum that led to an invitation to the two Scandinavian countries to join the alliance. In the leadup to the summit, despite feverish efforts by the NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and others, it seemed likely that Turkish President Erdogan’s objections to Finnish and Swedish membership would cast a pall over the gathering, and hand the Russian’s a huge propaganda victory. That, however, was not to be. Thanks to some likely carrots offered by the U.S. to Turkey, Finland and Sweden are now poised to become the 31st and 32nd NATO members. While far from official, the likelihood of Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO is a cause for celebration especially since their joining the alliance had only been a remote possibility just a few months ago. At the summit, NATO also adopted a new Strategic Concept, a document that details the alliance’s key purpose and tasks going forward and its first mission update in 12 years. The document reflects the new geostrategic reality facing the alliance, stating: The Russian Federation has violated the norms and principles that contributed to a stable and predictable European security order. We cannot discount the possibility of an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity. Strategic competition, pervasive instability and recurrent shocks define our broader security environment. This differs substantially from the treatment of Russia in the 2010 Strategic Concept, when NATO still saw the possibility for “a true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia.” The new Strategic Concept, along with the summit declaration and the statements of the allied leaders, also stress collective defense. Specifically, they all reiterate, nearly verbatim, the message of the Strategic Concept, aimed squarely at Moscow: “While NATO is a defensive Alliance, no one should doubt our strength and resolve to defend every inch of Allied territory, preserve the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all Allies and prevail against any aggressor.” The alliance also took actions to back up its words, announcing the expansion of the NATO Response Force from its current 40,000 military personnel to 300,000, as well as continued growth in prepositioned weapons and equipment stockpiles. The NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg noted of the Response Force expansion, “For the first time since the Cold War, we will have pre-assigned forces to defend specific Allies so that we can reinforce much faster if needed.” In fact, some allies have already stepped up, with Germany pledging 15,000 soldiers and the U.K. offering a Carrier Strike Group. In response to Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014, NATO created an Enhanced Forward Presence (EFP) of four multinational battalions in each of the Baltic states and Poland. These large deployments of forces at the edge of NATO’s eastern flank are intended to deter any attacks against the alliance’s most vulnerable members. This March in Brussels, following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the alliance announced the creation of four additional EFP battalions, one each stationed in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. The four new multinational battlegroups are already up and running. Moreover, NATO recently announced each EFP battlegroup would be increased to a brigade-level force; a doubling of their size to between 3,000-5,000 soldiers apiece. Some countries have already announced increases to their Enhanced Forward Presence contributions. For instance, the United Kingdom has roughly doubled its deployment to the EFP battlegroup in Estonia to over 1,600 troops. In early June, Germany announced that a further 500 troops would be stationed in Lithuania, as part of the German-led EFP battalion, increasing its footprint there to 1500 troops, up from 500 before the war began. The battlegroups have alliance-wide participation. Today, putting aside the three Baltic states that host EFP battalions to bolster their own forces, Greece, Portugal and Turkey are the only NATO members that do not contribute to an EFP battalion. What’s more, Portugal frequently contributes forces, including recently temporarily deploying troops to the NATO battlegroups in both Lithuania and Romania. On top of this and in conjunction with the summit, the U.S. announced a raft of new European deployments. These include two F-35 squadrons to be based in the U.K.; the establishment in Poland of the permanent V Corps headquarters (to provide command and control “focused on synchronizing U.S. Army, allied, and partner nation tactical formations operating in Europe”); a new rotational brigade combat team deploying to Romania; enhanced rotational deployments to the Baltics, which will include “armored, aviation, air defense, and special operations forces”; the forward stationing of an “an air defense artillery brigade headquarters, a short-range air defense battalion, a combat sustainment support battalion headquarters, and an engineer brigade headquarters” in Germany, as well as a short-range air defense battery in Italy. Meanwhile, NATO countries continue to make greater defense investments. In 2022, for instance, Slovakia will join the list of countries that spend the 2% of GDP or more on defense (there are 9 total) required of NATO members. And many more member states have pledged to reach the 2% threshold in the coming years. With this additional spending, allies are not merely padding military pensions, they’re investing in real capabilities. Indeed, all but six member states now meet the second NATO benchmark to invest 20% or more of defense expenditures in major new capabilities, 17 more than did in 2014. In Madrid, NATO also took off its rose-colored glasses regarding China, declaring in the new Strategic Concept that “The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values,” and warning, “The deepening strategic partnership between the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation and their mutually reinforcing attempts to undercut the rules-based international order run counter to our values and interests.” In the 2010 iteration, China was not even mentioned. It is perhaps then no surprise that the leaders of allies in the Pacific theater, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea participated for the first time in a NATO summit. The need to counter Russia with a united front including the engagement of allies in Asia, coupled with the rising challenge of China (now firmly on NATO’s radar) means it’s likely we will see similar participation of Asian allies in future alliance summits, probably beginning at the next meeting in 2023 in Lithuania. Much Left To Be Done Even though the Madrid summit should largely be billed as a success, how much of a success remains to be seen. Much depends on implementing the decisions just taken. For instance, will the alliance reach its goal of finding 240,000 new troops for its response force? And will it continue its progress on increasing allied defense spending? Despite significant improvements, fewer than one-third of member states are currently spending 2% of their GDP on defense. Even Finnish and Swedish accession could still be a sticky wicket. For instance, the language of the memorandum inviting the two countries to apply for membership was vague enough to allow them to join the alliance without having many actual responsibilities. This possibility is on Turkey’s mind because the ink on the agreement was barely dry before Erdogan created new caveats for the two countries, saying: “The key thing is for promises to come true,” and “we will monitor the enforcement of the elements in the memorandum and will take our steps accordingly.” Turkey’s about-face on Swedish and Finnish membership was suspiciously timed to the announcement of Biden administration support not only for the sale of F-16 upgrade kits to Turkey (which they had previously endorsed), but also the sale of new F-16 fighter jets. At the same time, while President Biden may be confident of congressional approval for the sales, it is far from assured. And on support for Ukraine, which not surprisingly was a focus of the summit, the proof will be in the pudding. Russia’s war in Ukraine shows no sign of abating, and the ability and willingness of the West to continue its essential support for Ukraine long term is not guaranteed. Domestic economic pressures, coupled with increasingly drawn down munitions and weapons stocks (as well as atrophied defense industrial bases that are necessary to backfill them), will combine to test the long-term resolve of NATO members to stand shoulder to should with Ukraine as Russia’s war there rages on. Finally, while the standing up of the four new NATO battlegroups with nearly alliance-wide participation is a big positive, the forces remain a tripwire rather than the core of an adequate defense. So far, NATO has failed to move beyond a tripwire concept in Eastern Europe and toward a force posture of deterrence with broad and, more importantly, robust participation across the alliance. In failing to do so, NATO members missed a historic opportunity and may have left room for dangerous ambiguity as to the alliance’s resolve. In Madrid, NATO successfully continued to flesh out promises made at its Brussels gathering this past spring, strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe—and in turn, making a spillover conflict from the Russian war against Ukraine less likely, an outcome squarely in U.S. national interest. Now it remains for the U.S. and its allies to fulfill the decisions made in Madrid and close down avenues of ambiguity regarding NATO resolve to stand up to aggressors and defend every inch of its territory.

#### Implementation key to ensure effective deterrence through cohesion and unity

Monaghan 6/28/22

(Sean Monaghan is a visiting fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C., “Resetting NATO’s Defense and Deterrence: The Sword and the Shield Redux,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/resetting-natos-defense-and-deterrence-sword-and-shield-redux> //um-ef)

Resetting NATO: The Sword and the Shield Redux “What we are looking for from NATO in this next phase is long-term planning for how it will contain Russia post Ukraine and provide resilience and reassurance to countries that cannot do that on their own. That could be permanent basing or it could be rapid readiness—being able to deploy quickly, instead of being stuck in a big base in one place. That is all up for development, which I think is incredibly important.” – Ben Wallace MP, UK Defence Secretary, May 19, 202268 NATO’s defense and deterrence reset will begin in Madrid when its leaders open the next chapter of their alliance with its eighth strategic concept. Like its predecessors, the concept will set the vision and basic principles that will guide NATO through this testing time.69 But the devil will be in the detail. As Britain’s defense secretary Ben Wallace stated recently, the finer points of NATO’s new strategy, such as whether it will rely on deterrence by reinforcement or through permanently forward-based forces, will require development by NATO’s military planners in the weeks and months after Madrid. What can they learn from the history of NATO’s strategic concepts? Plan against Russian “Maximum Intentions” The guidance that accompanied NATO’s first strategic concept advised that for defense planning purposes: “Precise Soviet intentions are not known and cannot be predicted with reliable accuracy. For military planning purposes, however, it is essential to consider maximum intentions and capabilities.”70 This is sound advice considering the inherent uncertainty in estimating adversary intentions and plans.71 It is also best practice for military planning.72 Moreover, in light of Russia’s current actions, NATO’s 1956 assessment of Soviet intentions and their implications are strikingly resonant today. Beyond the following highlights, the assessment is worth reading in full:73 Circumstances may develop, however, in which the Soviet leaders may harden their attitude and be prepared to take greater risks than theretofore. They have indulged in the use of threats, including the threat of war and even of nuclear attack, as blackmail to attain their ends. The Soviets are thus not likely to launch such [conventional] attacks, provided that the West maintains its defence commitments, such as the stationing of overseas troops in Western Europe, its firm purpose to defend itself, appropriate nuclear retaliatory strength and adequate conventional forces to ensure that local armed intervention by Soviet or satellite forces does not offer a prospect of easy success. However, the following possibilities of action . . . must be included among those requiring consideration: (a) General attacks against NATO. The USSR might launch general attacks with conventional weapons against NATO if the Soviet leaders estimated that the Alliance would be deterred from employing nuclear weapons . . . for example: - because of assumed Western reluctance to be the first to use nuclear weapons. - because [the West feared] it was more vulnerable than the Soviet Union to nuclear attack. - because of assumed Western division or demoralisation. (b) Local attacks against NATO. If the Soviets believe that NATO . . . were not able to defend itself against all types of limited aggression . . . [they] might initiate, instigate, support or condone such aggression. (c) Attacks against peripheral non-NATO countries. If . . . the Soviet leaders thought that a non-NATO country on the periphery of the Soviet Bloc would not or could not receive effective support of the Western powers, the Soviets might be tempted to use their preponderance in conventional forces either for armed intervention in the country in question or to exert pressure on it in order to influence it towards alignment with the Soviet camp.74 Revitalize the Sword and the Shield The second insight logically follows the first. The assessment of Soviet intentions set out above led to NATO adopting its strategy of the sword and the shield in its 1957 strategic concept—a combination of strategic nuclear forces to deter attack through the threat of massive retaliation, alongside the forward defense of NATO’s eastern front through the basing of significant forces as far east as possible.75 If NATO’s assessment of Russia today is anywhere close to that made by NATO’s planners of the Soviet Union then, the option of revitalizing this strategy must be on the table. Several questions for NATO defense planners flow from this insight. For example: What force posture—in terms of location, scale, and capabilities—is required to meet the basic aim of shield forces: “To make it credible to a potential aggressor that he will have to contend with an immediate and effective response by NATO?”76 What is the optimum balance between the sword and the shield, or deterrence by punishment versus denial?77 How can shield forces and NATO members in Eastern Europe best support NATO’s strategic nuclear forces? What is the utility of a revitalized “flexible response” or “graduated deterrence” doctrine for deterring a range of Russian aggression? What levels of response should this doctrine consist of?78 To what extent should out-of-area operations drive NATO defense planning?79 Modernize the Sword and the Shield The third insight builds on the second: if NATO revitalizes its sword and shield, both must meet the demands of the contemporary strategic and operational context. Further defense planning questions stem from the need to modernize NATO’s sword and shield. For example: Are NATO’s strategic nuclear forces resilient to threats from emerging technologies?80 What opportunities do emerging technologies present for enhancing the capability—and therefore deterrent effect—of shield forces?81 What is the contribution of “total defense” (through national and whole-of-society resilience and civil preparedness) to the aim of deterring conventional and hybrid aggression by denial?82 How does assistance to non-NATO partner nations support deterrence?83 Final Word: Political Cohesion and Military Strength NATO is the world’s largest, most powerful, most successful, and preeminent military alliance of nations. One reason for its longevity is continuous adaptation. The main mechanism for this process has been the alliance’s most important document: its strategic concept. NATO’s new concept will guide its latest evolution as the alliance resets to deal with a situation it has never faced in its history: a full-scale land war in Europe. Yet resetting NATO’s defense and deterrence posture is not simply a military-strategic matter. It is above all a political one, requiring unity and solidarity. In facing this crucial task, the allies of NATO must recall one of the basic principles from its founding strategic concept, taken from the North Atlantic Treaty itself: “They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation of peace and security.” Or, in the words of NATO secretary general Joseph Luns from 1976, which resonate today: “our efforts can only succeed if they are based on political cohesion and on military strength of a scale sufficient to resist military or political pressures. Then we shall be able to face with confidence the constant challenges which we must expect to be our lot over the months and years ahead.”84

#### Concept shifted AWAY from non-deterrence issues --- the alliance is focused on deterrence and defense and supporting Ukraine militarily

Gotkowska et al 7/5/22

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NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the Madrid summit defines Russia as the most significant and direct threat to allied security and does not rule out the possibility of an attack against any of the Allies. NATO intends to strengthen its deterrence and defence posture, but there will be no revolutionary change in its military presence on the eastern flank. The compromise reached at the summit implies there will be limited reinforcements of the existing battlegroups and a pre-assignment of forces stationed primarily in Western Europe. Additionally, NATO will develop a new Force Model by increasing the pool of higher readiness forces fitted into defence planning and subordinated to SACEUR. This may prove to be a much more far-reaching decision for the future of the allied deterrence and defence posture but it remains to be seen how it will be implemented in practice. Nor will changes be seen in the US military presence on the eastern flank from rotational to permanent – with the minor exception of the V Corps Headquarters Forward Command Post. Washington will, though, place a second rotational brigade in the Black Sea region. Overall, the security of the eastern flank will be strengthened in the coming years, but not to the extent expected by those NATO members bordering Russia. Redefining the threats and challenges The Madrid summit will above all be remembered for the adoption of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, which defines what kind of organisation it is to become. Collective defence will remain its core mission, with three associated core tasks: deterrence and defence, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. The approach to these tasks is different than twelve years ago and linked with the need to strengthen individual and collective resilience and to enhance the technological edge which NATO has over its adversaries. The document also emphasises the importance of the transatlantic bond and NATO’s role as a forum for consultations and coordination – thus fulfilling various demands of the Allies. The strategic environment is defined very differently in the new Concept. The Euro-Atlantic area is not at peace and an attack against Allies’ sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be ruled out. The Russian Federation is defined as the most significant direct threat to the security of NATO members, and its military build-up and military integration with Belarus are seen as a challenge to NATO security. This is a significant change from the 2010 Strategic Concept, which referred to NATO’s wish to develop a strategic partnership with Russia. The current document mentions neither the NATO-Russia Council nor the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, intended to be the basis for developing cooperation and strengthening stability in Europe in part through restrictions on the permanent stationing of substantial NATO combat forces in the new member states. There is no consensus within NATO to officially denounce the Founding Act, but there is agreement to avoid adherence to the constraints which arise from it due to the changed security situation. Some members still want to keep open the possibility of returning to the Act as a basis for future relations with Russia. Any change in NATO’s relationship with Moscow, however, will be dependent on Russia halting its aggressive behaviour and fully complying with international law. At present, the response to hostile Russian actions is to strengthen deterrence and defence as well as resilience. At the same time, NATO seeks stability and predictability and will want to maintain channels of communication to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency with Russia. Although Russia is defined as the main threat in the document, due to the 360-degree approach and indivisibility of allied security, NATO wants to take into account all threats coming from all directions. Therefore, terrorism is described as the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of NATO’s citizens and international peace. Conflicts and instability in Africa and the Middle East are also perceived as a challenge. For the first time in history, NATO’s Strategic Concept mentions China, whose ambitions and policies challenge NATO’s interests, security and values. It is worth noting that the strengthening of the strategic partnership between China and Russia and their attempts to undercut the rules-based international order is at odds with NATO’s interests. Other challenges mentioned in the document include cyber-attacks, emerging and disruptive technologies developed by adversaries, the erosion of arms control, the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and climate change. A remake of the deterrence and defence posture NATO’s three core tasks have been redefined by three factors: the Russian invasion of Ukraine; the move away from large-scale out-of-area operations sealed with the withdrawal from Afghanistan; and the rivalry with China. The priority is deterrence and defence, with the goal of denying any potential adversary opportunities for aggression. NATO is to develop forces, capabilities, plans and infrastructure to deter and defend, including for high-intensity warfighting against nuclear-armed peer-competitors. The new Strategic Concept places greater emphasis on the role of nuclear deterrence in NATO’s strategy than the 2010 document. With regard to conventional deterrence, however, there will be no revolutionary changes when it comes to the deployment of forces on NATO’s eastern flank and no shift from a forward presence to forward defence, which Poland and the Baltic states favoured and which would bring a significant increase in the allied presence. There are several reasons for this – the diagnosis of Russia’s relative military weakness and the conviction of some NATO members that Moscow is not able to take aggressive actions against NATO after the invasion of Ukraine.; the reluctance of the largest member states to engage significant forces in the region on a permanent basis, as they want to retain flexibility to operate in other theatres; and the lack of political will among some members for significant and rapid investments in a military build-up. For these reasons, a compromise was developed that consists of limited reinforcements of existing NATO battlegroups on the eastern flank and pre-assigned combat-ready forces there if necessary, (without stationing them there). In total, these combined forces will reach brigade-size units (3,000–5,000 troops) in the Baltic states and Romania. This is to be complemented by the prepositioning of ammunition and equipment, improved military mobility, investments in military infrastructure, intensified training and exercises, strengthened NATO Command and Force Structure, a faster decision-making process and a new generation of military plans. The lack of significant changes in the deployment of NATO forces will be offset by the implementation of the new NATO Force Model. This is briefly mentioned in the Madrid summit declaration, but without entering into detail.[1] According to Jens Stoltenberg, NATO will increase the size of its higher readiness forces from the current 40,000 within the NATO Response Force (NRF) to over 300,000 troops in the new Force Model.[2] These forces will be pre-assigned to specific NATO defence plans, will have specific tasks and areas of responsibility and will be subordinated to SACEUR. They will have an increased level of readiness of up to ten days (100,000 troops), around 10–30 days (200,000 troops) and up to 30–180 days (500,000 troops).[3] The plans for the new NATO Force Model are to be completed next year.[4] The first country to publicly declare units for the new Force Model was Germany. Berlin wants to assign 15,000 troops, including an armoured division with two brigades, 65 combat and transport aircraft, 20 warships and special forces units.[5] The UK has also announced the assignment of one brigade, an unspecified number of multi-role aircraft and warships, including an aircraft carrier.[6] While crisis management was an important task in the 2010 Strategic Concept, NATO has far less ambition in this area now. It wants primarily to prevent conflicts and to engage less in managing them. It will continue to maintain capabilities to conduct crisis management operations, but will rather focus on supporting its partners in building their military and civilian crisis response capacity. Similarly, the 2022 Strategic Concept is much less focused on cooperative security, which was a top priority in 2010. NATO wanted then to concentrate on arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, on an open-door policy and partnerships, including with Russia. Nowadays, NATO underlines the importance of enlargement policy, mainly in connection with the planned accession of Finland and Sweden. Before the Madrid summit, it was not entirely clear whether Turkey would lift its objections to them joining NATO. In the end, the three countries signed a trilateral memorandum on, among other issues, countering terrorism, which opened the way for both countries to be invited to join NATO, to sign the accession protocols and for NATO members to ratify those documents. The memorandum does not however spell out how long Turkey will take to ratify the process, and it retains the possibility to prolong or block it.[7] In 2022 the development of relations with partner countries is also important for NATO. Relations with the Western Balkan and Black Sea countries are considered as crucial – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia and Ukraine were explicitly mentioned. NATO will continue to support Ukraine cautiously, sticking to the consensus that sending military aid is the responsibility of member states and is coordinated outside NATO. Nonetheless members have agreed to an updated comprehensive assistance package to Ukraine that includes the supply of secure communications, fuel, medical assistance, protective equipment and portable anti-drone systems. In the long term, NATO also wants to support Ukraine in the transition from Soviet-era military equipment to modern Western weapons systems but with regard to technical support rather than arms supplies. In second place, the Middle East, North Africa, the Sahel, and the Indo-Pacific region were mentioned in the Strategic Concept. Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea were invited to the NATO summit for the first time.

### 2NC --- UQ --- Cohesion/Focus Now

#### The new Strategic Concept breeds cohesion and refocuses on Russia and China. There is no mention of AI and biotech, and the approach to cyber and space are uncontroversial nods about “norms” not security cooperation.

William Alberque 6-30-2022. Director of Strategy, Technology, and Arms Control at the IISS. "The new NATO Strategic Concept and the end of arms control". The International Institute for Strategic Studies. https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2022/06/the-new-nato-strategic-concept-and-the-end-of-arms-control. DL

The NATO 2022 Strategic Concept significantly downgrades the focus on arms control as the principle tool for managing conflict and arms races in favour of risk reduction, conflict management and confidence-building measures – compared to the last Strategic Concept released back in 2010. This was to be expected in an era when the concept of negotiating with Russia on any topic remains out of bounds. The Russia and China policies expressed in the new Strategic Concept are also important and break with past policies in several key areas. The fact that the Strategic Concept mentions China at all is notable because NATO documents very rarely do so. And it uses Cold War-style language regarding Russia that is stronger than that which has been used in any of the post-Cold War strategic concepts (in 1991, 1999 or 2010).

More specifically, the new Strategic Concept describes Russia as a ‘direct threat’, which is the strongest use of language to describe Russia since 1991. The 1991 Strategic Concept (the first to be issued publicly by NATO) hailed cooperation with the Soviet Union in the context of breakthroughs in arms control with the United States and Europe. However, quite presciently, it also said that potential future malign changes in Soviet forces were ‘a factor of which the Alliance has to take account’. The 2022 Strategic Concept lays out a new Russia policy, stating that ‘[t]he Russian Federation is the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.’ Russia had been NATO’s strategic ‘partner’ in the previous Strategic Concept, and this is a clear statement that it has become a threat.

The 2022 Strategic Concept is also the first NATO strategic document to mention China. The 2019 London Summit Communiqué was the first mention of China in any NATO-agreed public statement since December 1965. The Strategic Concept states in paragraph 13 that China’s ‘stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values’, which is consistent with language in the 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué.

The Strategic Concept also discusses risk reduction and transparency as potentially useful ways to approach arms control with both Russia and China. Regarding Russia, it states that ‘NATO does not seek confrontation and poses no threat to the Russian Federation’ (par. 9). Therefore, NATO will ‘remain willing to keep open channels of communication with Moscow to manage and mitigate risks, prevent escalation and increase transparency. We seek stability and predictability in the Euro-Atlantic area and between NATO and the Russian Federation.’ Meanwhile, regarding China, it asserts that NATO will ‘remain open to constructive engagement with the PRC, including to build reciprocal transparency, with a view to safeguarding the Alliance’s security interests’.

The Strategic Concept discusses the problems facing the current instruments of the global arms-control and non-proliferation regime, but it does not offer much in the way of solutions. Paragraph 18 is very specific in describing the problems:

The erosion of the arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation architecture has negatively impacted strategic stability. The Russian Federation’s violations and selective implementation of its arms control obligations and commitments have contributed to the deterioration of the broader security landscape. The potential use of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear materials or weapons against NATO by hostile state and non-state actors remains a threat to our security. Iran and North Korea continue to develop their nuclear and missile programmes. Syria, North Korea and the Russian Federation, along with non-state actors, have resorted to the use of chemical weapons. The PRC is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal and is developing increasingly sophisticated delivery systems, without increasing transparency or engaging in good faith in arms control or risk reduction.

However, it is not until later in the document that the Allies describe their views about the future of arms control. The document turns first to strategic stability, falling back on the definition of arms control provided by the 1967 Harmel Report: deterrence and defence must come first and then, on that basis, arms control. It is interesting to note that this specific description of strategic stability does not specify that it applies only to Russia, and it was also not placed, as in previous documents, in the context of NATO-Russia or US-Russia arms control. Therefore, by inference, NATO’s approach to strategic stability can apply to China: ‘Strategic stability, delivered through effective deterrence and defence, arms control and disarmament, and meaningful and reciprocal political dialogue remains essential to our security’ (par. 32).

Then, in the same paragraph, the Strategic Concept continues by discussing the Alliance’s traditional approach to arms control (to which I am proud to have contributed when I was a staff member at NATO):

Arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation strongly contribute to the Alliance’s objectives. Allies’ efforts on arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation aim to reduce risk and enhance security, transparency, verification, and compliance[.]… We will make use of NATO as a platform for in-depth discussion and close consultations on arms control efforts.

Paragraph 32 also contains new, unexpected language that engages with issues of crisis management and crisis prevention instead of arms control as a focus for practical work ahead:

We will pursue all elements of strategic risk reduction, including promoting confidence building and predictability through dialogue, increasing understanding, and establishing effective crisis management and prevention tools. These efforts will take the prevailing security environment and the security of all Allies into account and complement the Alliance’s deterrence and defence posture.

The unexpected element here is that it signals a new concept of operations for NATO on how to pursue ‘arms control’ in an era when there are no recognisable arms-control agreements or proposals on the table. By focusing on action related to tools from the broader security toolbox, such as strategic risk reduction, dialogue, responsible behaviours and crisis management and prevention, NATO is opening the aperture quite wide on the ways to pursue the key aim of arms control – preventing unintentional conflict – while at the same time strengthening Allied deterrence and defence. The last sentence in the passage cited just above is key to understanding how little appetite NATO has for chasing grand ideas in arms control with Russia today and for the foreseeable future.

The section of the Strategic Concept discussing arms control ends by referencing the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). There is no notable departure from the language used in previous strategic concepts and, importantly, there is no mention of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (the Nuclear Ban Treaty), which seems quite wise (given the Allies’ well-known opposition to the treaty and their persistent status as objectors):

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is the essential bulwark against the spread of nuclear weapons, and NATO remains strongly committed to its full implementation, including Article VI. NATO’s goal is to create the security environment for a world without nuclear weapons, consistent with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Lastly, the new Strategic Concept endorsed an approach towards arms control in outer space and cyberspace that focuses on responsible behaviour (par. 25), which is a nod to the ongoing work at the United Nations (inspired by the UK government) on reducing space threats through norms, rules and principles:

We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space.

The 2022 Strategic Concept and its perspective on arms control is clearly in line with the new direction taken by NATO member countries beginning at the 2014 NATO Summit in Wales, held in the wake of the war launched by Russia against Ukraine in February of that year and its annexation of Crimea. Arms-control optimism is now gone; pessimism has set in; Russia is a threat; China is a challenge; and risk reduction and crisis prevention are the preferred tools, alongside deterrence and defence, for safeguarding the Alliance.

#### Cohesion now. Strategic Concept and Turkey.

Atlantic Council 7-1-2022. Non-profit, non-partisan think tank in the field of international affairs. "Experts react: What the NATO summit breakthrough means for Turkey and the Alliance". https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/experts-react-what-the-nato-summit-breakthrough-means-for-turkey-and-the-alliance/. DL

This week at their Madrid summit, NATO allies formally invited Finland and Sweden to join the Alliance. It was the latest step in a whirlwind process initiated by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and delayed by Turkey—home to the second-largest military in the Alliance, after the United States—which argued that the Nordic countries did not sufficiently address Turkey’s national-security concerns. After weeks of tough negotiations, Turkey, Finland, and Sweden agreed to a breakthrough trilateral declaration on Tuesday.

Atlantic Council IN TURKEY asked experts for their take on the implications of the summit and the trilateral declaration.

A victory for NATO unity and cohesion

The ongoing Russian aggression in Ukraine since 2014 has entirely changed the security landscape, not only in the Euro-Atlantic area, but globally. It has fundamentally altered threat perceptions beyond the Alliance, leading Finland and Sweden to officially apply for membership in NATO. These two countries have indeed crossed the Rubicon and deserted their neutrality in response to persistent Russian belligerence in the middle of Europe. Their decision to combine their efforts and assets with the Alliance against Russian aggression is natural and legitimate. Hence the need to incorporate Finland and Sweden into the Alliance family.

The trilateral memorandum signed among Turkey, Finland, and Sweden on June 28 is a welcome development designed to demonstrate NATO’s solidarity and unity, and further strengthen the Alliance.

It is commonplace in NATO to consult on and negotiate over any dispute among allies and would-be allies to find a common ground. That is how NATO plays its role, and at the end a solution accommodating such concerns is found by consensus.

It is also true that once new members accede to NATO, they are bound by the decisions previously taken by the Alliance on a wide range of subjects. In NATO there exists a robust set of decisions and practices in fighting terrorism, beginning with the intervention in Afghanistan. Therefore, there is already an agreement comprising all sorts of conceptual work and practices in different geographical theaters on combatting terrorism, developed within NATO and binding on all members.

The newly adopted Strategic Concept (SC) clearly identifies Russia and “terrorism, in all its forms and manifestations” as the primary sources of threats in a 360-degree manner and across all three core tasks of NATO: collective deterrence and defense, crisis prevention and management, and cooperative security. Given that terrorism is “the most direct asymmetric threat to the security of our citizens and to international peace and prosperity,” as defined in the SC, it makes sense both for Finland and Sweden to cooperate with Turkey in combatting terrorism as one of the primary sources of threats against Alliance interests.

In a nutshell, collective deterrence and defense against actual and potential adversaries, nipping crises in the bud, and expanding the web of networks with partners under challenging circumstances are the main tasks of NATO in the next decade.

The main center of gravity for NATO is its solidarity, unity, and cohesion, including all allies and those set to become allies.

The summit decisions in their entirety will help NATO to navigate the troubled waters ahead over the long term.

### 1NR --- UQ --- Focus on Russia/China

#### Focus on China and Russia.

DomÈNec Ruiz 7-5-2022. member of the European Parliament. "It’s time for a sweeping transformation of the alliance". POLITICO. https://www.politico.eu/article/time-sweeping-transformation-alliance-nato/. DL

Offering a convincing blueprint for the kind of sweeping transformation NATO will have to go through to address the return of great power competition, the alliance’s freshly agreed new Strategic Concept is the product of inevitable compromise. However, the document adopted at last week’s Madrid Summit also stands out for its comprehensiveness and balance — as well as its ambition.

And yet, on its own, it‘s still not enough.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing war in Ukraine, NATO’s original task of collective defense is now — unsurprisingly — front and center once more, with the alliance planning to step up its high-readiness forces from 40,000 to over 300,000 by 2023.

In addition, transatlantic leaders also smartly avoided a mere back-to-basics approach, reinterpreting the other two core tasks introduced by the 2010 Strategic Concept — crisis management and cooperative security — in order to meet the changed realities of today’s contested international environment.

As a result, cooperative security, which in the previous strategic document had been closely linked to a “reset” in the relationship with Moscow, is now geared toward leveraging NATO partnerships to counter Russia as “the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security,” in addition to China.

Indeed, for the first time, the Strategic Concept now spells out how NATO can contribute to dealing with an increasingly assertive and militarily capable China — a subject that made it into the alliance’s internal discussions just a few years ago — as Beijing’s military and technological advances will require staying vigilant.

#### Deterrence and collective defense-focus now

Simón & Arteaga '22

(Luis Simón Director of the Research Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) & Félix Arteaga, Research Professor in International Security at the Brussels School of Governance, 1/17/22, "NATO gets an update: the Madrid Strategic Concept"; Real Instituto Elcano; https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/nato-gets-an-update-the-madrid-strategic-concept/)

Deterrence and defence NATO endorsed its posture of deterrence and defence after the ratification of the Lisbon Strategic Concept as a means of having a combination of capabilities appropriate to a range of possible scenarios.[7] In the absence of a specific adversary, the capabilities to be established could only be generic, but the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014 and its burgeoning hostility forced the Alliance’s military posture to be redefined. NATO had to deploy forces on its Eastern border to reassure the allies and strengthen its capacity for deterrence. The Russian aggression forced the natural procedure to be inverted and, since 2014, NATO has had to adapt its deterrence and defence posture to the new situation without waiting for the formal review of the Lisbon Strategic Concept. It began by strengthening its reassurance and adaptation measures on its eastern flank (its Readiness Action Plan) in 2014,[8] followed by a review of its military strategy (MC 400/4) in 2019, the adaptation of its defence and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic region (Defence and Deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic Area, DDA) in 2020 and NATO’s fundamental concept of combat (NATO Warfighting Capstone Concept, NWCC) in 2021.[9] In recent years NATO’s military authorities have thus been establishing the doctrine, goals and capabilities needed to confront the Russian threat before the political concept that will require them is approved. The new military developments are not known in detail given their confidential nature, but amid a specific threat such as Russia’s they will have been tailor-made to address it, and therefore will be less reactive than those envisaged in the current Strategic Concept, which are restricted to awaiting an armed attack before responding. The new military strategy will need to address the new forms of confrontation in all domains (land, sea, air, outer space and cyberspace) and in their conventional and non-conventional forms (hybrid war), a more proactive and anticipatory shift in focus that now requires a political justification. As matters stand, the necessity now arises of reconciling the political component of the Madrid Strategic Concept with the military strategy already adopted, which could present problems if one or several allies disagree with the new terms of military planning. Spain has contributed and will continue to contribute to collective deterrence on NATO’s eastern borders, meaning that it will not be difficult to adapt itself to the new deterrence and defence guidelines from a military point of view. It may be more difficult to acknowledge the Russian Federation as a threat and to act accordingly from the political perspective, because Spanish strategic culture is reluctant to put a name to threats to national security and because adopting the necessary measures would incur major political and economic costs. Russia, China and strategic competition The North Atlantic Council described Russia’s aggressive conduct as a ‘threat’ at its June 2021 meeting in Brussels,[10] together with terrorism and other asymmetrical threats such as hybrid threats, disinformation and cyberattacks. Numerous acts jeopardising Euro-Atlantic security were listed and laid at Russia’s door, and consequently Russia is going to provide the adversary that the Alliance lacked in the Lisbon Strategic Concept. With China, the Council’s communiqué was more cautious: the country was described as a ‘systemic challenge’ to the international order and it was called upon to behave more responsibly within this order. However, while the NATO 2030 report drawn up by a group of experts did not deem China a ‘military threat’ like Russia, it placed it on an equal footing in terms of threat to the security of the Alliance. The allies, including Spain, will need to endorse the characterisations in the Madrid Strategic Concept and the respective measures to reverse these types of behaviour. The measures to be taken against the Russian threat already seem to be defined in the new allied strategy, but it remains to be seen what measures are adopted against China. The allies are faced with the dilemma of how to address the geopolitical rivalry between China and the US and to take preventative measures to deter and defend their security interests against Chinese power in the European region, the scope of its global capabilities and, above all, the application of its disruptive technologies to erode NATO’s military superiority.[11] In this context, the NATO 2030 report warns about China’s strategy of civil-military fusion, whereby Beijing seeks to acquire the intellectual copyright and advances of European and Western research centres and companies with the goal of boosting its own military development. All the foregoing presents the Madrid Strategic Concept with the need to use a public language of diplomacy that explains the reasons and consequences of returning to a strategy of deterrence and containment. This constitutes a significant communication effort because the allies and their citizens have become accustomed over the course of various decades to prioritise crisis management to the detriment of collective defence and deterrence. It was a habit they hurriedly had to abandon in 2014 after the Russian annexation of Crimea and required halting the freefall in military spending and committing to investing 2% of GDP by 2024 (NATO Defence Investment Pledge). Spain is not one of the allies most affected by geographical proximity to Russia or the Asia-Pacific, but it must share its allies’ concern about the growing physical presence of these countries in its space of strategic interest in the Mediterranean and Africa and about the virtual reach of their hybrid capabilities to destabilise national security. The tendency of Spanish strategic culture is inclined to prioritise détente over deterrence, but it will have to revise this inclination if the Madrid Strategic Concept incorporates binding containment measures against the Russian and Chinese threats. The Alliance’s functions NATO has three fundamental functions: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security, with none of these taking precedence. The Madrid Strategic Concept will have to address the situation on NATO’s eastern flank and experiences such as Afghanistan so as to prioritise collective defence against the Russian threat, to the detriment of its functions of crisis management and cooperative security. As well as priorities, the allies will have to weigh whether to add new functions to the traditional list, and candidates such as resilience, cybersecurity, pandemics and technological disruption, among others, are all under consideration. Prior to the Lisbon Strategic Concept, the usefulness of crisis management operations –referred to variously as international, humanitarian or, in Spanish terminology, peace-keeping missions– was being called into question. It was agreed in Lisbon to halt combat missions in Afghanistan in 2014 and promote the construction of local capabilities as a way of avoiding new interventions within the function of cooperative security. The outcome of operations in Libya and Afghanistan had the effect of discrediting the crisis management function, at least whenever it involves mass troop deployments on the ground, and the Madrid Strategic Concept should reduce its priority compared to deterrence, which is necessary against the Russian threat, and cooperative security, which is necessary in order to strengthen local partnerships.

### 1NR --- AT: Uniqueness Overwhelms

#### It’s the dawn of the alliance, but unity is not guaranteed. We must maintain it to preserve spending.

Alexander Brotman 7-5-2022. political risk and intelligence analyst with a focus on EU politics and security developments. "Opinion – The NATO Madrid Summit and the Alliance’s New Dawn". E-International Relations. https://www.e-ir.info/2022/07/05/opinion-the-nato-madrid-summit-and-the-alliances-new-dawn/. DL

After years of its relevance being questioned by former President Trump and even being described as ‘brain-dead’ by French President Macron, NATO is meeting at Madrid at a time of renewed strength and invigoration of the alliance. The past few months have witnessed significant alliance cohesion in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, with two new states, Sweden, and Finland, set to join after Turkey has lifted its opposition. NATO’s cause for existence has never seemed clearer, yet serious rifts remain, and the unity of the alliance is not guaranteed as the war in Ukraine goes on and domestic pressures across member states increase. Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has led NATO closer to Russia’s borders, not further away, and more troops will be permanently stationed on NATO’s eastern flank, including a new permanent U.S. base in Poland. For Putin, this is undoubtedly the opposite effect of what he intended, however Ukraine is no closer to joining NATO and the prospect of a prolonged conflict in its disputed territories will likely stall Kyiv’s accession for the foreseeable future.

As NATO members meet in Madrid, there are two main challenges that alliance members will have to contend with. The first is continued isolationism and retrenchment in the U.S. amongst both Democrat and Republican lawmakers, including former President Trump. Washington is increasingly keen to pivot its resources to the Indo-Pacific and its strategic competition with China. As such, the U.S. is eager to see European member states spend more on their own defence to be able to rapidly respond to their security threats should U.S. leadership be absent or directed elsewhere. Defence spending amongst alliance members is increasing, and while Germany’s Zeitenwende or ‘turning point’ marks a notable shift in German defence policy, there is the risk of it being a cosmetic rather than a practical watershed, with tangible results likely years away. Support for an increase in German defence spending remains stubbornly low, with notable resistance coming from Chancellor Scholz’s own Social Democrats as well as other coalition members.

In addition, the cost-of-living crisis, economic, and energy security factors are likely to test European member states’ support for Ukraine as the autumn and winter loom. This has already divided NATO member states between those who wish to see a full Russian withdrawal and for Ukraine to regain control of the entirety of its territory, versus those who think Kyiv should accept a peace settlement with Russia to avert further bloodshed and economic pain in Europe. Poland, the Baltic states, the US, and the UK fall into the first camp, whilst France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, and several others fall into the second. The alliance may now be formally united in recognizing the scale of the threat from Russia, but it is not united as to the degree that that threat should trump individual member states’ economic and security needs. ‘Ukraine fatigue’ is already setting in and it looks likely to increase as the months drag on, something that Moscow is all too eager to exploit.

For NATO, the past few months leading to the Madrid summit has also been a wake-up call as to the real source of Moscow’s antagonism. The 2022 Strategic Concept rightly identifies Russia as ‘the most significant and direct threat to Allies’ security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.’ It is a bold statement after years of cohabitation and cooperation with Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, when NATO membership remained on the table for Moscow as it charted its new course. Russia under Vladimir Putin has long railed against NATO enlargement and seen it as a threat to Russia’s security interests at its periphery. However, the invasion of Ukraine is about much more than NATO enlargement and Western influence. Rather, NATO is the easy scapegoat and object of Moscow’s ire to help distract from Putin’s neo-imperial ambitions that are less a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and more a result of the waning days of the Russian Empire. Catherine the Great, rather than any Soviet era leader, is the model in Putin’s quest to restore long-lost Russian territory and glory, making NATO’s aims and strategic outlook look fundamentally modern and fit for the 21st century in comparison. Putin is focused on the past while NATO is focused on the present and the future, something that wasn’t clear at the start of this year, but which has now been presented in stark terms because of Russia’s war of aggression.

Whilst Russia is the most immediate threat to NATO member states, given its geographical position, for NATO to remain forward-looking and relevant China has come to occupy a more prominent spot on the list of threats. This is so as Russia is no longer a superpower but a declining power capable of inflicting great harm upon its neighbours, yet posing no immediate threat to the structure of the global order. A heavily sanctioned Russia under Putin will exist as a pariah state for some time, while China will continue to threaten its neighbours in the South China Sea, all while increasing its economic and security influence from Eurasia to Central Europe and even Latin America. China has the bandwidth and political will to create new threats and challenge the global order, whilst Russia can act as a spoiler to the global order without having the capacity to present meaningful alternative alliances or systems of governance. Russia has retained its allies in the BRICs grouping of nations, but it will always be the junior partner to China, which has significant leverage in crafting the course of its relations with Moscow.

The Madrid Summit also marks a major turning point for NATO and transatlantic relations in (a) the post-Cold War, (b) post-9/11 and (c) post-Afghan War eras. The alliance is adapting to new threats and challenges whilst expanding its membership, all while recommitting resources to its original strategic adversary. It is easy to conclude that NATO has the upper hand and Moscow will fade into irrelevance, it’s actions in Ukraine proving that it should have no place at the table of respectable nations. However, NATO’s continued strength and unity is far from assured, and it will be important for European leaders not to become complacent. At the beginning of 2022, few would have predicted that NATO would be in the position it is today. A moment of crisis can unexpectedly galvanise an alliance of 30 very different member states stretching across three continents and with distinct histories. However, it can also reveal where true interests and values lie, and where the fissures that will inevitably outlast the current crisis are located and threaten the alliance’s response to the next challenge once the platitudes and commitments made in Madrid are long past. For now, however, Madrid is its own form of ‘Zeitenwende’, an unexpected but welcome watershed moment that demands bold and inspiring action amidst political upheaval.

### 1NR --- Resolve key/At Risk

#### Resolve and unity are up post the concept --- but CONTINUED resolve is CRITICAL for effective deterrence

Graham 6/30/22

(Thomas, PhD in political science from Harvard University, distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is a cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University and sits on its faculty steering committee. He is also a research fellow at the MacMillan Center at Yale, Foreign Service officer for fourteen years. His assignments included two tours of duty at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow in the late Soviet period and in the middle of the 1990’s during which he served as head of the political internal unit and acting political counselor, “Did the summit reveal a newfound sense of NATO unity?” pg online @ <https://www.cfr.org/in-brief/nato-countries-signal-resolve-summit-what-does-it-mean-russia> //um-ef)

The summit was an impressive show of resolve to counter Russia’s aggression, including through continued diplomatic, economic, and military support for Ukraine. NATO pledged to further expand its military support for its vulnerable allies along the Russian frontier. In particular, the United States announced that it will establish a permanent headquarters for its V Corps in Poland. Most important was the eleventh-hour agreement that Turkey reached with Finland and Sweden, by which Ankara lifted its objections to their joining the alliance and allowed NATO to begin the accession process.

However, challenges remain. Burden-sharing is a perennial issue: Even after Russia’s assault on Ukraine, the majority of members fall short of their commitment to spend at least 2 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. The laggards include, most importantly, Germany, although it has taken steps recently to meet that target as a multiyear average. Moreover, in the weeks ahead, the alliance’s resolve will be tested, as strains over rising inflation and concerns over energy and food supply mount across the Euro-Atlantic region. In recent weeks, France, Germany, and Italy have expressed interest in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict, which would likely leave some seized Ukrainian territory in Russian hands. That position is vehemently opposed by Poland and the Baltic states, among others. Though those differences were pushed into the background during this summit, they have not gone away.

### 1NR --- AT: DIANA/Innovation Fund

#### The result has been investment in the private sector, not NATO security cooperation.

NATO 6-30-2022. "NATO launches Innovation Fund". https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news\_197494.htm. DL

The Fund will invest 1 billion euros in early-stage start-ups and other venture capital funds developing dual-use emerging technologies of priority to NATO. These include: artificial intelligence; big-data processing; quantum-enabled technologies; autonomy; biotechnology and human enhancement; novel materials; energy; propulsion and space.

The Fund will complement NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic – or DIANA – which will support the development and adaptation of dual-use emerging technologies to critical security and defence challenges. There has also been significant progress for DIANA at the 2022 Madrid Summit where Allies agreed that innovators participating in DIANA’s programs will have access to a network of more than 9 Accelerator Sites and more than 63 Test Centres across Europe and North America. \\\

# LINKS

## General Links

### 2NC --- Link Wall

#### A --- OVERSTRETCH and MISSION CREEP

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

(Lt. Col. Aaron Bazin, doctorate in psychology, specializing in mediation and conflict resolution. He has over twenty years of experience including service with NATO and the U.S. Army Central Command, and operation deployments to Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. He previously published “Winning Trust under Fire” in the January-February 2015 issue of Military Review.PsyD, U.S. Army Dominika Kunertova, PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Université de Montréal, Quebec, Canada. She holds a BA in political science from Comenius University, Bratislava, Slovakia, and an MA in international relations from Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic. Her research focuses on transatlantic security and defense cooperation, and she has published in the Journal of Transatlantic Studies and European Security. “An Alliance Divided?,” pg online @ <https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/January-February-2018/An-Alliance-Divided-Five-Factors-That-Could-Fracture-NATO/> //um-ef)

External risks. The participants found it questionable whether allies will be able to find a common conventional threat that would be perceived as strong enough to “transcend the domestic pressures and the concept of sovereignty.” Although an absence of external threat to the Alliance is very unlikely, the future risk will lie in multiplication of external threats and a lack of common perception of those threats. This underdeveloped common understanding of external threats, accompanied by differential threat assessments, could weaken NATO’s cohesion. To illustrate this point, although the survey participants listed the failure to activate Article 5 in case of attack as a potential risk, further discussions showed that non-Article 5 missions could constitute the real test for NATO’s cohesion. In words of the one of participants, “if there is an operation and only two nations show up, this is not cohesion.” For some nations, this threat multiplication and dissimilar threat perceptions can lead to an operational overstretch or to an eventual “mission creep.” In contrast, other nations might develop an excessive sense of security that would lead them to reduce their attention and willingness to participate in NATO activities. For this reason, terrorism, for instance, cannot constitute NATO’s defining threat. Additionally, the changing nature of threats to allies’ security will require domestic, nonmilitary means to address them, rather than alliance-wide military measures. In other words, “nations will be looking inside to maintain order.”

#### B --- UNPREDICTABILITY

Speranza 12/1/21

(Lauren Speranza, Director of the Transatlantic Defense and Security Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “American Leadership in NATO: A Rocky Return but a Firm Future,” pg online @ <https://icds.ee/en/american-leadership-in-nato-a-rocky-return-but-a-firm-future/> // um-ef)

Although America is ‘back’ at NATO, Europe remains unsettled about the credibility and longevity of US commitments to the alliance. A cloud of uncertainty hangs over the alliance’s next Strategic Concept and how the two sides will craft a common agenda to endure the coming decade. The Biden administration, despite a few recent transatlantic missteps, recognises the gravity of this moment and has come prepared with a focused set of priorities for NATO’s future. Following his successful first trip to Europe, a string of recent US decisions has undermined President Biden’s early pledges to strengthen cooperation with NATO allies. Whether the tacit approval of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, or the controversial announcement of the AUKUS security pact, these disjointed moves have begun to sow doubt in Europe about America’s willingness and ability to work jointly with Europe, even under an Atlanticist president. While the Biden administration has acknowledged and sought to address these slipups, such unpredictability in the transatlantic relationship has weakened the political cohesion required for building NATO’s next Strategic Concept.

#### C --- Lack of INTENSE CONSULTATION

Adebahr et al ‘22

(Adebahr is a nonresident fellow at Carnegie Europe. His research focuses on foreign and security policy, in particular regarding Iran and the Persian Gulf, on European and transatlantic affairs, and on citizens’ engagement, Erik Brattberg was director of the Europe Program and a fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. He is an expert on European politics and security and transatlantic relations, Lizza Bomassi is the deputy director of Carnegie Europe, where she is responsible for harmonizing Carnegie Europe’s strategic and operational priorities and managing relations with Carnegie’s global centers and programs as well as partner organizations in Europe.“How the Transatlantic Relationship Has Evolved, One Year Into the Biden Administration,” pg online @ <https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/01/20/how-transatlantic-relationship-has-evolved-one-year-into-biden-administration-pub-86213> //um-ef)

As the EU develops its Strategic Compass and as NATO prepares for its summit in Madrid, intense consultation between the United States, key EU members states, and EU institutions is necessary in order to safeguard Europe’s defense architecture. More broadly, the compatibility of Turkey’s bilateral actions and its participation in NATO is at stake. While the current situation between Turkey and its partners and allies is fraught—to say nothing of Turkey’s huge domestic economic challenges and rising political uncertainty—perhaps close U.S. and European collaboration can find a path to the stronger, more stable relationship that would benefit all three. CORNELIUS ADBEHR: ON IRAN After four years of increasing transatlantic confrontation over Iran policy following America’s withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear deal, expectations of a joint approach with the incoming Biden administration were high. The past twelve months have seen solid cooperation, if also underwhelming progress on the dossier. Initially, the concern was that European allies might not be prepared to accommodate a decisive U.S. return to the negotiating table, as announced by Biden on the campaign trail, even though they had been the ones keeping the agreement alive. This turned into frustration over the sluggish pace of the administration to make tangible offers for a reopening of the talks. The Islamic Republic has had its own role in stalling progress, from refusing to conclude the negotiations before a presidential election in June to slow-walking their resumption for five months after. Given the country’s advances in nuclear technology as well as in the stockpiling of highly enriched uranium, the urgency to restore the limits set by the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA, as well as the International Atomic Energy Agency’s inspection regime, is obvious. However, with both Iran and the United States constrained by domestic politics that do not reward compromise with an adversary, any agreement to relax U.S. sanctions in return for the reintroduction of stringent nuclear controls will have to be carefully calibrated. The continued focus on the nuclear file, though, belies a reality that is moving on. Israel has been establishing relations with Arab Gulf countries, and its new government is much less opposed to a nuclear accord than the previous one. Countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in turn, have begun to speak with Tehran directly about their security concerns, sensing that Washington is, slowly but surely, on its way out of the region. Meanwhile, Russia has gained an active security presence in the region via the Syrian theater while maintaining strong ties with Israel. Lastly, China remains a sought-after commercial partner that is gaining political clout as a result of America’s turn toward Asia. It is these shifting geopolitical sands that should make the focus on regional cooperation an imperative for the coming year. Ideally, such a move would follow a revival or renewal of the JCPOA, the “longer and stronger” deal that Washington aspires to. However, the chances of failure increased during 2021, so a push for some kind of security arrangement is critical, especially in case talks should falter. The alternative is another violent conflagration that benefits only a handful of cynics, and not the people in the region itself. ERIK BRATTBERG: ON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY While Biden’s team has removed any doubt about U.S. commitment to NATO after Trump’s threats—and has gone out of its way to support the EU—the past year has also seen some serious transatlantic diplomatic rifts, notably over the haphazard U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August and the sudden announcement of the AUKUS security agreement in September. These two events reinforced European concerns about shifting U.S. strategic priorities to the Indo-Pacific and triggered complaints about the inadequacy of U.S. consultation with transatlantic partners. Biden administration officials have responded by stepping up diplomatic engagement with European capitals. But the recent geopolitical turbulence between Russia and Ukraine also painfully illustrates Europe’s lack of power and influence on the world stage, prompting more voices in Europe to call for investing in European sovereignty. (The Ukraine crisis is also a clear reminder that Europe remains completely dependent on Washington for its own security for the foreseeable future.)

#### D --- EDT Economics

Borchert et al ‘21

(Dr Heiko Borchert directs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affair consulting boutique and Marcin Zaborowski is policy director of the future of security program at the Bratislava-based think tank GLOBSEC, General John Allen is President of Brookings and former Commander of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” pg online @ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/> //um-ef)

The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel. Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals. Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies. NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond. First, NATO needs to embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations. In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies. Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element. Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks. The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies.

#### D --- FOCUS and PRIORITIZATION

Kochis ‘21

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For quite some time, NATO has been grappling with divergent threat perceptions among its member states. The summit did nothing to reconcile or systematize these views. Instead, the alliance opted for an umbrella approach where every threat is deemed equally acute. This oversized umbrella may have kept everyone’s threat perceptions dry for now, however, there is only so much focus, money, and political willpower to go around. Sooner or later the alliance will need to prioritize. For those nearest Russia, it’s crystal-clear Putin is not only NATO’s greatest threat, but also one which the alliance is best suited to confront. In the 21st century, NATO needs to return to basics, with territorial defense as its primary goal. NATO cannot try to be everywhere in the world doing everything all the time. Keeping Russia at bay requires the alliance to address the full range of Russian aggressions against NATO members: aerial incursions, cyber-attacks, energy coercion, espionage, and propaganda. It must also be able to deter Russia’s use of conventional and nuclear arms. Facing daily arrivals of migrants from North Africa, our Mediterranean allies view migration and terrorism as NATO’s greatest security threat. And then there is the gnawing reality of China’s rise, with its implications for transatlantic security. These are secondary threats to the alliance. Nonetheless, NATO has some (albeit limited) role to play in keeping them in check. Yet in the Brussels Summit Communiqué, climate change gets top billing as a threat to the alliance. This suggests that NATO, now with Team Biden calling the shots, views climate as NATO’s greatest threat, or at least as important as the other threats mentioned: Russia, China, instability in Europe’s near abroad, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. At the summit, NATO adopted a “Climate Change and Security Action Plan.” Among other things, it commits the alliance to conducting an “annual Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment” and to mapping and analyzing greenhouses gases from military installations and military activities. “Furthermore,” the plan states, “data on energy demand and consumption in the military could inform Allies’ investment decisions, help define the role of Emerging Disruptive Technologies and innovative energy efficient and sustainable technologies, as well as inform operational planning.” The Summit Declaration goes further, inviting the Secretary General to “formulate a realistic, ambitious and concrete target for the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions by the NATO political and military structures and facilities and assess the feasibility of reaching net-zero emissions by 2050.” This is not to say that climate change isn’t real, nor that it has implications for NATO member states or theaters (particularly the Arctic). NATO, however, is not the right organization to lead on addressing these issues. There is now a very real possibility that the alliance’s new climate focus, with its reporting and consultation requirements, will become a distraction which undermines collective defense. Worse yet, NATO’s drive to hit arbitrary emission targets could lead some nations to make choices which weaken transatlantic security. Why invest in emissions belching tanks when you can buy light armored cars? Why invest in fifth-generation fighters when many new aircraft consume more fuel than older platforms? Why invest in capabilities at all when you can invest in carbon capture technology and wind farms? Scaling up to challenge Russia’s increased presence in the High North? Expect headwinds ahead under NATO’s climate turn. How about joint exercises, the lifeblood of NATO’s continued interoperability and readiness? Could they one day be reduced to lower emissions? And what of the alliance’s adversaries? The idea that Russia, the world’s fourth-largest carbon emitter, or China, the world’s largest emitter by far, are going to allow emissions targets and climate change concerns restrain their military acquisitions, basing, or operations is farcical. Many of our NATO allies are still struggling to meet their defense spending commitments. Their militaries suffer from glaring capability gaps. Siphoning scarce resources away toward a green agenda will only further enervate alliance collective defense.

#### E --- RESOURCES --- the plan consumes them to get a consensus agreement

Koegler et al ‘18

(Torsten Gojowsky, Sebastian Koegler, Bernardus Haspels, Flemming Haar, and Sverre Wetteland,Torsten Gojowsky is a U.S. Army officer. Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer. Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer. Sebastian Koegle is a German officer. Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” pg online @ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato)

NATO special operations forces have been slow to adopt innovative solutions such as Tactical Assault Kit, despite its attractive and innovative features. What explains this resistance? Resistance to innovation is at once puzzling, intellectually intriguing, and a commercially interesting phenomenon. In the 1940s, the German psychologist Kurt Lewin was the first to introduce a systemic understanding of the resistance phenomenon. The cause, according to Lewin, is not found in the mind of the individual employee, but in the dynamics of opposing forces, including the behavior of leadership. According to the political economist Josef Schumpeter, “Innovation is the creation of new combinations that represent a departure from established practices.” In other words, a technological tension between the need to innovate and the desire to maintain order and stability will always exist. Wendell Wallach nicely defines the problem as “the pacing gap” between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development. Wallach believes that modern technological innovation is occurring at an unprecedented pace, making it harder than ever to govern using traditional legal and regulatory mechanisms. NATO as a whole suffers severely from the pacing gap, due to the fact that it consists of 29-member countries. If a new communication technology is proven highly successful by one country, the product still has to be vetted by each country’s security and intelligence services. A process like this takes time and consumes resources, forcing poorer nations to evaluate the importance of a new technology versus the old. This process exacerbates the pacing gap within NATO as standardization becomes a protracted process of having to generate consensus among the member states.

### 2NC --- Links --- Bolt from Blue

#### Unpredictable, bolt from the blue actions anger allies – that matters more than the substance of any policy.

Lesser 20 [Ian Lesser is vice president at The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) and a member of GMF’s executive team, managing programs across the organization. He serves as executive director of the Brussels office of GMF, and leads GMF’s work on the Mediterranean, Turkey, and the wider Atlantic. He also served as interim president of GMF from September-December 2021.; “Great Optimism in the EU and NATO as Brussels Looks to Biden”; The German Marshall Fund of the United States; November 12, 2020; https://www.gmfus.org/news/great-optimism-eu-and-nato-brussels-looks-biden]//eleanor

After years of transatlantic stress, officials and observers in Brussels believe that a Biden administration holds the prospect of profound change in style and policy. There will continue to be areas of disagreement. But the overall approach from Washington is sure to be more engaging and closer to mainstream European policy preferences. From economics to security, Europe values predictability in U.S. leadership, something that has been in remarkably short supply under the Trump administration. The anticipated shift is likely to be most profound from the perspective of the EU and its institutions. Among member states, there was always a spectrum of views about Donald Trump. The outgoing administration’s approach enjoyed a degree of support in right-wing and nationalist circles, including several governments in Central and Eastern Europe. For some, this was a matter of ideology. For others it was a cooler geopolitical calculus. In general, however, the Trump administration was derided for its brash unilateral style as much as its policy choices, most of which were at odds with EU preferences. The list of sharp differences ranged from climate policy to trade, from Iran to the World Health Organization. Above all, Trump and his key advisors were seen as dismissive of, or even opposed to, the idea of the EU itself. For them, international politics seemed to be about nation states, often individual leaders—some seen positively, most seen negatively. The traditional U.S. attachment to the “European project” had become the preserve of a foreign policy elite with little influence on Trump and his circle. A Biden administration should spell a return to the traditional balance in transatlantic relations, with the EU itself taken seriously again alongside relations with France, Germany, and others. On substance, there is a realization that it may not all be smooth sailing across the Atlantic. Trade and digital policy are widely assumed to be the most challenging areas. Indeed, there is some concern that Biden may find it difficult to move away from the protectionist stance that has taken hold in recent years, against the backdrop of similar pressures in Europe and elsewhere. On other fronts, the outlook is for closer consultation and convergence. EU leaders will welcome a U.S. return to the Paris climate accords and the World Health Organization. Biden has signaled a desire to bring the United States back into the multilateral nuclear agreement with Iran. A Biden administration is assumed to be more interested in and willing to assist with a host of problems on Europe’s periphery, from Africa to the Eastern Mediterranean. In some respects, NATO was one of the areas least affected by Trump’s approach to the world. The U.S. military presence in Europe has grown modestly but steadily; a trend that began under President Barack Obama. U.S. complaints about defense burden-sharing were nothing new, even if the style was more abrasive. But from the start, Trump spread anxiety about the solidity of the U.S. commitment to European defense. It never quite came to a disavowal of Article V, and Trump would have faced a very tough bipartisan battle if he ever wished to leave NATO as he hinted on more than one occasion. By contrast, it is assumed that a Biden administration would put NATO back at the core of U.S. strategy. In policy terms, the emphasis on increased European defense spending will surely continue. There will be a tougher and more predictable line on Russia, coupled with an interest in new arms-control arrangements. Biden is a well-known figure in NATO circles. For the alliance, a Biden administration will be a return to the known world and an energizing element for the institution.

### 2NC --- Links --- Info-Sharing

#### Info-sharing on EDT causes alliance breakdowns --- countries won’t want to share their tech

Bazin and Kunertova ‘18

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Technology advances. The participants agreed that technology advances are important for NATO’s continued cohesion. Technology will constitute a significant intervening factor in how NATO nations maintain their cohesion in the future for three reasons. First, ever-evolving communication technology can facilitate the spread of risks coming from outside of the Alliance and exacerbate their negative effect. The examples that resonated the most during focus group sessions are information warfare and targeted propaganda against NATO nations. Internet communications technology creates infinite room for alternative media that distort reality, contribute to the emergence of populist and radical movements, and increase the danger of miscommunication among nations. Second, NATO risks losing the innovation game to the commercial defense industrial sector. In the future, private companies will continue to stay ahead of NATO in designing specifications and setting standards for platforms. This can have a major impact on readiness and interoperability among NATO nations if their innovation efforts (e.g., the U.S. Third Offset Strategy) do not materialize.31 Third, some nations may become reluctant to share their latest technology acquisitions, especially if they put private gains above the collective endeavor. This would pose a challenge “for anyone to share information they own without gaining any profit for themselves.” The political unwillingness may feed distrust, which can result in a deepening interoperability gap between allies on the battlefield, and ultimately, a less cohesive Alliance.

#### Info-sharing and non-deterrence measures trade-off with NATO deterrence measures and cause overstretch

Moller '20

(Sara Assistant Professor at the School of Diplomacy and International Relations, "It Will Take More Than a Biden Victory to Solve NATO’s Strategic Malaise," pg online @ https://warontherocks.com/2020/09/it-will-take-more-than-a-biden-victory-to-solve-natos-strategic-malaise/)

If and when the Biden team embarks on its grand European tour, it seems virtually certain that, beyond the expressions of gratitude for America’s “return” that will surely follow them wherever they go, the delegation can expect to be met with a lengthy list of items requiring their immediate attention. Moreover, appeals for Washington’s assistance are likely to differ from capital to capital, with each NATO ally arguing that their particular issue or concern represents the most pressing challenge and therefore requires the most attention and resources. In Warsaw and the capitals of the Baltic states, the U.S. delegation will hear that, despite a new U.S. rotational troop deployment, a revanchist Russia necessitates additional NATO (but especially U.S.) military commitments along the Eastern flank of the alliance. In Rome, Athens, and Madrid, U.S. policymakers will learn that the Mediterranean countries represent the “soft underbelly” of NATO and that the alliance must do more to project stability along its southern arc of instability. In Ankara, the message will be one of anger directed at what the Erdogan government perceives as NATO’s collective failure to support Turkish actions in Syria and elsewhere. In Paris, the message for the U.S. delegation will be that the alliance must strengthen its counter-terrorism efforts in the Middle East and North Africa, while in Berlin the focus will be on reforming NATO’s nuclear posture and salvaging expiring arms-control agreements. Meanwhile, securing the Arctic and halting the effects of climate change will be at the top of the agenda in Copenhagen and Oslo. In short, wherever the Biden presidential delegation goes, it will be met with requests that Washington — and with it, the NATO alliance — prioritize everything, thereby fulfilling the old adage that, “When everything is a priority, nothing is a priority.” Given the precarious state of international relations today, the temptation to do more is understandably strong. It is easy to understand why, in the present climate of global instability, calls for the transatlantic alliance to reinforce and strengthen its existing commitments while simultaneously adding new mandates, missions, and programs are popular. Rather than adding more items to its already crowded agenda, however, the time has come for not just the United States but also NATO to consider doing less but doing it better. When More Is Less, and Less Is More For an alliance that has long prided itself on its commonality of purpose and interests, the truth is that NATO is in danger of losing both. On paper and in public, the members still agree the core purpose of the 71-year-old alliance is deterrence and defense of the North Atlantic region. When internal disagreements are aired publicly, other allies are quick to dispel reports of rifts by pointing out that differences of opinion are nothing new. But unlike during the Cold War, when a single adversary occupied all of the alliance’s attention, today’s security environment — as the allies routinely remind each other — is multifaceted and complex. In an effort to address members’ often disparate security requirements, NATO has taken on additional tasks over the past three decades almost as quickly as it has taken on additional members. The NATO-ization of every security challenge has meant that issues once considered the purview of individual nations or other international organizations — such as migration, terrorism, and foreign security force assistance — are now lumped onto NATO’s agenda under the guise of fulfilling its ambitious (and potentially limitless) post-Cold War mandate of “projecting stability.” For far too long now, alliance leaders have tasked the NATO military infrastructure with a seemingly impossible undertaking: weighing down the military organization with new responsibilities like peacekeeping and counter-terrorism while simultaneously allowing members to shirk on contributing the resources required to fulfill old and new alliance missions. To date, much of the criticism surrounding NATO’s current strategic deadlock has focused on the resource issue and the strains caused by uneven burden-sharing within the alliance. Far less attention has been paid to the first part of the “ends-means-ways” formulation of strategy, namely NATO’s original purpose. While addressing “means” and “ways” are crucial elements in any strategic enterprise, it is past time the Allies got around to focusing on NATO’s strategic ends once more. Confronting NATO’s present strategic dilemma will require looking beyond existing strategic documents like the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty, which proclaimed the signatories’ commitment to the “preservation of peace and security” in the North Atlantic area. As the past three decades of NATO transformation have shown, there is not much that does not fit under the rubric of fostering “peace and security” and consequently cannot be tacked onto the alliance’s agenda. True strategy requires setting (and adhering to) actual goals and priorities, as well as developing plans to achieve them. Although the alliance’s past strategic documents have often sought to define NATO’s evolving strategic purpose with more precision than the founding treaty, the alliance has not adopted a new strategic concept since 2010 for fear that embarking on such an exercise would only further inflame the deep rifts within the alliance that such strategic endeavors are meant to help address. Officially, NATO members still assert collective defense is the alliance’s primary task, despite the inclusion of two other core tasks — projecting stability and cooperative security/crisis management — in all three of its post-Cold War Strategic Concepts (1991, 1999, 2010). The addition of these latter two core tasks — coupled with members’ differing threat perceptions about what rises to the level of an existential security threat — has clouded the organization’s focus. After three decades of continual adaptation, the danger that the alliance’s original raison d’étre of collective defense gets further downgraded to the point where it risks becoming primus inter pares among NATO’s many other responsibilities is real. As with previous critical junctures in transatlantic relations, it will take American leadership to change NATO’s future course. Come January 2021, a Biden administration should move swiftly to announce its intention to commission a new NATO strategic concept by 2022. Should Trump win, all bets are off. Defenders of NATO’s post-Cold War emphasis on projecting stability and collective security argue that NATO has a proven track record of crisis management and capacity-building beyond its borders in places like Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. The alliance’s cooperative security track record, however, is hardly stellar. This past June, the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo entered its 22nd year of operation. Almost 17 years after the alliance’s Integrated Military Command first assumed responsibilities in Afghanistan, the NATO flag continues to fly in Kabul, where some 15,000 allied troops remain as part of NATO’s Resolute Support mission. Nor can the alliance’s intervention in Libya in 2011 be considered a resounding success, judging by the state of affairs there today. That NATO remains engaged in some of these places decades afterward is not an impeachment of the men and women who served in these operations and performed the tasks demanded of them. It is, howevwer, evidence of NATO’s failure to give sufficient consideration to its core strategic purpose. While one can debate the wisdom of NATO having accumulated such an expansionist security agenda in an era marked by American unipolarity, an all-encompassing approach to security is harder to justify in a time of waning American power. Just as the diminishing threat of great-power competition in the 1990s and early 2000s freed NATO to take on additional security tasks beyond its traditional mission of collective defense, its return should prompt a reexamination to determine whether NATO is still the appropriate entity for handling such tasks. Another center of excellence, special representative, or office will not fix what ails NATO. As the authors of a recent Heritage Foundation report on “NATO in the 21st Century” put it, it is time for NATO to get “back to the basics.” There are limits to what an international institution — even one as successful as NATO — can accomplish: “When policymakers expect or want NATO to do what it was never designed to do, that is when the Alliance risks failure.” The launch of NATO Secretary Gen. Jens Stoltenberg’s #NATO2030 reflection process earlier this year to address political reforms within the alliance presented just such an opportunity to tackle these and other big-picture questions. It is still unclear to what extent the pandemic has delayed the work of the group of experts begun last March. The Biden team will have to move quickly if it hopes to help shape the working group’s deliberations, as Stoltenberg is slated to brief members on the path forward for the alliance at the April 2021 Leaders’ Summit. Back to the Future: Narrowing (Not Broadening) NATO’s Remit Looking ahead, alliance leaders should consider ways to streamline current NATO missions and tasks so that responsibilities that fall below the threshold of existential challenges can be unloaded onto other multilateral institutions or global partnerships. In addition to bringing an end to the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan, alliance leaders should consider getting NATO out of the security assistance and stabilization business altogether. Calls for NATO to look for opportunities to do more in the MENA region should also be rebuffed. Few would dispute that this region poses real security challenges to European states or that these challenges are particularly acute for the southernmost members of the alliance, some of whom might even view migration and refugee flows as rising to the level of existential threats. But while the 21st century challenges to the “stability and well-being” of member states may be numerous and growing, there is only one NATO. A single organization cannot tackle every national security challenge its members face. To remain useful, the alliance must choose which threats to prioritize. Doing so requires recognizing that not every security issue rises to the level of an existential threat to the alliance. Terrorist attacks were a common occurrence in many West European nations in the 1970s and 1980s, yet NATO did not fundamentally transform its agenda back then because members recognized that the threat posed by the Soviet Union was greater. While neither Russia nor China as yet represents a threat on par with the Soviet Union, NATO should prepare for the possibility that the latter (either alone or in combination with Moscow) could pose an existential challenge to the Atlantic community in the coming decades. Nor is it evident that NATO was ever the appropriate venue for tackling threats like terrorism in the first place. Effective counter-terrorism requires intelligence-sharing; local policing and counter-radicalization programs; and financial instruments that agencies like Europol, Interpol, the Global Counterterrorism Forum, and others are better equipped to lead than an overstretched military alliance. The same is true when it comes to other activities the transatlantic alliance has added to its roster since 1991, like stabilization missions and security sector reform. In fact, organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, and the European Union provide more appropriate venues for tackling many of the collective security duties the alliance has assumed since the 1990s. As a regional defensive military alliance, NATO’s comparative advantage lies in providing territorial defense against other states or groups of states. This is a comparative advantage that should be preserved, not diluted by the addition of other security tasks. True comparative advantage arises from specialization. Continuing to add more and more security responsibilities to NATO’s already-full plate risks transforming the military alliance into a glorified clearinghouse or administrative apparatus whose sole task is the facilitation of information-sharing rather than the provision of collective defense. Yes, NATO is better equipped to handle the myriad security problems its members face than any other multilateral security organization in existence today. But the proposition that because NATO has the resources and coordinating mechanisms it should automatically take on the latest mission du jour is what has led to a strategically deadlocked alliance. Much like the 1990s, the coming decade will be one of transition for NATO. Back then, proponents of alliance reform argued that the only way forward was to enlarge the alliance and take on new responsibilities. Without such reforms, they claimed, NATO would disappear. The choice facing NATO members today is different: not a world without NATO, but a world in which NATO fails to fulfill its intended purpose. Preparing NATO for China’s rise does not mean sending alliance-flagged vessels to the South China Sea. But the reality is, as Stoltenberg put it last December, China is already “coming closer to us.” Ultimately, NATO possesses few capabilities of its own. Individual allies — and not the alliance itself — retain ownership and control over the military material and personnel assigned to NATO operations and missions. The alliance’s real strength, however, lies in its integrated military command structure. Preserving and protecting the integrated command structure’s organizational bandwidth should be the primary focus in the coming years. Unloading the alliance’s collective security responsibilities onto other international actors would allow alliance military officials to focus on the challenges emanating from China (and, to a far lesser degree, Russia) free of the need to also tackle a host of lower-threshold security concerns, all of which require office space, funding, and personnel billets. Bifurcating collective security tasks from collective defense would also force European leaders once and for all to decide exactly what price they are willing to pay for their own national defense. The Way Forward Instead of seeking to tackle every new security challenge of the 21st century, NATO leaders should work to preserve NATO’s core assets and capabilities for the task that it is uniquely suited for: deterring state-based adversaries and defending the territorial integrity of its members. The time when NATO could be both a collective defense and a collective security organization has passed. Amid the reemergence of great-power rivalries, it no longer makes sense to assign NATO’s limited resources to naval operations in support of the refugee crisis as the organization did back in 2016. Or for the alliance to continue to try its hand at stabilizing war-torn nations. NATO has survived this long by adapting. But unlike in the past, where NATO adaptation has always meant taking on more responsibilities, the reforms needed today are those that involve shedding commitments rather than taking on additional ones. In seeking to reestablish NATO once again as an alliance focused solely on collective defense, and not a collective security organization, the Biden team will need to resist the urge to pick up the phone and call NATO Headquarters whenever a new security challenge emerges, like previous U.S. presidents have done since the end of the Cold War. Jettisoning the collective security responsibilities the NATO alliance has assumed over the past three decades won’t be easy. Nor does freeing NATO from responsibility for tackling issues like counter-terrorism and instability in the near abroad mean that such threats are not deserving of international cooperative efforts by states. It simply means that going forward, countries committed to these kinds of activities will have to look to organizations and venues other than NATO to address them. Rather than expend precious resources and continue to use NATO as an instrument to grapple with all manner of cooperative security issues, a Biden administration should instead reorient the alliance’s strategic focus toward the more pressing task of adjusting to China’s rise. Not doing so risks turning NATO into nothing more than a glorified discussion club. To avoid this fate, the Biden team will have to move quickly. At stake is not just alliance unity but NATO’s future utility.

### 2NC --- Links --- Spending

#### Deterrence key to stopping Russia --- ineffective alliance spending and focus trades-off

Herem 6/23/22

(Martin, The writer is commander of Estonian Defence Forces Nato must show Putin it is serious about defence,” pg online @ <https://www.ft.com/content/48ba1732-8d3c-49e4-9ac6-5259a760356d> //um-ef)

However, it seems that with every Russian military engagement over the past 30 years, the Kremlin’s threshold for aggression has fallen ever lower. As Moscow’s desire for self-assertion has increased, the west’s response has often been too soft or accommodating. For Nato allies, deterrence has worked so far and we have not experienced military aggression. But since Putin is not prepared to play by the same rules as the rest of us, we have no guarantees. We need a fundamental shift in approach: we need to move from deterrence by punishment to deterrence by denial. In other words, we me must be ready to prevent Russia taking a single inch of Nato territory, rather than simply trying to reconquer occupied enclaves. We need to rethink our objectives — first and foremost, we must prepare stronger defences. In light of the changed security environment, we need to double the speed and scale of our efforts to boost our military posture across the alliance. The overall aim is to be able to put in place a credible defence capability anywhere on Nato territory, from the very beginning of a conflict. We cannot wait for another massacre such as the one in Bucha to happen before taking action. To do this, Estonia and its fellow Nato members need to shape up. First, governments must trust military personnel to build readiness. Not in drawing up defence or security policy, but in proposing the best solutions according to military science. Those with practical experience on the battlefield can decide how best to invest the allotted money to defend their country. Second, states must invest wisely. There is no point in acquiring the most modern technology if you don’t have the people, the skills or the funds to sustain it, or enough ammunition to use it, in case of a conflict. Unfortunately, these foundations do not sound exciting, and cannot easily be displayed to adversaries. How do you present at a parade the amount of training, ammunition, communication systems or equipment maintenance you have undertaken, which are all critical in warfare? Third, Nato and its allies need to prepare much more comprehensively for swift and viable deployments at the first signs of aggression. We must deny Russia any military success anywhere on the alliance’s territory. The aim is not to intimidate: when deploying forces to Nato countries, we should not measure how much deterrence those aircraft, ships or tanks are providing. Instead, we must assess how ready the forces are to fight in case of need. And if it is not sustainable to keep the necessary number of forces to counterbalance Russia permanently stationed in frontline Nato countries, then we need to have a credible defence plan for emergency deployment.

### 2NC --- Links --- China Focus

#### The plan’s focus on china ruptures the alliance

Shifrinson ‘21

(Joshua, PhD in political science/international relations from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Non-Resident Fellow at the Quincy Institute and Assistant Professor with the Pardee School of Global Studies at Boston University and a term member of the Council on Foreign Relations. Shifrinson’s research focuses on U.S. foreign policy and grand strategy, European and Asian security, alliance politics, and diplomatic history, “The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future,” pg online @ <https://quincyinst.org/report/the-dominance-dilemma-the-american-approach-to-nato-and-its-future/> //um-ef)

Although Trump has now left office, NATO is nonetheless in for difficult times, as strategic circumstances change and China’s rise draws American attention toward East Asia. Though some European NATO members now express interest in helping to counter Beijing, and the alliance itself is working to stake out a position on China’s rise, as the NATO Reflection Group Report underscored in November 2020, the United States will inevitably be more invested in Asian developments than will other NATO members.16 The net result presents two possible avenues for deeper, substantive divides in the alliance. First, if competition with Beijing escalates, the United States may be impelled to devote fewer resources and attention to European affairs. This would invert the Cold War experience, creating the potential for the alliance to wither away as American attention moves elsewhere and NATO’s European members seek alternatives for their security. Alliances, after all, usually change as new threats appear; as American priorities change, NATO cohesion may decline as well. Then, too, European actors might also be expected to complain about prospective American “abandonment.” Mounting Chinese–American competition may also encourage NATO’s European members to distance themselves, perhaps dramatically, from the United States. During the contest with the Soviet Union, European allies regularly feared that Soviet–American tensions might entangle them in a conflict with Moscow at times and places beyond their control. A U.S.–China contest would carry even greater risks. With less at stake in Asia, NATO’s European members can be expected to separate themselves from U.S. policy. If the United States were to respond by pressuring its European allies to assist against Beijing, an alliance rupture would become possible.

### 2NC --- Links --- Pressure

#### US pressure undermines cohesion – the plan pushes the fine line

Schnaufer 21 [ Tad, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida ; “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; January 15, 2021; DOA: 7/18/22; <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/>; Lowell-ES]

Policymakers must balance the coercion needed to increase contributions of European allies by making them question US intentions, but not distance the United States to the point that it jeopardizes the alliance or the deterrence that the US military power provides. A snapshot of one such policy could involve pulling a significant number of permanently stationed US forces from Europe, while reassuring US commitments to its allies through rotational deployments (not of equal number to the withdrawal) in support of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence and other operations. This concept aims to incentivize allies to build up military strength for initial deterrence and defense on the continent with the backing of US security guarantees, but lacking the tangible comfort drawn from a large permanent US force presence. With the probability that the incoming Biden administration will quickly mend relations in Europe, it runs the risk of reversing the current trend of increasing defense spending across the alliance and fostering free-riding. The United States should not go running back into the arms of the Europeans. Rather, it should maintain blunt political pressure on the Europeans to do more while ensuring its commitment to its allies remains clear to NATO’s potential adversaries.

## Links --- Cyber

### Links --- Cyber Troops

#### And, our cybertroops are stretched thin --- additional operations undermine their effectiveness

Waterman 3/14/22

(Shaun, “Cyber Troops Stretched Thin in Ukraine Response as NATO Builds Common Air Picture,” pg online @ <https://www.airforcemag.com/cyber-troops-stretched-thin-ukraine-response-nato-common-air-picture/> //um-ef)

The war in Ukraine has provided a wake-up call for U.S. military cyber defenders, who are facing hard choices about how to deploy limited resources, said Air Force Brig. Gen. Chad D. Raduege, the chief information officer of U.S. European Command. “There’s been a realization that, quite frankly, we can’t protect everything we have,” Raduege told a virtual luncheon hosted by the Gabriel Chapter of the Air Force Association on March 9. He added that this realization had been growing for some time. In his prior job in 2021 as chief information officer of Air Combat Command, “we found ourselves … identifying the key [IT] components for us to fly, fight, and win. And we were applying mission defense teams from a cyber component against those weapon systems and saying, these are our crown jewels that we need to protect.” But faced with a crisis that is demanding agile U.S. deployments alongside a wide variety of partners, meaning small teams operating from unfamiliar locations, there weren’t enough cyber defense teams to go around, Raduege said, answering an audience question from retired Maj. Gen. Burke E. ”Ed” Wilson, the former deputy assistant secretary of defense for cyber policy, who previously commanded Air Forces Cyber. “I think the area that we’ve got to continue to figure out is this idea that we were going [to] protect the weapon systems themselves, protect those smaller groups, with our mission defense teams. That’s a really great vision. What we found is we didn’t have enough capacity in the cyber realm to even stand up some of those capabilities,” Raduege said. He said the Air Force is deciding which weapon systems it can afford to protect. “The Air Force, right now, through Air Combat Command, is working through a prioritization of which weapon systems we will apply those mission defense teams against,” he said. The overwhelming “demand signal” for cyber protection, Raduege said, was driven by the circumstances of the U.S. response to the Ukraine crisis, which combined NATO military operations with humanitarian relief efforts involving a much wider alliance of partners—all requiring connectivity. “There’s an insatiable appetite to have connectivity. And we’re seeing not only fielded forces at the home stations, but now we have all of these tactical edge airfields and logistics hubs that are standing up,” Raduege said. “We have fielded forces all over the place that have an air picture that they want to share. … We have logistics hubs that are all over the European theater right now. … We’re seeing our own nation want to put donations and goods into the European theater. And so we’re seeing coordination centers stand up” to manage that flow of incoming goods and their onward distribution. Coordination was required, not just with the 30-member NATO alliance, but with “a whole bunch of other allies and partners for this current fight,” he said. “And the ability to track all of that aid, all of that hardware and software that is going into different places … requires information-sharing requirements at a protected military level,” Raduege said. That secure connectivity required developing the mission partner environment, or MPE, “a coalition network,” which could move data, classified as highly as “secret,” securely between the military networks of allied nations. The MPE was an alternative to the “sneaker net”-style of manual exchanges NATO partners had to cope with for many years in Afghanistan, but Raduege suggested that some kinks still being worked out.

### Links --- Cyber Time Consuming

#### Cybersecurity cooperation is difficult and time-consuming for the alliance.

Jacobsen 21 [Jeppe T. Jacobsen is a Ph.D. candidate at the Danish Institute for International Studies and the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. His primary focus is U.S. cyber armament, its motivation and consequences to international security. Jacobsen worked as cyber coordinator at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark where he coordinated Denmark’s cyber diplomacy. ; “Cyber offense in NATO: challenges and opportunities”; International Affairs; May 10, 2021; https://academic.oup.com/ia/article-abstract/97/3/703/6205395]//eleanor

The abovementioned incidents have led cyber-conflict scholars to point to several technical and practical difficulties in the operational integration of cyber effects.29 In the interviews and background conversations that contributed to this study, three of these difficulties were continuously reiterated when discussing successful integration of cyber effects into NATO operational planning: the temporal dimension of developing exploits; the assessment of battle damage; and the problem of confliction. Developing exploits—a matter of time One of the characteristics of cyber attacks that receives most attention is the fact that they hit suddenly and without warning.30 While this is often the case, the central question for operational integration is not the speed at which they hit their target, but the speed with which the tools and techniques that exploit IT vulnerabilities in order to deliver cyber effects can be developed. Like conventional weapons, the cyber tools—the exploits or cyber weapons—take time to develop. However, an exploit is often harder to reuse than a conventional weapon, as it is more dependent on a meticulous analysis and target preparation—in this case, specifically, the target’s IT infrastructure. Without knowing the adversary’s IT systems and its vulnerabilities better than the adversary itself, meaningful cyber weapons are impossible to develop. The fact that knowledge about the target is linked not only to the deployment of a weapon but also to its development influences the extent to which it can be used and reused. Stuxnet, for example, required years of development, testing and perfecting before it could deliver the intended effect on the Iranian centrifuges. Despite the techniques used in the Stuxnet malware having been found in other malware,31 Stuxnet lost its ability to destroy the centrifuges when it was discovered and the IT vulnerabilities that enabled it were patched. Importantly, part of the complexity of Stuxnet relates to the US–Israeli intention to keep the effect secret. In a hot conflict, secrecy in terms of the effect is often less important, and thus the development and deployment of cyber effects do not necessarily have to be as complex and time-consuming. This observation does not necessarily change the fact that the development of exploits often has to precede the military confrontation in which they are intended to be used. NATO states that want to deliver cyber effects in NATO operations must try to gain access to Russia’s or other potential adversaries’ critical military networks to identify and exploit IT vulnerabilities. As several informants emphasized, if states wait for a conflict to escalate before they begin the development of exploits, it is most likely to be already too late.32 The alternative to penetrating adversary networks in peacetime is for states to rely on the exploitation of vulnerabilities in as many commercial off-the-shelf products as possible. This can be done, for example, by purchasing exploits from private companies offering this service, in the hope that it will then be possible to quickly create an overview of the enemy’s IT infrastructure and adapt the exploits to this environment when a conflict escalates. The latter approach is more likely to succeed against adversaries with low network security, which does not apply in the case of Russia, or in contexts where less sophisticated and less closely targeted cyber effects are required. Whether member states develop sophisticated exploits for future targeted effects or stockpile well-known exploits to cause more minor effects, they cannot—as several informants indicated—be certain that they will be able to deliver the cyber effect at the specific time it is requested by CYOC. This is because the IT vulnerabilities upon which exploits depend might not exist for ever. Cyberspace is a dynamic environment: vulnerabilities are patched, systems are updated or replaced and bad IT security practices are identified and improved. This means that exploits are temporary in nature and cannot be stored for later use.33 States must constantly ensure that the exploits still work, which requires minor adjustments when updates take place. As a consequence, the larger the military ‘cyber arsenal’, the more technically skilled human resources are needed for its maintenance. In the current labour market, where recruitment and retention of a cyber workforce is difficult, extensive investment is required for states to be able to stand ready with cyber effects available when requested. In short, if a state is to offer a cyber effect in a NATO operation, then the state is likely to have to be able, first, to predict what Russian IT systems it is going to target months or years in advance, and second, to marshal the necessary resources to develop and maintain a large array of exploits that can be used against these systems. Even if this is successfully done, the state still faces difficulty in ensuring that an effect is delivered as promised.

#### Cyber policy changes are slow and cause divisive reactions within NATO

Lonergan and Moller ’22 -- (Erica D. Lonergan and Sara B. Moller, 4-27-2022, "Opinion: NATO’s Credibility Is on the Line with Cyber Defense Pledge. That’s a Bad Idea." POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/04/27/nato-credibility-cyber-defense-pledge-russia-ukraine-00027829, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

President Joe Biden has issued grave warnings that Russia might launch a cyberattack against the United States in retaliation for the punishing sanctions levied after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. He’s advised American companies to “accelerate efforts to lock their digital doors,” and many officials expect an attack against critical U.S. infrastructure to be inevitable. One way Biden and other Western leaders are attempting to deter potential Russian cyber retaliation during the Ukraine crisis is through NATO’s Article 5 collective defense pledge — that an attack on one is an attack against all. That’s because since the 2014 NATO summit in Wales (which, coincidentally, took place following another Russia-Ukraine crisis), the alliance has affirmed that Article 5 extends to cyberspace. In other words, a cyberattack against any NATO member could conceivably represent an attack against the entire alliance. The pledge is the embodiment of the allies’ security guarantee to each other and the beating heart of NATO. After Russia invaded Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg confirmed that NATO policy on collective defense and cyberspace holds strong, noting that NATO has “decided to make clear that a cyberattack can trigger Article 5.” And following an extraordinary meeting of heads of state and government on March 24, the alliance reinforced that it is “ready to impose costs on those who harm us in cyberspace.” But despite this rhetoric, exactly how and when Article 5 applies to cyberspace remains unclear. This ambiguity is a problem — with potentially disastrous consequences. Staking the credibility of Article 5 to what are often murky activities in cyberspace threatens to undermine the broader principle of collective defense. We can’t risk fracturing the transatlantic alliance at a critical juncture in its history over a debate on what constitutes a major or minor cyberattack. For that reason, NATO should move quickly to clarify its policy on cyberattacks and explicitly state the threshold for what would trigger an Article 5 response. Furthermore, NATO members should commit to treating cyberattacks that do not rise to the level of a major attack as a national matter — not one for the alliance. Such a shift might face some initial resistance, particularly in light of the Kremlin’s history of malicious cyber activities. One of the first state-initiated cyberattacks was perpetrated by Russia against Estonia, a NATO member, in 2007. In the intervening years, Moscow has increased its malicious cyber activities, such as the SolarWinds breach uncovered in December 2020 in which Russia gained access to a treasure trove of U.S. data. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s maneuvers against NATO members, along with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, spurred the alliance to adopt a Cyber Defense Pledge in 2016 that recognized cyberspace as a military domain. Two years later, NATO created a Cyberspace Operations Center in Mons, Belgium to improve situational awareness and coordinate cyber operations. Since then, the alliance has consistently reaffirmed the application of Article 5 to cyberspace. At the 2021 summit in Brussels, NATO committed to a new Comprehensive Cyber Defense Policy, with allies agreeing to employ the “full range of capabilities” at all times to “deter, defend against, and counter the full spectrum of cyber threats.” Notably, NATO refined its language with last summer’s summit communique to account for the fact that some cyber incidents may not be individually decisive, but nevertheless significant when viewed in the aggregate. Specifically, the allies recognized “the impact of significant malicious cumulative cyber activities might, in certain circumstances, be considered as amounting to an armed attack.” In practice, however, NATO leaders have avoided clarifying the conditions under which a cyberattack would trigger Article 5 and how NATO would respond. When pressed about Russian cyberattacks in the Ukraine context, Stoltenberg cautioned that, “we have never gone into the position where we give a potential adversary the privilege of defining exactly when we trigger Article 5.” This equivocation is not surprising, for several reasons. The nature of cyberspace often confounds unequivocal deterrence declarations. States tend to operate in cyberspace with plausible deniability, which can make it difficult to rapidly ascertain responsibility for cyber incidents. Also, it can be challenging to understand the intent behind observed cyber behavior, and there is often a substantial time lag between when an initial penetration of a network occurs and when the target even realizes the breach. And the vast majority of cyber operations cause virtual, not physical, damage, complicating efforts to assess and evaluate the implications of the costs inflicted. Moreover, it can take time to develop and identify a way to infiltrate a network as well as the computer code that takes advantage of a vulnerability for malicious ends. This means states may lack a palatable cyber response option for retaliatory purposes at the desired time. This creates a slew of practical problems if Article 5 were to be invoked for a cyberattack. From an implementation perspective, it would trigger deliberations within the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s primary decision-making body. Decisions made within the NAC require unanimity, which can be difficult to achieve for many issues but is especially burdensome for cyber ones, given all of the ambiguities outlined above. The most likely outcome of this process would be a long, drawn-out deliberation resulting in a divided alliance unable to agree on how or whether to respond. Quite simply, some allies are unlikely to want to risk World War III for a cyberattack that disrupts the financial infrastructure, for instance, of another country but doesn’t lead to loss of life or sustained damage. These challenges have major strategic implications for NATO. After years of publicly and repeatedly linking Article 5 to cyberspace and reinforcing that policy in response to the Ukraine conflict, a failure to achieve consensus and respond to a Russian cyberattack against a NATO member could imperil Article 5 in other areas. The disunity that is likely to be revealed during NAC deliberations would then undermine the broader political cohesion that has, for the most part, been remarkably strong throughout the war in Ukraine. This would make it more difficult for the alliance to respond to other forms of Russian behavior. As Biden emphasized at a press conference last month, “the single-most important thing is for us to stay unified … We have to stay fully, totally, thoroughly unified.” NATO has achieved some strategic ambiguity with its current cyber policy, which may help to deter high-stakes Russian assaults during the present crisis. However, rather than an all-out Russian cyberattack, a far more plausible scenario is a lower-level attack carried out by the Russian government or a proxy group against one or more allies. In this case, the alliance’s interests — not to mention transatlantic security — would be better served by adopting nationally-tailored responses rather than pulling the Article 5 lever. Additionally, to prevent further escalation and reinforce the implicit firebreak that currently exists between cyber and conventional military operations, NATO allies should also agree to restrict any retaliatory response against Moscow to the cyber realm or non-military instruments of power. With little chance of improved NATO-Russian relations any time soon, time is of the essence to get this right. The allies should begin the hard political legwork now to ensure members get on the same page before NATO’s June summit, if not sooner. Achieving consensus on significant cyber issues has previously taken time. NATO’s attribution of the Microsoft Exchange hack last summer to China was an important step for the alliance and sent a strong signal to our adversaries. But it took months to reach agreement on the statement; the hack was uncovered in March 2021 and the NATO statement was not made public until July. In the current crisis, the alliance will not have the luxury of waiting four (or more) months to agree on a response. To avoid incurring damaging costs to NATO’s credibility and its deterrent powers, the allies should refine their cyber policy, now. We live in an age in which more people have access to highly sophisticated technologies and almost every social, economic or military asset has become ‘securitized’ or vulnerable to disruption – whether temporary or more lasting – from an outside attacker or even an inside source.

### Links --- Cyber undermines Cred

#### The nature of cyber operations undermines NATO credibility – impossible to ensure proportionality and discrimination.

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How likely is it that the requested cyber effect will be delivered? The answer to this question is not clear, in respect of either its preparation or its execution. This is not only because IT vulnerabilities are constantly discovered and patched; it is also because of the difficulty of assessing the effects and possible side-effects of an exploit when navigating and analysing complex IT infrastructures. In other words, reconnaissance is difficult in cyberspace, and so is the containment of effects. The Russian attempt to use ransomware aimed at disrupting critical Ukrainian infrastructure in 2017, for example, succeeded—but simultaneously encrypted computers globally, causing substantial economic damage to multinational businesses such as Maersk and FedEx.34 Collateral damage and unintended consequences are serious issues for NATO. The alliance takes pride in its adherence to the principles laid out in international law, such as proportionality and discrimination, as former NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary-General Jamie Shea has emphasized.35 Thus, disruptions of servers with huge negative implications for civilians, or the use of generic cyber tools that risk spreading their effects far and wide, are most likely not going to be considered for use in NATO operations. Indeed, one of the main challenges to US efforts to disrupt servers in working against ISIS was finding ways to ensure that civilians were not hit by their cyber effects.36 Another aspect of the difficulty of assessing the cyber effect relates to adversaries’ cyber defence efforts. For the more sophisticated players in cyberspace, cyber defence has developed into more than simply patching, clearing and updating systems. Cyber defence is also increasingly about following an intruder’s activity in one’s own network and creating ‘honeypots’ or ‘honeynets’; or about following data traffic back to the intruder’s network. In short, cyber defence is also about deception and active defence.37 This approach to cyber defence offers valuable insights into the intruder’s techniques and strategies; but the mere knowledge that deception is becoming a predominant defensive strategy also introduces doubts into the intruder’s assessment of possible effects. Consequently, as Russia is considered a peer competitor with considerable cyber-defensive capacities, one informant expressed scepticism about the extent to which smaller member states are confident in their ability to deliver a cyber effect when it is requested by NATO.38 This is especially the case if operational success depends on a specific effect. Even if a state has developed the appropriate exploit, it must also be able to verify that the effect is achieved and ensure that the effect is contained to minimize collateral damage. And even if a state is confident about its current ability to contain and verify an effect, it must also be confident that it can deliver, verify and contain the effect at the specific time in the future when CYOC requests it. The process of integration is further complicated by the fact that NATO must be willing to hand over to contributing states the responsibility for making battle damage assessments and collateral damage estimations. As the following subsection shows, states are generally unwilling to share classified information about exploits. Hence, the delegated NATO commander is unlikely to receive much useful information about how cyber effects are delivered before a decision about their deployment must be taken. As commanders would prefer to have control over the capabilities used, member-state cyber effects are likely choices of method only if alternative, conventional effects are unavailable.

### Links --- Cyber = Distrust

#### NATO cyberoperations exacerbate distrust between members – cyber exploits require secrecy which results in allied deconfliction.

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The third challenge to the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations relates to a well-known military concept, deconfliction. The coordination by allies and military units of their efforts to avoid confliction, between for example an air operation and a special forces operation in the same area, is a central element in every military campaign. Deconfliction is all about openness and communication between allied partners. But in cyberspace, deconfliction comes with several difficulties. At the core of these difficulties is the fact that the tools and techniques that produce cyber effects—which are often also used and heavily depended on for intelligence collection—are developed in secret and must stay secret until the effect is achieved. If the IT vulnerabilities and exploits are known, vendors or adversaries can fix or replace the software and thereby render the effect impossible to achieve.39 In an alliance not known for sufficient mutual trust among members to share intelligence,40 there is little indication that allies will become more open about the cyber tools and techniques they currently have at their disposal. The request-based model is the result of that lack of trust. And the unwillingness to share cyber intelligence seriously challenges NATO’s ambition to use CYOC to facilitate information-sharing to increase situational awareness and thereby achieve the ‘cyber readiness’ and ‘cyber resiliency’ that NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană hopes to attain.41 Furthermore, lack of coordination and discussion about the use of military cyber capabilities, both internally in each state and among allies, can have negative implications for intelligence activities and general network security. A conventional military decision to deliver cyber effects is rarely concerned with maintaining access and staying secret after an effect is achieved. Even though it is customary to try to obscure the vulnerabilities that are being exploited, it is difficult to ensure that those operating the targeted system or third-party network analysts do not identify and fix the vulnerabilities in, for example, commercial products used all over the world. Thus, military plans to engage other state entities need to weigh the benefit of delivering cyber effects against the risk of losing intelligence capacity, as well as the risk that other actors (allies, corporations, adversaries, criminals, etc.) will use the same exploits against oneself. In other words, there is a conflict of interest between attack, intelligence collection and internal defence in each NATO member state.42 The desire of the US Cyber Command to become more independent from the National Security Agency (NSA) is precisely an attempt to gain a stronger voice when the US government assesses whether a vulnerability should be disclosed to vendors, retained for intelligence purposes or used to deliver ‘loud’ cyber effects.43 The risk of confliction among allies arises from the fact that a similar assessment procedure does not exist across NATO. As conversations with several national representatives at the CDC reveal, such a procedure is unlikely to be agreed upon owing to the different perspectives on offence, defence and espionage in cyberspace currently prevailing among member states.44 If the Netherlands, for example, offers to deliver a ‘loud’ cyber effect in a NATO operation, British or American intelligence operations could end up being disturbed because they rely on the same vulnerabilities which—when used in military operations—risk being exposed and subsequently fixed.45 When deploying ‘loud’ cyber effects, malicious actors such as criminals are also given the opportunity to identify and exploit the same vulnerabilities in unpatched systems in allied countries. The ransomware incidents known as WannaCry and NotPetya are examples of the damage that can emerge from government exploits becoming publicly available—even though the specific vulnerabilities were already patched by Microsoft and updates released to supported systems.46 In short, there is a dilemma both internally, between intelligence agencies and the military, and externally, between allies. While it is difficult to do much about the latter, the internal power dynamics in most states, with the intelligence agencies as the primary cyber actors, are likely to limit the willingness of most states to deliver military cyber effects—whether offensive or defensive—when CYOC makes requests. They also limit the willingness to share cyber threat information across the alliance through CYOC. This section has pointed to three characteristics about cyberspace that limit the integration of cyber effects in NATO operations. In a complex and constantly changing cyberspace, it continues to be difficult to develop and maintain sophisticated exploits for targeted cyber effects. This is especially the case if the cyber effects are requested for a specific time and place in order to guarantee operational success, and if they simultaneously have to be verifiable and conform to international legal principles. Neither the member states, which face an internal dilemma between attack, intelligence collection and defence in cyberspace, nor the NATO commander, who will prefer to control the capabilities used, are likely to feel sufficiently confident about the targeted or highly integrated cyber effects to choose that option if other capabilities are available.

### Links --- Cyber/OCOs Aff

#### The plan sparks disagreement and expansion; even if it’s a meaningful conversation, it destroys the Strategic concept

Smeets ’19 [Max; October 14; Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich, co-founder and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI.eu), an organization promoting the interdisciplinary study of cyber conflict and statecraft in Europe and beyond, also an Affiliate at Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation; Lawfareblog, “NATO Allies Need to Come to Terms With Offensive Cyber Operations,” <https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations>]

Neg in Green

U.S. Army Cyber Command, Fort Belvoir, Va. (Source: U.S. Army Cyber Command/Bill Roche)

In May 2008, the U.S. Department of Defense and the German Ministry of Defence signed a memorandum of understanding concerning “Cooperation on Information Assurance and Computer Network Defense.” Computer network defense (CND) refers to actions taken on computer networks to monitor and protect those networks. It is not the only memorandum the U.S. Department of Defense has signed with allies on cyber defense.

In late 2016, U.S. Cyber Command operators wiped Islamic State propaganda material off a server located in Germany. The German government was notified in some fashion but not asked for advance consent, causing much frustration. While U.S. Cyber Command’s reported action may have violated Germany’s sovereignty, it didn’t explicitly violate the memorandum. It wasn’t an act of CND; it was a computer network attack (CNA), seeking to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy.

This reveals an uneasy situation within cyber cooperation: Allies do not agree on the appropriate procedures and boundaries for offensive cyber operations. More specifically, there is no agreement on when military cyber organizations can gain access to systems and networks in allied territory to disrupt adversarial activity. As I have argued previously, this issue may end up causing significant loss in allies’ trust and confidence. My proposed solution: NATO allies should establish memoranda of understanding on offensive cyber effects operations in systems or networks based in allied territory.

#### 1AC evidence concedes the issue of OCOs is rife with allied disagreements and causes loss of trust in NATO – memorandum can’t solve if consensus is virtually impossible

1AC Smeets ’19 -- (Max Smeets, 10-14-2019, "NATO Allies Need to Come to Terms With Offensive Cyber Operations," Lawfare, https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-allies-need-come-terms-offensive-cyber-operations, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

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### Links --- Cyber Security

#### Burden-Sharing --- Cyber coop increases costs in a time of pressure on defense budgets --- risks backlash and cohesion

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/7-Cyber_Threats_NATO_Multidomain_Perspective_ebook.pdf> //um-ef)

In considering cooperation and burden-sharing, Allies face several dilemmas depending on their ambitions and resources for both cyberspace and MDO. The US must overcome domestic inter-service rivalries and decide how to integrate partners, including whether it can accept a multinational vision of MDO that is not imposed on smaller allies—or excludes them entirely, at NATO’s expense—but rather is genuinely collaborative (Watling & Roper, 2019). Larger European nations face the dilemma of whether to buy into a US-led architecture and system-of-systems with implications for freedom of action, data-sharing and procurement choices, or shoulder the costs of sovereign or multinational alternatives.11 They also face choices over how best to contribute to multinational MDO: whether to aspire to full-spectrum capabilities to allow sovereign action and offer redundancy to Allies’ capabilities or to specialise in certain domains (e.g. cyber) to offer niche capability and buy leverage with the US and NATO by making themselves indispensable. Smaller nations must decide how to influence larger Allies and NATO, and what to do if they lack cyber capabilities (or others deemed central to MDO, e.g. long-range fires) or their forces are too small to operate or gain MDO experience at echelons above brigade (Watling & Roper, 2019). The economic fallout of COVID-19 also raises renewed questions about affordability and the extent to which Allies are willing and able to invest in new cyber capabilities—though some may see these as cost-efficient alternatives to land, air or maritime forces—and how they time investments in ambitious transformation programmes such as MDO (Clark, 2020). Timing presents both threats and opportunities from a cyber perspective. Rapid, hasty transformation risks undermining NATO cohesion and interoperability or creating vulnerabilities in JADC2 systems with immature cyber defences (Donaldson & Sciarini, 2019b). Conversely, overly cautious change risks ceding ground to adversaries such as Russia and China which are investing heavily in asymmetric means, including offensive cyber capabilities, to gain an information advantage over NATO (Kilcullen, 2020).

#### Cyber Info-Sharing stresses alliance cohesion

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/7-Cyber_Threats_NATO_Multidomain_Perspective_ebook.pdf> //um-ef)

Policy differences exacerbate conceptual ones. Allies differ in their policy and legal constraints, strategic cultures, threat perception, resources, planning and budgetary cycles and forces (Sondhaus, 2006). While solidarity ultimately remains NATO’s strongest asset, these differences create seams that adversaries can exploit. This is especially so with cyberspace, where there is more sensitivity and less commonality to emerging national approaches than in more established domains, and to MDO, which is inherently predicated on integration and interoperability (Sharpy, 2020). Information sharing is especially problematic for the cyber dimension of MDO, with Allies reticent to share details of their capabilities across NATO given security concerns and political sensitivities. The issue of permissions is also a ‘significant challenge in the development of cyber capabilities’, especially where reconnaissance on Allied soil and networks is required to detect hostile cyber activity (Watling & Roper, 2019). Nations also have differing policy, legal and ethical stances on key technologies on which MDO relies. This includes the use of offensive cyber capabilities or basing of hypersonic missiles or longrange penetrating fires in Europe, which some fear could be destabilising and escalatory (Quintin & Vanholme, 2020). NATO similarly lacks a common approach to governance and use of AI, autonomy and automation, all envisaged as essential enablers for JADC2 (Williams, 2020). This affects the levels of autonomy (with the human in, on or out of the loop) used for sensor data fusion and decision-making, or to deliver effects using uncrewed platforms, automated cyber systems and human-machine teaming (Scharre, 2018).

#### Private Sector

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/7-Cyber_Threats_NATO_Multidomain_Perspective_ebook.pdf> //um-ef)

Problematically, authorities associated with using cyber capabilities are typically held at the strategic and national level; how tactical or operational commanders might call upon cyber means as part of future MDO remains unclear (Nettis, 2020). Responsibilities for cyberspace also often fall at least partly to civilian agencies, adding the complexity of cross-government cooperation. The private sector’s role developing and applying technologies in the cyber domain (and, increasingly, space) also necessitates that NATO work more closely with industry, academia and others than for land, maritime or air operations (Ablon et al., 2019). This presents operational, policy and legal difficulties for C2, and cybersecurity challenges associated with reliance on industry-owned networks, though Allies continue to evolve novel mechanisms for partnering with industry to address cyber threats (Carr, 2016).

#### Tempo

Black and Lynch ‘20

(James Black Research Leader Defence, Security and Infrastructure RAND Europe Alice Lynch1 Former Security and Defence Analyst RAND Europe, “Cyber Threats to NATO from a Multi-Domain Perspective,” pg online @ <https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/12/7-Cyber_Threats_NATO_Multidomain_Perspective_ebook.pdf> //um-ef)

There is also the question of tempo: how to synchronise operations in cyberspace with the delivery of effects in other domains (Reilly, 2020). Though cyber attacks might initiate in a moment, the underlying tools and exploits may take years to develop and the lead times and scale of their eventual effect may be difficult to predict or measure given the difficulties with battle damage assessment in cyberspace or the EMS (Patrikarakos, 2017; US Joint Staff, 2019). Similarly, commanders may lack awareness or understanding of available cyber instruments and their limitations and effects compared to more familiar weapons in the physical domains, limiting inclusion in joint planning and decision-making (Carbonell, 2017).

### Links --- General Cyber Ops

#### Cybersecurity is a divisive issue – divergent European and American approaches result in intra-alliance tensions.

Burton ’15 -- (Joe Burton, 2015, “NATO’s cyber defence: strategic challenges and institutional adaptation,” Defence Studies, 15:4, 297-319, DOI: 10.1080/14702436.2015.1108108, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

NATO has frequently been beset by intra-alliance tensions and in the cyber security arena there appears to be at least some evidence of a divergence in European and US policy approaches. Recent revelations by former NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, for example, have exposed transatlantic tensions around surveillance, and the alleged NSA hacking of Chancellor Angela Merkel’s cell phone, which led to an angry phone call between Obama and Merkel and the summoning of the US Ambassador to Germany, was a major embarrassment for the US government (Wilder 2013). The US has arguably taken a harder security stance on cyber issues since 9/11 because of its desire to protect the US homeland, and because it faces increased strategic rivalry from rival global power centres. A more aggressive cyber posture can certainly be seen in the establishment of the US Cyber Command, a unified and expanding military command structure tasked with coordinating defensive and offensive cyber operations for all branches of the US military, the deployment of the Stuxnet software against Iranian nuclear centrifuges, the Patriot Act, and the mass surveillance programmes run by the NSA, including the Prism programme. The use of offensive and even pre-emptive operations by the US government has also grown in recent years, with a high number of ICT specialists employed to penetrate foreign networks (Gellman and Nakashima 2013). In 2012, Obama signed Presidential Decision Directive 20, a classified document that gave the US military the authority to conduct more aggressive cyber operations to thwart cyber attacks against US systems (Nakashima 2012). The wealth of cyber resources and capabilities that exist within the US military and associated agencies may be a reason in and of itself why the US approach to managing cyber conflict has been dominated by that branch of the US government. Mary O Connell takes up this line of argument, suggesting that the US government has become “trapped in an ideology of militarism” (O’Connell 2012, p. 191) and claiming that “the US military today has the largest concentration of expertise and legal authority with respect to cyberspace” (O’Connell 2012, p. 187). She further notes that in 2009, following the Estonia attacks, the Russia Georgia war and the release of the Stuxnet virus, the US government “began releasing a number of policies on cyber security that were predominantly military in orientation” (O’Connell 2012, p. 188). This would seem to support the line of argument advanced by this article, that threats from state rather than non-state actors explain the elevation of cyber security as an issue within the transatlantic security community. This hard power approach to cyber security in the US could also be explained by the rhetoric being used to describe cyber attacks in the American context. Former Defence Secretary Leon Panetta’s claim that the US could face a “cyber Pearl Harbour” is a prime example of the securitisation and militarisation of cyber discourse. When there is a propensity at the highest levels of government to adopt Second World War and cold war analogies to characterise cyber conflict, this can shape US policy and doctrine in a certain direction. Shachtman and Singer (2011) argue that clear links can be found between cold war strategic thinking and the formulation of current US policy, especially the idea that cyber attacks might be met with conventional attacks; an idea “lifted” from the 1960s strategy of flexible response. Commercial and political motives might also have led to the US taking a more military-based approach to cyber security issues. They further argue that “there is a massive amount of threat inflation going on in Washington’s discussion of online dangers, most frequently by those with political or profit motives in hyping the threats” Shachtman and Singer (2011). While we should be careful in suggesting that a new “cyber industrial complex” is forming in America, the huge US government spending on cyber protection for the federal government, such as a $1 billion contract awarded to Raytheon by the Department for Homeland Security in 2015, may create incentives for responses to cyber security threats to be militarised. Equally, threat inflation may displace attention from the arguably more pervasive problem of cyber crime. In Europe, at least on the surface, a softer cyber security approach is evident. EU responses to cyber security have typically emphasised criminal and civil procedures for dealing with cyber attacks, reflecting a European preference for soft power over hard power, and there has been a broader reluctance in Europe to militarise cyberspace. The new European Union Cyber Security Strategy, for example, is based on promoting norms in cyberspace, encouraging dialogue between nations, enhancing technical capacity and resilience, and fighting cybercrime (Ashton 2013). The most controversial aspect has been the requirement for businesses in Europe, and particularly critical infrastructure providers, to report cyber attacks to a central authority. Overall though, the strategy is defensively orientated and non-militaristic.

### Links --- Cyber = Russia War

#### The aff expands NATO beyond its military purpose to cyber which is hybrid – that increases the risk of escalation and overstretches the agenda.

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One way to explain this is through the existence and dominance of a largely unspoken but widely accepted norm. For decades, the predominant actors in cyberspace have been intelligence agencies; and the norms that characterize interactions between intelligence agencies are not primarily concerned with military concepts such as conflict escalation and deterrence.67 In the world of intelligence agencies, success is not about keeping a distance between oneself and the adversary by signalling one’s intentions and capabilities. It is about being able to outmanoeuvre adversaries in a space of constant contact.68 There are always risks, and the work usually takes place in legal grey zones where a clear distinction between war and peace is not the guiding principle. This is an arena where the opportunity to annoy, cheat and delay opponents is taken when it arises. In short, espionage and counter-espionage do not fit well with the thorough military operational planning that characterizes NATO operations. Intelligence operations, on the other hand, fit perfectly with a dynamic cyberspace where anonymity is easy to achieve and uncertainty a constant condition.69 The states that embrace cyberspace as a domain where the intelligence norm dominates are able to use a broader array of tools to pursue or respond to various foreign political objectives than only those that relate to military operations. In its 2018 ‘vision’, the US Cyber Command built implicitly on the dominant intelligence norm. Here, the objective is to become more agile and act as close to the adversary as possible (‘defend forward’).70 The United States considers ‘constant contact’ and ‘persistent engagement’ as the necessary guiding principles to achieve superiority in cyberspace and to take full advantage of the broader potential for pursuing its political objectives through cyberspace. During the 2018 US midterm elections, for example, the US Cyber Command worked closely with the NSA to disrupt servers operated by the Russian Internet Research Agency aiming to spread fake news and stir up tension in the United States.71 More recently, the US Cyber Command responded with various cyber effects against Iran after the Iranian Revolutionary Guards apparently placed mines on ships in the Strait of Hormuz.72 These practices illustrate that, for the United States, cyber effects provide political options when one does not want to escalate existing tensions into military confrontation. Defensive coordination between allies through CYOC supports such defensive use of cyber effects, increasing the possibility that US Cyber Command will be allowed to ‘defend forward’ and work persistently through allied networks.73 A more cyber-active NATO, however, risks being counterproductive to the ambition to ‘defend forward’ through allied networks. Unintended conflict escalation from ongoing cyber activity is mainly a risk if military analysts—in a strategic environment with heightened attention to military confrontation—ignore the dominant intelligence norm. If that happens, it becomes more likely that ‘persistent engagement’ and active cyber defence will be misinterpreted as military preparation, armament or the initial phase of an attack. If NATO, an organization that has publicly returned to its original raison d’être of deterrence and collective defence, becomes the entity that coordinates cyber effects below the threshold of armed conflict, then the likelihood increases that Russia misinterprets these effects as escalatory and acts accordingly. In other words, a more active NATO in the current strategic environment increases the risk that the existing intelligence norm will be undermined and replaced by a more militarized norm.

## Links --- AI

### Links --- Best 2NC AI Link

#### NATO’s strategy on AI is uncoordinated and under-developed --- the plan’s coordination efforts cause time and effort and result in backlash and disagreement

Dr. Sharma 5/30/22

(Sanur, Dr Sanur Sharma is Associate Fellow at Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, “NATO’s AI Push And Military Implications – Analysis,” pg online @ <https://www.eurasiareview.com/30052022-natos-ai-push-and-military-implications-analysis/> //um-ef)

The influence of AI on NATO comes with a set of opportunities, challenges and risks. Its adoption process has been incremental and prescriptive. The rising geopolitical conflicts and the use of AI in such conflicts have required the establishment of a dynamic ecosystem to support interoperability. The military adoption of AI requires an innovation ecosystem that is self-sufficient, supports deterrence and resilience, and encompasses the strategic innovation process. NATO’s AI strategy raises many concerns related to the AI-driven autonomous weapon systems, as it does not adequately address the development of such systems, its deployment and governance. The AI strategy mostly talks about the ethical and responsible use of AI and has omitted the challenges related to the use of lethal autonomous weapon systems. For the US, its priorities lie in ensuring responsible use of AI-enabled systems with their allies for operational and data sharing. It remains to be seen if all the 30 NATO states agree on the same rules and would be willing to agree on practical guidelines for the operational use of AI-enabled systems. Another challenge for NATO is to standardise rules for all member states in dealing with AI-enabled autonomous weapon systems. Countries like Turkey are working on autonomous weapons and have developed AI-enabled loitering munitions. Turkey has requested the US for upgraded F-16 fighter jets that are said to be AI-enabled.25 The Biden Administration has asked the Congress to approve the upgrade of Turkey’s F-16 fighter jet fleet.26 Turkey’s armed drones have also been used in the Ukraine conflict. For smooth functioning of such systems, it will be necessary for all NATO members to have standardised rules when it comes to deployment of such systems. Also, there is no transparent allocation of roles for different NATO bodies, and “no dedicated line of funding” for its AI strategy.27 The finances are shared through multiple funding like NATO Innovation Fund and DIANA which manages funding for various other projects leading to uncertainty over availability of funds and budget cuts. This will be a significant challenge for the effective implementation of the AI strategy.28 Some other challenges with the adoption of AI strategy through innovation include fragmented national innovation initiatives, allied technological categorisation and digitisation gaps, speed of adoption and spending levels and the underuse of NATO’s mechanisms to undertake collaborative defence innovation.29

### Links --- AI Standardization

#### Political fights over AI undermine allied coordination

Stanley-Lockman and Trabucco ‘22

(Zoe Stanley-Lockman was previously an Associate Research Fellow at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) and contributed to this chapter in a personal capacity. Lena Trabucco is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen. Both authors contributed equally to this chapter, “NATO’s Role in Responsible AI Governance in Military Affairs,” pg online @ <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197579329.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780197579329-e-69> //um-ef)

More broadly, this chapter illustrates that regional and international organizations have high stakes for military AI governance. As development, procurement, and implementation of AI is accelerating, it is imperative that international organizations facilitate cooperation among states and industry partners to guide responsible military AI implementation aligned with core values and legal obligations. The convening and coordinating power of international organizations, among other governance tools, is a necessary step for state cooperation and policy alignment. How exactly NATO interacts with other international organizations in the security architecture, including the UN and EU, is a political topic that will also have important implications for the composition of international technology governance regimes, and is a subject for further research. On that note NATO, or any other international organization, is not exempt from these political hurdles. As EDTs increasingly become a focal point in the geopolitical space, any approach of AI governance in the international security environment will have global political undertones. This will undoubtedly be a significant hurdle for NATO as it balances responsible AI development and Allied coordination and cooperation in a changing geopolitical landscape. And certainly, the political realities may well represent the greatest challenge and disincentivize NATO to emerge as a leader in responsible military AI. Nevertheless, the three pillars indicate that NATO is an institution with considerable opportunity to shape responsible AI governance. More specifically, this entails urging and facilitating Allied standards and policies to establish foundations for emerging military technology built on informed and ethical principles and enhance the international security environment.

### Links --- AI Governance

#### AI governance causes massive infighting within the alliance – divergent priorities between allies makes cohesion impossible and hampers NATO efficacy.

Heikkila ’21 -- (Melissa Heikkilä, 3-29-2021, "NATO wants to set AI standards. If only its members agreed on the basics.," POLITICO, https://www.politico.eu/article/nato-ai-artificial-intelligence-standards-priorities/, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

On paper, NATO is the ideal organization to go about setting standards for military applications of artificial intelligence. But the widely divergent priorities and budgets of its 30 members could get in the way. The Western military alliance has identified artificial intelligence as a key technology needed to maintain an edge over adversaries, and it wants to lead the way in establishing common ground rules for its use. “We need each other more than ever. No country alone or no continent alone can compete in this era of great power competition,” NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoană, the alliance’s second in command, said in an interview with POLITICO. The standard-setting effort comes as China is pressing ahead with AI applications in the military largely free of democratic oversight. David van Weel, NATO’s assistant secretary general for emerging security challenges, said Beijing's lack of concern with the tech's ethical implications has sped along the integration of AI into the military apparatus. "I'm ... not sure that they're having the same debates on principles of responsible use or they're definitely not applying our democratic values to these technologies,” he said. Meanwhile, the EU — which has pledged to roll out the world's first binding rules on AI in coming weeks — is seeking closer collaboration with Washington to oversee emerging technologies, including artificial intelligence. But those efforts have been slow in getting off the ground. For Geoană, that collaboration will happen at NATO, which is working closely with the European Union as it prepares AI regulation focusing on “high risk” applications. The pitch NATO does not regulate, but “once NATO sets a standard, it becomes in terms of defensive security the gold standard in that respective field,” Geoană said. The alliance's own AI strategy, to be released before the summer, will identify ways to operate AI systems responsibly, identify military applications for the technology, and provide a “platform for allies to test their AI to see whether it's up to NATO standards,” van Weel said. The strategy will also set ethical guidelines around how to govern AI systems, for example by ensuring systems can be shut down by a human at all times, and to maintain accountability by ensuring a human is responsible for the actions of AI systems. “If an adversary would use autonomous AI powered systems in a way that is not compatible with our values and morals, it would still have defense implications because we would need to defend and deter against those systems,” van Weel said. “We need to be aware of that and we need to flag legislators when we feel that our restrictions are coming into the realm of [being detrimental to] our defense and deterrence,” he continued. Mission impossible? The problem is that NATO's members are at very different stages when it comes to thinking about AI in the military context. The U.S., the world's biggest military spender, has prioritized the use of AI in the defense realm. But in Europe, most countries — France and the Netherlands excepting — barely mention the technology’s defense and military implications in their national AI strategies. “It’s absolutely no surprise that the U.S. had a military AI strategy before it has a national AI strategy," but the Europeans "did it exactly the other way around," said Ulrike Franke, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said: That echoes familiar transatlantic differences — and previous U.S. President Donald Trump's complaints — over defense spending, but also highlights the different approaches to AI regulation more broadly. The EU's AI strategy takes a cautious line, touting itself as "human-centric," focused on taming corporate excesses and keeping citizens' data safe. The U.S., which tends to be light on regulation and keen on defense, sees things differently. There are also divergences over what technologies the alliance ought to develop, including lethal autonomous weapons systems — often dubbed “killer robots” — programmed to identify and destroy targets without human control. Powerful NATO members including France, the U.K., and the U.S. have developed these technologies and oppose a treaty on these weapons, while others like Belgium and Germany have expressed serious concerns about the technology. These weapons systems have also faced fierce public opposition from civil society and human rights groups, including from United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres, who in 2018 called for a ban. Geoană said the alliance has “retained autonomous weapon systems as part of the interests of NATO.” The group hopes that its upcoming recommendations will allow the ethical use of the technology without “stifling innovation.” Staying relevant These issues threaten to hamper NATO's standard-setting drive. "I think there’s a certain danger that if NATO doesn’t take this on as a real challenge, that it may be marginalized by other such efforts,” Franke said. She pointed to the U.S.-led AI Partnership for Defense, which consists of 13 countries from Europe and Asia to collaborate on AI use in the military context — a forum which could supplant NATO as the standard-setting body. That could have consequences for human rights, too. “NATO… is a great place to responsibly think about how to harness the good parts of this technology and how to prohibit the parts that would be catastrophic for humanitarian law and human rights law, and people at the end of the day,” said Verity Coyle, a senior adviser at Amnesty International, which is part of the Stop Killer Robots campaign. “Without oversight mechanisms to ensure ethical standards and measures, which would guarantee that this technology will operate under meaningful human control” NATO’s strategy could head into an “ethical vacuum,” Coyle said. Franke said it's better for the alliance to focus on the basics, like increased data sharing to develop and train military AI and cooperating on using artificial intelligence in logistics. “If NATO countries were to cooperate on that, that could create good procedures and set precedents. And I think we should then move on to the more controversial things such as autonomous weapons systems,” she said.

### Links --- LAWS

#### NATO allies don’t agree on LAWS regulations or implementation --- plan ignites a firestorm

Konaev and Chahal ‘21

(Margarita Konaev Margarita Konaev is a research fellow with CSET, where Husanjot Chahal is a research analyst, Husanjot Chahal, “The Path of Least Resistance,” pg online @ <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-Path-of-Least-Resistance.pdf> //um-ef)

That said, there is no international consensus on how to regulate the process of integrating AI into military systems or the development and potential use of AI-enabled weapons. In international forums, the United States alongside allies like Australia, France, Israel, South Korea, and the United Kingdom, have opposed negotiating a new international treaty preemptively banning autonomous weapons. 10 Yet France as well as Germany have also expressed interest in a nonbinding declaration on the regulation of LAWS, while others like Canada are open to transparency and confidence-building measures on the development and potential use of such weapons systems. 11 In January 2021, the European Parliament released a report on military uses of AI that called for an European Union (EU)-wide strategy against LAWS, which the report defined as “weapons 4 Center for Security and Emerging Technology | systems without meaningful human control over the critical functions of targeting and attacking individual targets.” 12 As a whole, U.S. allies differ in their positions. Meanwhile, the main outlet for international deliberations on this issue—the Group of Governmental Experts on emerging technologies in the area of lethal autonomous weapons systems, established by the contracting parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons—has made little progress beyond agreeing on the principles to guide the discussions themselves.

## Links --- Biotech

### Links --- Cognitive Biotech

#### Cognitive Biotech requires agreement and governance strategies to develop

Bernal et al ‘21

(Johns Hopkins University: Alonso Bernal, Cameron Carter, Mohamad Elgendi, Melanie Kemp, Richard Kim, Gabriel Ramirez, Ishpreet Singh, Ujwal Arunkumar Taranath, Klinsman Vaz, Alysia Mirilia Martins and FNU Mallika Imperial College London: Sophia Mexi-Jones and Bridget Shidok, “Cognitive Biotechnology: opportunities and considerations for the NATO Alliance,” pg online @ <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2021/02/26/cognitive-biotechnology-opportunities-and-considerations-for-the-nato-alliance/index.html> //um-ef)

Ethical issues and responsible use There are several ethical considerations for CBT that may transcend even AI in their complexity. First is the issue of personal agency. If CBT is able to motivate, enable, and even control human decision making and action, where does individual responsibility end? Are soldiers responsible for their actions when under the influence of advanced CBT, and under what conditions? Relatedly, how does the Alliance ensure that there is sufficient consent for the use of CBT for individuals tasked to use the technology? These technologies can be invasive, both physiologically and mentally, and have the potential to cause harm, particularly as we do not fully understand their unintended cognitive and biological consequences. In addition, significant privacy concerns will be raised once these technologies can enter our minds and see our most private thoughts and memories. What are the limits of such searches? And what are the protections for physiological and cognitive data, and who may store and control their dissemination or cause their deletion? More generally, what protections will we have against the potential of mind control, cognitive erasure, and reprogramming? The Alliance’s success with CBT will depend upon well-designed principles and practices relating to these ethical considerations, since the adoption and integration of these technologies will be based on the consent and acceptance of Allied governments and their societies at large. As in the case of AI, the Alliance and member governments will need to develop principles of responsible use, addressing such issues as privacy, consent, lawfulness, responsibility and governability.

## AT: Link Turns

### 2NC Internals --- Disagreements S/Over

#### Disagreements spillover and tube cooperation on an entire NATO program

Nicholas Burns 19, Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations at Harvard Kennedy School, MA in International Relations from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, and Douglas Lute, Senior Fellow at the Project on Europe and the Transatlantic Relationship, Former United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, Holds Degrees from the United States Military Academy at West Point and from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, “NATO at Seventy: An Alliance in Crisis”, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School Report, February 2019, https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/nato-seventy-alliance-crisis

NATO needs to take a hard look at itself. Across twenty-five indicators of democracy rated by Freedom House, the downward trend among NATO allies over the past decade is stark.35 Especially in Central Europe but not exclusively, there are setbacks in the media, the judiciary and the functioning of national democratic institutions. The rate at which democracy is declining in Poland, Hungary and Turkey is particularly alarming. In 2017 and 2018, these three states’ scores represented some of the largest one-year declines in political rights and civil liberties of all 195 countries ranked by Freedom House.36 Poland—with the largest category declines in the forty-year history of the survey—is close to leaving the “consolidated democracy” category.37 Hungary is no longer rated a consolidated democracy. Turkey, whose decline in freedom over the last ten years represents the largest of any country in the world, crossed the threshold from “free” to “not free.”38

While less severe today, nationalist populism movements in other allies represent a broader, more diffuse threat to NATO and can amplify other challenges facing the Alliance. The United States is not immune, with its Freedom House rating declining in 2018 due to “Russian interference in the 2016 election, violations of basic ethical standards by the new administration and a reduction in government transparency.”39 While this slippage in the U.S. is relatively recent and still minor in scale, it nonetheless diminishes America’s standing as a standard-bearer for democracy and further erodes its leadership position within the Alliance. Further, anti-democratic policies among allies open vulnerabilities for interference by competitors outside the Alliance, especially Russia that seeks to divide NATO and the EU politically using hybrid tactics.40

The question for allies is what must the role of the Alliance be in reinforcing its core values when they are under assault from within. NATO is both a political and a military alliance. It is not enough to be bound together by a commitment only to Article 5 collective defense. The values in the Treaty and the adherence of NATO allies to those values is fundamental for Alliance cohesion. That shared commitment to values in turn makes credible the Article 5 commitment. The Washington Treaty is binding for both its political and military commitments.41 Allies cannot ignore the failure to abide by political commitments including values and expect military commitments to be unaffected. In short, NATO allies should not expect that they could violate democratic values without consequences, while resting assured that NATO cohesion is intact and other commitments in the Treaty will be upheld. The Treaty is not a menu of options from which allies can select some obligations while ignoring others.

The NATO Treaty has no provision for policing members that drift from common political values, unlike the European Union Treaty’s Chapter 7 that has been invoked recently toward several EU member states with some success.42 While it would be impossible to achieve consensus to impose penalties on wayward allies, given that the ally in question could veto any penalties, a range of escalating political initiatives on the part of the Secretary General and a coalition of the other allies could assert pressure. As a start, the Secretary General should express concern in his bilateral meetings with the anti-democratic governments, with the support of key allies and in partnership with the European Union. To increase awareness within the Alliance and among the public, foreign ministers could review annually indicators of democracy for all twenty-nine allies, perhaps prepared by an informal high-level group of experts drawing on Freedom House data. The NATO Parliamentary Assembly and coalitions of allies can amplify the message.43 To increase pressure, NATO could suspend hosting of visits, official meetings and even military exercises with these nations. In severe cases, NATO infrastructure spending and even access to military schools and information sharing could be affected. An indirect way to express concern among allies is to increase the prominence of core democratic values when considering NATO enlargement decisions in the future.44 None of these steps is without political cost and risk, even if calibrated carefully. But the costs and risks of the gradual erosion of Alliance cohesion as member states drift from the founding values are even greater. NATO cannot expect to remain coherent and relevant and able to address the full range of challenges it faces, if it ignores the internal drift from democracy within some member states. This drift is a fundamental issue for the Alliance.45

Streamlining NATO Decision-Making

Finally, the challenges facing NATO today demand more flexibility in executive decision-making. As a core principle in preserving NATO cohesion, consensus decision-making must remain the basis for major NATO actions.46 The Treaty requirements for consensus on collective defense decisions (Article 5) and enlargement decisions (Article 10) remain sensible. Major policy decisions like the Defense Investment Pledge or the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force rapid reaction capabilities require consensus. But today with NATO enlarged to twenty-nine members and facing increasingly diverse and complex challenges, it is time to consider how other, more routine, administrative decisions can be taken more efficiently. But this should be a management function, not derogation from the consensus principle.

We recommend strengthening the Secretary General’s role as the chief executive of the Alliance with broader authority to carry out routine business without seeking consensus among the twenty-nine members. For example, the Secretary General should consult allies on matters such as agendas and timings of Ministerial Council meetings, but not be required to seek consensus agreement. Today the agenda and even the dates of a Foreign Minister meeting or a NATO-Russia Council meeting can consume hours of formal Council time seeking consensus at the ambassadorial level, consuming headquarters’ bandwidth and crowding out more substantive and urgent topics, including many outlined in this paper. Further, the Secretary General’s flexibility on international staff personnel changes and NATO budget matters should be increased. Today, for example, the Secretary General is severely constrained from adapting the Alliance to emerging challenges by making meaningful shifts in personnel and budgetary resources.47 While nations will continue to want a critical role in all these decisions, criteria should be developed that will provide for more flexibility while ensuring that all allies gain a fair share of opportunities and allocation of resources.

A related problem is the tendency of some allies to bring into the Alliance bilateral issues that impede progress on collective issues of the Alliance. As an example, an ally might hold up agreement on the entire NATO military exercise program because of an unrelated bilateral dispute with a NATO partner who wishes to participate in an exercise.48 This practice erodes Alliance cohesion and should not be permitted. After appropriate consultation, we recommend the Secretary General should have the authority to exclude such external issues from consideration in the Alliance, even if it means moving forward without full consensus.

## Internals

### 2NC --- Internals --- Unity k NATO

#### Unity and burden sharing are critical to NATOs effectiveness

Ellehus ‘21

(Rachel, is deputy director and senior fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. “NATO Futures: Three Trajectories,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/nato-futures-three-trajectories> //um-ef)

As ever, the key to NATO’s continued survival will be its ability to adapt to a changing external security environment in keeping with the security needs of its members. Merely raising the level of ambition without ensuring political cohesion and adequate resources will only undermine the alliance’s credibility and relevance for the next decade. An examination of the above potential trajectories can assist NATO allies in effecting the future they wish to see. While the future is inherently unpredictable, keeping the alliance on the positive trajectory will require more equitable burden sharing within NATO; leveraging the competencies of other capable actors, such as the European Union and like-minded global partners; investing in innovation to maintain NATO’s technological edge; and building resilience to counter adversaries’ attempts to divide the alliance. Conversely, if unity of purpose and shared values are lost, the security burden is carried by only a few allies, internal resilience is unaddressed, and U.S. leadership is absent, NATO will find itself on the negative trajectory. And while the status quo of “muddling through” may seem good enough for now, it will likely also land NATO on the negative trajectory over time.

### Internals --- Defense Priorities

#### Diverging threat perceptions impact decisions --- discussions over how to allocate scarce resources impact stability and cohesion

Kunz ‘21

(Barbara, PhD from Stockholm University/Sweden and a Master's degree from the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris. She is a Member of the steering committee OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions., “NATO 2030: Towards a New Strategic Concept and Beyond.,” Ch. 7 pg Muse //um-ef)

It would, however, be erroneous to solely limit the analysis of disagreements among NATO members to the actions of Turkey as the current ‘problematic ally.’ Even Western European Allies sometimes hold positions that are incompatible with each other. Key disagreements pertain to threat perception and hence defense priorities as well as to the likelihood of continued US security guarantees. These disagreements run deep—sometimes so deep that they are not always visible at the surface level of every-day policy issues. Yet, they clearly shape positions, as a closer look at the ongoing European defense debate reveals. In past years, many important aspects of this debate revolved around the notion of European strategic autonomy. Long known and used in a French national context,14 the 2016 European Union Global Strategy lifted “strategic autonomy” to the European level. The document “nurtures the ambition of strategic autonomy for the European Union,” but does not provide a concise definition of the notion’s content or implication.15 The ensuing and There is No “Europe” 161 at times heated debate among Europeans was not particularly enlightening at the conceptual level and is today considered in need of being “detoxified.”16 Yet, the debate has offered many meta-level insights into the various national approaches to European security and defense. Two variables are key in this context: threat perception and assessments of the likely future of US security guarantees for Europe. Threat perception is an absolute classic in European defense debates: the question of against what or whom Europe needs to be defended. Diverging threat perceptions translate into different and even incompatible views on what policies the Alliance should adopt regarding certain key issues, notably in its relationship with Russia as the single most important issue for Euro-Atlantic security in the 21st century. Moreover, given that threat perception requires translation into defense planning, this is also a debate about allocating capabilities and defining priorities in light of scarce resources. Most important in the context of threat perception is how Europeans should deal with Russia, notably in a wider vision of Euro-Atlantic security. The second variable pertains to the United States and its engagement in European security. Here, the key question is that of the mid- and long-term reliability of US security guarantees and the conclusions Europeans need to draw for their own security cooperation, which, in turn, has ramifications for NATO.

### Internals --- Competing Priorities

#### Concept must balance competing priorities --- Russia deterrence focus with global issues like EDT

Simon 6/2/22

(Prof. Luis Simón is director of the Brussels office of the Elcano Royal Institute, and director of the Centre for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy (CSDS) at the Brussels School of Governance, “The Madrid Strategic Concept and the future of NATO,” pg online @ <https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2022/06/02/the-madrid-strategic-concept-and-the-future-of-nato/index.html#:~:text=At%20the%20Brussels%20Summit%20in,world%20was%20a%20different%20place> //um-ef)

Initial discussions on the next Strategic Concept revolved around the need to prepare the Alliance for a world characterised by the return of inter-state threats and great power competition. This alone marked a sharp contrast with the Alliance’s post-Cold War focus on transnational challenges and non-peer competitors. What would the return of great power competition entail for the evolving balance between NATO’s so-called three core tasks (i.e. collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security)? How should NATO balance a renewed focus on inter-state threats and great power competitors with the ongoing relevance of transnational threats and challenges, like terrorism or the climate-security nexus? When thinking about great power competition, how much emphasis should NATO put on Russia’s immediate threat to Europe, as opposed to the more systemic challenge represented by China’s strategic rise? And what should be the right balance between the military and non-military aspects of great power competition? The latter question becomes particularly relevant in light of the growing salience of “hybrid” forms of warfare and emerging disruptive technologies, which compel the Alliance to emphasize societal resilience at home and step up its efforts to innovate technologically. The war in Ukraine – and ongoing debates about how the Alliance can assist Ukraine while strengthening deterrence in Eastern Europe – have become important topics in Strategic Concept discussions. In a way, the current war vindicates the view that we do indeed live in an increasingly competitive world, and that inter-state threats are back. On the other hand, the overt and direct nature of Russia’s invasion challenges some of the pervading assumptions about how future conflict was likely to unfold in indirect and hybrid ways. Even though the Strategic Concept is meant to inform long-term strategy, the salience of the war in Ukraine and the fact that it is likely to reverberate for years to come, makes the crisis important when developing the Concept. That said, uncertainty as to the fate of Russia’s operations in Ukraine or how they may impinge on Russia’s power and strategic posture along the Eastern border of the Alliance, mean that any reflection on NATO’s strategy in the East will need to go beyond the Strategic Concept. More broadly, the Strategic Concept must look beyond immediate challenges in Europe and take stock of the broader shift in global power from the Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific. The Strategic Concept from a historical perspective The current NATO Strategic Concept, adopted in Lisbon in 2010, aims to strike a balance between the Alliance’s so-called three core tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. In many ways, the Lisbon Strategic Concept draws on the previous one (adopted in Washington in 1999). It represents a crystallisation of NATO’s experience in the post-Cold War period, an era characterised by Western military-technological supremacy, and the seeming absence of peer competitors. In the immediate post-Cold War period, the belief that former adversaries like Russia and even emerging great powers like China could somehow be integrated in the rules-based order was still widely held. This was a truly exceptional period. The power surplus enjoyed by the United States and its allies gave the West a free hand (both politically and militarily) to engage in ambitious out-of-area endeavours, and leverage crisis management operations and collective security initiatives to expand the remit of the so-called open and rules-based international order, not only in the broader Euro-Atlantic neighbourhood but also beyond. During the long-post Cold War era, collective defense and deterrence took a back seat. Even though they constituted the fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security, they were considered almost superfluous in light of Western military-technological supremacy. Crisis management and collective security ruled the day. But this world is gone and great power competition is back. That reality was illustrated by Russia’s annexations of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Crimea in 2008 and 2014, and even more starkly by its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Also striking has been China’s strategic rise and growing assertiveness in East Asia and beyond. Peer competitors are once again challenging security, and geopolitical and security architecture in the important regions of Europe and East Asia, but also the institutional and normative fabric that underpins the open, rules-based international order. Adapting the Alliance to this new wave of great power competition is arguably the main challenge in the coming decade. Beyond Ukraine Since NATO’s birth in 1949 – and potentially as far back as the industrial revolution – the Euro-Atlantic region has been the undisputable centre of gravity of global politics. Developments in and around the Euro-Atlantic region typically had a profound impact upon geopolitical and strategic balances elsewhere. However, in today’s and tomorrow’s worlds, the opposite is likely to be true. As the Indo-Pacific becomes the center of gravity of global economic growth, military competition and technological innovation, dynamics emanating from that region are likely to have a growing impact on other regions, including the Euro-Atlantic. Thus, the geopolitical and security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic region is likely to be increasingly affected by exogenous factors. In a world that no longer revolves around the Euro-Atlantic region, and is increasingly defined by China’s strategic rise and the growing centrality of the Indo-Pacific region, the Alliance will need to think more globally about security. To be sure, the Euro-Atlantic region will remain NATO’s direct referent. However, the future of that region – and that of NATO itself – will likely become increasingly affected by broader geostrategic dynamics to a degree and in ways that are unfamiliar to NATO and its member countries. NATO must therefore adapt to a world in which the Euro-Atlantic region will remain important, but will probably become a secondary theatre in world politics, as well as in the context of US geostrategy. These changes should push the Alliance to develop a more global approach to security. Beyond the more specific question of whether NATO itself should act globally (e.g., by developing a presence in the Indo-Pacific region), the Allies ought to think more systematically about the main communicating vessels between Euro-Atlantic security and broader geostrategic dynamics, specifically the Indo-Pacific. Three stand out: the global implications of China’s rise; the evolution of the Sino-Russian relationship; and America’s need to prioritise between Europe and Asia, and what that may mean for NATO, European security and the longstanding debate about a transatlantic division of labour. The war in Ukraine, and Allied efforts to assist Ukraine and to bolster deterrence in the East, seem to have led to a revival of the transatlantic relationship, and a renewed focus on Europe, including for the United States. Yet contrary to what one may instinctively think, the war in Ukraine is unlikely to alter the steady shift in the centre of global strategy and politics – or, for that matter, of US geostrategy – towards the Indo-Pacific region. Rather than halt a shift towards the Indo-Pacific, the Ukraine crisis and the response to it so far, provide a powerful illustration of how European geopolitical and security dynamics are increasingly affected by extra-European ones. For one thing, China- and Asia-centric considerations have featured prominently in debates about how the United States should respond to Russia’s aggression in Europe. Some experts argue that the United States should avoid getting bogged down in a European war – lest this should distract its attention from the Indo-Pacific. Others have contended that a strong U.S. response will deter adversaries and reassure allies elsewhere, notably in the Indo-Pacific. As long as the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific hinges largely on US power, and as long as these two regions continue to exercise significant pressure on US defense resources, their alliance and deterrence architectures will probably remain intertwined. This underscores the importance of greater political and military coordination between NATO and its key partners in the Asia-Pacific, namely Japan, Australia, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand. For another thing, it is also important that NATO and its Asia-Pacific partners have a common picture on Russia and China, and how their relationship may evolve. Without ignoring existing frictions, if the Sino-Russia relationship remains broadly cooperative, attempts to drive a wedge between them may prove challenging. The broader point, however, is that whatever the United States and its European and Asia-Pacific allies think they can do in relation to engaging Russia or China, or manipulating their relationship, they must remain aligned. Otherwise, there is a risk they may draw different conclusions about either power’s trajectory or how their relationship may evolve, and thus frame their policies on the basis of different premises. This could conceivably trigger competition between the United States and its allies, and among NATO Allies themselves. Conclusion The war in Ukraine has become an important aspect in the debate about NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. Discussions on how to continue to assist Ukraine and bolster deterrence along the Eastern part of the Alliance will no doubt take center stage in Madrid in June. This is understandable: deterring a war in Europe is what NATO was created for. In fact, when it comes to the main questions informing the debate on the Strategic Concept - i.e. the balance between the three core tasks; state vs. non-state threats; military vs. non-military; Russia vs. China, etc. - the war in Ukraine may make the pendulum swing closer to the former than many would have anticipated just prior to the invasion. However, preparing the Alliance for a context increasingly defined by great power competition requires looking beyond the current crisis in Eastern Europe, and taking stock of broader geo-strategic developments. This is particularly important in light of the decreasing centrality of the Euro-Atlantic region in global strategic competition, and the fact that security dynamics in and around Europe will be progressively affected by extra-European developments. Critically, the Alliance will need to develop a more global approach to security, and more specifically a better understanding of geo-strategic developments in the Indo-Pacific region, and their likely implications for Euro-Atlantic security.

### Internals --- Prioritize k Deterrence

#### Broad strategic concept that doesn’t prioritize certain threats waters down NATO and causes disunity – the 2010 strategic concept proves.

Ringsmose and Rynning 21 [Jens Ringsmose, Dean of the Faculty of Business and Social Sciences at SDU, has been appointed as the new Rector of the University of Southern Denmark from 1 November 2021. Sten Rynning is Professor in the Center for War Studies at the University of Southern Denmark.; “NATO’s Next Strategic Concept: Prioritise or Perish”; Survival; September 28, 2021; https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00396338.2021.1982203]//eleanor

The 2010 Strategic Concept displays all the signs of an Alliance faced with a range of security challenges but no major threats. It was drafted and approved at a time when NATO forces were heavily engaged in a war of choice in Afghanistan, and when the vast majority of allies did not perceive Russia – let alone China – as an adversary, but rather saw it as a potential strategic partner. Certainly, some allies wanted NATO to ‘come home’ and focus its energies on Europe, Russia and collective defence, but most allies, including the United States, preferred NATO to be global in orientation and better prepared for crisis management. Thus, there was little consensus as to what NATO’s key strategic focus should be in an indeterminate security environment.7 Unsurprisingly, the Strategic Concept does not set any clear strategic priorities. It merely identifies three core tasks: collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security. Collective defence is catalogued first, but there are no indications that the order in which the tasks are listed is meant to signify a hierarchy of priorities. Several new initiatives and forward-looking schemes are introduced, yet the concept stops short of giving precedence to any core task. Likewise, the potential threats, risks and challenges identified by the concept, most of which are unconventional and transnational in nature, appear to be listed in no particular order. Tellingly, the concept describes the security environment as being characterised by ‘a broad and evolving set of challenges’ that include the proliferation of nuclear weapons, technology-related trends and environmental constraints.8 The 2010 concept’s ambiguity concerning threats and strategic priorities predictably spills over into its (lack of) military guidance. Unlike the 1991 and 1999 Strategic Concepts, the 2010 version does not include a detailed section on ‘Guidelines for Defence’ that lays out comprehensive directions for military planners. It speaks in generic terms of new defence initiatives and lists aspirations to develop future capabilities, yet it is silent on concrete measures, desired military effects and objectives. Compared with its forerunners, and particularly the Cold War concepts, the 2010 document is thus extraordinarily political in character and oriented towards public diplomacy, and by implication rather disconnected from the military side of NATO. Any bridge linking the Alliance’s political masters to its military authorities, as previously established by the ‘Guidelines for Defence’ in 1991 and 1999, is awkwardly missing.

#### The strategic concept sets NATO’s purpose for the next decade.

Heard et al. 6/15/22 [Kaleigh Heard is a senior analysist for RAND and has a Ph.D. in political science; Pauline Paillé is an analysist for RAND; Kristin Thue is a research assistant at RAND; “Human Security and the 2022 NATO Strategic Concept”; RAND Corporation; June 15, 2022; https://www.rand.org/pubs/conf\_proceedings/CFA2067-1.html]//eleanor

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is set to adopt its new Strategic Concept on 29-30 June 2022 at the Summit in Madrid. The Alliance's second most important document after its founding Treaty, the Strategic Concept reaffirms NATO's values and purpose, and provides a collective assessment of the security environment. The Strategic Concept is foundational in driving NATO's strategic adaptation and guides its future political and military development. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has undertaken a consultation phase to explore and inform key issue areas within the new Strategic Concept. While human security has long been a priority for NATO, ongoing events in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of Western forces and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have provoked further consideration of the role human security plays in NATOs activities.

### Internals --- SC key to Cohesion/Deterrence

#### Cohesion measured through strategic plans and capabilities outweighs their thumpers --- the Concept is CRITICAL

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

NATO achieves its objectives by upscaling its readiness, response and military capabilities to deter an adversary. It aims at maintaining military forces in the right place and time capable of deterring or, if necessary, repelling an adversary. In this context, NATO leaders, who are aware of the fact that unity is essential for success, comply with the principles of “cohesion” and “coherence”. Hence, “cohesion” and “coherence” have become distinctive indicators of NATO’s current strategic concept. According to the former NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen, “the Alliance that cannot ensure collective defence loses cohesion in achieving collective security”. In order to clarify the principles that are crucial for the implementation of the new strategy, it is necessary to understand what “NATO’s cohesion” and “NATO’s coherence” mean.Footnote1 NATO’s cohesion means a level of political and ideological unity as well as solidarity between the members of the Pact. It mainly refers to the principles on which the Alliance is based. This is particularly true of the Member States’ commitment to collective defence, threats and challenges facing the Alliance. NATO’s coherence refers to consensus among the Member States in order to guarantee the Alliance’s capabilities and capacities necessary to ensure the effective implementation of NATO’s missions. It involves strategic plans, resource requirements, material capabilities, operational procedures, command structures, the number of soldiers and logistical infrastructure (Hodges et al. 2019). The dynamics of events after 2014 as well as the emergence of new international threats (e.g. ISIS, refugees, epidemics) has led to increasing expenditures on security and collective defence (Grygiel and Wess Mitchell 2014). This issue seems to be extremely important and therefore still remains within the realm of discussions among the politicians and bodies responsible for the state security. With time and transformations in geopolitical and military situations in the world, the requirements for the North Atlantic Pact have also changed, which has inspired the authors to write this article.

### Internals --- SC key to Ukraine

#### Focus on only Russia now – energy limited

Goldgeier and Moller 6/29/22 [James Goldgeier and Sara Bjerg Moller; A visiting scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and a former Eisenhower Fellow at the NATO Defense College; “What to watch for at this week’s NATO summit”; June 29, 2022; DOA: 6/30/22; https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/06/29/nato-summit-madrid-russia-china-strategic-concept/; Lowell-ES]

The United States is more deeply engaged in Europe than the Biden administration intended — and Putin’s war has once again highlighted America’s role as the guarantor of European security. It wasn’t supposed to be this way: Washington’s focus was supposed to be on China. And that brings us to the original headliner of the Madrid summit: the Strategic Concept.

At their December 2019 summit, NATO leaders mentioned China for the first time in a summit declaration. The alliance’s last Strategic Concept, in 2010, didn’t address China. In 2021, we and other analysts had every expectation that the big item to look for at the gathering in Madrid this week would be a detailed explanation of NATO’s role in countering the growing threat from China.

But responding to Russian aggression, deterring future potential Russian military, political and cyberattacks on NATO members — and boosting the alliance’s force posture to shore up NATO’s eastern members — now take precedence. In fact, Stoltenberg on Monday announced NATO’s high-readiness forces would grow from 40,000 to more than 300,000, which means sizable numbers of U.S. troops will be heading to Europe.

Although the Russia-Ukraine war is thus making the U.S. foreign policy pivot toward the Indo-Pacific that much harder, expect to see some language about China in the new Strategic Concept. One point to watch is whether a proposed summit on the sidelines takes place among NATO’s key Indo-Pacific partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

As with any strategy document, of course, it’s the implementation that really matters. As NATO leaders gather in Madrid, one big question is whether the alliance has the energy not only to continue for as long as necessary the broad-based support for Ukraine but to tackle other key challenges as well.

#### NATO has to focus on current strategy, else failure in Ukraine

Kupchan 6/29/22 [Charles, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University; “NATO’s Hard Road Ahead”; June 29, 2022; DOA: 7/3/22; <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-29/natos-hard-road-ahead>; Lowell-ES]

But despite its clean bill of health and demonstrable unity, NATO faces a thicket of thorny issues, and discussions in Madrid will only just begin to address them. The war in Ukraine will, of course, dominate the summit. The conversation is poised to focus on the easy part: getting more arms to the frontlines. But NATO also needs to take up the hard part: when and how to marry the flow of weapons to a diplomatic strategy aimed at producing a cease-fire and follow-on negotiations over territory. The urgency of making that pivot stems from the need not just to end the death and destruction but to limit the war’s economic spillover, which could threaten the Atlantic alliance from within by eroding solidarity and weakening the West’s democratic foundations. The conflict in Ukraine also puts on NATO’s agenda a set of additional challenges: managing the future of enlargement, channeling Europe’s growing geopolitical aspirations, and building a transatlantic architecture that can accommodate the ever more complex and diverse issues facing the West.

# IMPACTS

## Impacts --- Core DA/Deterrence

### Impacts --- Divisions = War

#### Russia will exploit divisions between NATO members to instigate nuclear crises---extinction.

Kulesa ’18 [Lukasz; February 2018; Research Director at the European Leadership Network; European Leadership Network, “Envisioning a Russia-NATO Conflict: Implications for Deterrence Stability,” <http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep17437>]

Escalation: Can a NATO - Russia conflict be managed?

Once a conflict was under way, the “fog of war” and rising unpredictability would inevitably set in, complicating the implementation of any predetermined theories of escalation, deescalation and inter-conflict management. The actual dynamics of a conflict and the perceptions of the stakes involved are extremely difficult to predict. Simulations and table-top exercises can give only limited insights into the actual decision-making processes and interactions.

Still, Russian military theorists and practitioners seem to assume that a conflict with NATO can be managed and controlled in a way that would bring it to a swift end consistent with Russian aims. The Russian theory of victory would seek to exploit weak points in an Alliance war effort. Based on the conviction that democracies are weak and their leaders and populations are risk-averse, Russia may assume that its threats of horizontal or vertical escalation could be particularly effective. It would also try to bring home the notion that it has much higher stakes in the conflict (regime survival) than a majority of the NATO members involved, and thus will be ready to push the boundaries of the conflict further. It would most likely try to test and exploit potential divisions within the Alliance, combining selective diplomacy and activation of its intelligence assets in some NATO states with a degree of selectivity in terms of targets of particular attacks.

Any NATO-Russia conflict would inevitably have a nuclear dimension. The role of nuclear weapons as a tool for escalation control for Russia has been thoroughly debated by experts, but when and how Russia might use (and not merely showcase or activate) nuclear weapons in a conflict remains an open question. Beyond catch phrases such as “escalate to de-escalate” or “escalate to win” there are a wider range of options for Russian nuclear weapon use. For example, a single nuclear warning shot could be lethal or non-lethal. It could be directed against a purely military target or a military-civilian one. Detonation could be configured for an EMP effect. A “false flag” attack is also conceivable. These options might be used to signal escalation and could significantly complicate NATO’s responses.

Neither NATO nor its member states have developed a similar theory of victory. Public NATO documents stipulate the general goals for the Alliance: defend against any armed attack and, as needed, restore the full sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states. It is less clear how far the Alliance would be willing to escalate the conflict to achieve these goals, and what mechanisms and means it would use while trying to maintain some degree of control over the conflict.

The goals and methods of waging a conflict with Russia would probably have to be limited in order to avoid a massive nuclear exchange. Such limitations would also involve restrictions on striking back against targets on Russian territory. But too narrow an approach could put too much restraint on NATO’s operations: the Russian regime’s stability may ultimately need to be threatened in order to force the leadership into terminating the conflict. NATO would thus need to establish what a proportional self-defence response to Russian actions would involve, and to what extent cyber operations or attacks against military targets in quite different parts of Russia would be useful as tools of escalation to signal NATO’s resolve. Moreover, individual NATO Allies, especially those directly affected by Russia’s actions, might pursue their individual strategies of escalation.

With regards to the nuclear dimension in NATO escalation plans, given the stakes involved, this element would most likely be handled by the three nuclear-weapon members of the Alliance, with the US taking the lead. The existence of three independent centres of nuclear decision-making could be exploited to complicate Russian planning and introduce uncertainty into the Russian strategic calculus, but some degree of “P3” dialogue and coordination would be beneficial. This coordination would not necessarily focus on nuclear targeting, but rather on designing coordinated operations to demonstrate resolve in order to keep the conflict below the nuclear threshold, or bring it back under the threshold after first use.

Relying on concepts of escalation control and on lessons from the Cold War confrontation might be misleading. The circumstances in which a Russia-NATO conflict would play out would be radically different from the 20th century screenplay. Moreover, instead of gradual (linear) escalation or salami tactics escalation, it is possible to imagine surprizing “leap frog” escalation, possibly connected with actions in different domains (e.g. a cyberattack against critical infrastructure). Flexibility, good intelligence and inventiveness in responding to such developments would be crucial.

Conflict termination

Russian and NATO assumptions regarding conflict termination would most likely not survive the first hours of an actual conflict. Both sides are capable of underestimating the resolve of the other side to prevail in a conflict and the other side’s willingness to commit the necessary resources and endure the costs, especially once both sides start committing their political capital and resources and the casualties accumulate.

### Impacts --- Prioritize k Deter Russia

#### Failure to prioritise deterrence in NATO’s stragic concept emboldens Russia

Kochis 22 [Daniel Kochis, Senior Policy Analyst in European Affairs, Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom; Thomas Spoehr, Director, Center for National Defense; Luke Coffey, Director, Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy; Patty-Jane Geller, Senior Policy Analyst for Nuclear Deterrence and Missile Defense, Center for National Defense; “The Russian Threat: Bolstering NATO Deterrence at a Critical Time”; The Heritage Foundation; March 14, 2022; https://www.heritage.org/defense/report/the-russian-threat-bolstering-nato-deterrence-critical-time]//eleanor

The security and prosperity of the transatlantic community, including the United States, rests on the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Russia’s ongoing war of naked aggression against Ukraine, a NATO non-member state, should put to rest any lingering questions about the modern utility of the Alliance and about which threat should be the focus of NATO’s upcoming strategic concept. The answer is clear: The U.S. must lead the Alliance to a wholesale refocusing on the organization’s raison d’être of collective defense. While the Alliance faces challenges emanating from an unstable Mediterranean basin and terrorism originating from the Middle East, the fact remains that Russia continues to be the only existential threat to member states. NATO must send a strong signal that it is strengthening deterrence measures explicitly in response to the increased threat from Russia. Deterrence measures should include an Alliance-wide recommitment to defense spending; a persistent and continuing U.S. presence in Eastern European member states; updated Alliance operational planning in light of Russia’s position in Belarus and Ukraine; and an increase in U.S. air, ground, and naval forces in the European theater as a sign of continued commitment to the NATO treaty’s Article 5. These deterrence measures must be carried out with the recognition that, from a long-term perspective, China is the largest peer challenger from whom the U.S. must expect hostile action. Any improvements to the U.S. force posture must not be to the detriment of the nation’s ability to counter China. The Importance of NATO Deterrence Has Only Increased From the Arctic to the Levant, Russia remains an aggressive and capable threat to NATO and the interests of its members. For member states in Eastern Europe, Russia represents a real and potentially existential threat. Russia’s entrenched position in Belarus, along with its ongoing actions to cleave Ukraine, a nation that borders four NATO members, in two, scramble the geostrategic map of Europe and necessitate changes to NATO operational planning, exemplifying the need for the Alliance to take swift and resolute steps to bolster deterrence measures along its eastern flank. Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine will hopefully be the push that some allies need to finally live up to their commitments to the NATO defense spending benchmark. As an intergovernmental security alliance, NATO is only as strong as its member states. Weak defense spending on the continent has led to a significant loss of capabilities and embarrassing gaps in readiness for NATO allies. As a result, American Presidents of both political parties have long called for increases in defense spending by NATO allies. Although most are familiar with Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty—an attack on one is an attack on all—Article 3 is the most important when it comes to the overall health of the Alliance. Article 3 states that member states, at a minimum, will “maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” Only a handful of NATO members can legitimately say that they are living up to their Article 3 commitment. In 2006, in an effort to encourage defense investment, NATO set a target for its 30 member states to spend 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. At the 2014 Wales Summit, member states recommitted to spending 2 percent of GDP on defense and committed to spending 20 percent of their defense budgets on “major equipment” purchases by 2024. NATO allies have made real and sustained increases in defense spending in recent years, but it is far from enough. In 2021, 10 members of the Alliance spent 2 percent of GDP on defense, and 24 members met the 20 percent benchmark.1

### Impacts --- Russia Deterrence

#### Strong NATO deters Russia --- makes Russia hesitant to risk any conflict.

\*\*Alexander Lanoszka and Michael A. Hunzeker 19. Lanoszka is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at the University of Waterloo. Hunzeker is an Assistant Professor at George Mason University’s Schar School of Policy and Government and is also the Associate Director of the Center for Security Policy Studies. “Conventional Deterrence and Landpower in Northeastern Europe.” http://www.alexlanoszka.com/lanoszkahunzekerssi.pdf

Russian military capabilities are impressive at the local level, but they lose their luster once we adopt a global perspective. Simply put, Russia has local escalation dominance vis-à-vis neighbors to its immediate west, but it does not have global escalation dominance vis-à-vis NATO. Russia shares borders not only with NATO members to its west but also China and Japan to its east. It needs a large security apparatus to address multiple threats both within and outside its borders. Russia also faces unfavorable demographic trends, limiting the recruitment pool and reducing prospects for future economic growth.61 Russia thus faces a disadvantageous global balance of power that will become even more unfavorable as time goes by. Russia is outmatched by the United States and will be outmatched, if it is not already, by China. Because of U.S. military capabilities, NATO is in a more advantageous situation. Total NATO defense expenditures exceed those of Russia by a factor of 10. Even if we exclude U.S. defense expenditures, European NATO members still spend more than twice as much on their militaries than Russia. Of course, European allies vary in their operational readiness and willingness to fight Russia. However, because the United States has a significant nuclear weapons arsenal, any overt attack against a NATO member could trigger Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, creating escalatory dynamics that might go beyond what Russia might find acceptable.62

#### Credible NATO deterrence key to stopping Russian aggression and WWIII

Yuriy Gorodnichenko & Torbjörn Becker 22, Gorodnichenko is the Quantedge Presidential Professor of Economics at the University of California Berkeley, Becker is the Director of the Institute Stockholm Institute of Transition Economics at the Stockholm School of Economics, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/nato-russia-nuclear-threat-mutual-assured-destruction-by-yuriy-gorodnichenko-and-torbjorn-becker-2022-03/micahw

Unfortunately, the world seems to have forgotten the importance of standing up to a bully with nuclear weapons. Remember that MAD was about the balance of terror: lose the balance and all that remains is terror. Today, NATO must balance Russian threats to use nukes with a commitment to retaliate in kind, and meet Putin’s escalation with escalation of its own. In a MAD world, caving in to nuclear intimidation is a sign of weakness that makes a war more likely.

Furthermore, in case of any aggression, the response must be total war. The paradox of Narva helps in understanding the calculus. Suppose that the Russian army captured Narva, a small Estonian city bordering Russia. If NATO did not respond to this attack on a member state, the Alliance would be dead, and all countries without nuclear weapons, lacking a credible deterrent against a nuclear strike, would be obvious targets of future aggression.

A limited NATO response would mean that the aggressor could keep pushing boundaries and raising its demands, just as Hitler raised his demands in the name of peace. One must therefore conclude that the answer is to go “all in,” no matter how small Russia’s aggression is. This also means that NATO must avoid describing what it will not do in response to aggression. Instead, the Alliance must credibly signal that all options are on the table.

The prospect of a nuclear war is terrifying. But it is equally if not more terrifying to think that a madman in the Kremlin with nuclear weapons can beat into submission whole countries or continents by threatening to launch his arsenal against anybody who meddles with his ambitions.

Today, when Ukraine is the target of Putin’s delusional ambitions, some US policymakers may ask why NATO should risk a nuclear confrontation over a country that is not a member. Putin may then threaten European Union members Finland or Sweden. But, again, the argument goes, they are not in NATO, so why risk Armageddon? The day after tomorrow, the target may be Poland or Germany – but at least they are not America.

World War II is a grim reminder that “a quarrel in a faraway country, between people about whom we know nothing,” as Neville Chamberlain infamously described the Sudeten crisis, can quickly escalate into a global conflagration. But such dangerous progressions are not inevitable.

If Ukraine has the courage to battle Russian aggression under the most difficult conditions, the West must find the nerve to stand up to Putin’s nuclear blackmail in order to preserve the wider peace. Russia has shown that it is ready to murder innocent Ukrainians, but it is not ready to commit suicide. And that holds the key to preventing more unspeakable tragedies.

### Impacts --- Strong NATO k Russia Deter

#### NATO strength is key to deterring Russian aggression – uncertain commitments greenlight attacks

Wemer 19 (David, associate director of editorial content, former program coordinator at the Eiseinhower Institute, M.S. in European Politics from the London School of Economics, “Don’t be fooled: Russia is still NATO’s greatest challenge,” Atlantic Council, December 3, 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/dont-be-fooled-russia-is-still-natos-greatest-challenge/) PCS

Seventy years after NATO’s birth, the Alliance is still confronting an existential threat to its east, several defense and foreign affairs ministers said on December 3. Although French President Emmanuel Macron has made waves by suggesting that terrorism, not Russia, was the biggest threat facing NATO today, the defense ministers from Estonia and Lithuania were clear that they still see Moscow as their biggest challenge. “Russia has shown with its actions that it is a serious security threat,” Estonian defense minister Jüri Luik said during a panel discussion on Baltic and Black sea security during the NATO engages event in London on December 3. “For Lithuania, [Russia] is the only external existential threat we have,” added Lithuanian defense minister Raimundas Karoblis. While Macron has a legitimate concern in preventing terrorism in Europe, Luik argued that unlike terrorism, “Russia is the existential threat” because “it is a nation state.” NATO, he added, is “the only organization that can viably” deter Russian aggression against its neighbors. Both ministers praised NATO’s efforts to protect the Baltic states from Russian attack and show Moscow that the Alliance would not leave them undefended. “Lithuania has never had such a great number of guarantees and allies as we have now,” Karoblis said. Luik warned, however, that persistence is key to staving off Russian aggression. “If we are serious in our actions, if we are clear and concise in our messaging, then the threat is quite low,” he explained. “But if we are weak, if we are wobbly, then the threat can go up.” Both Karoblis and Luik suggested that NATO needs to do more to shore up its Baltic defense, including larger exercises to show “how we bring in additional troops if they are necessary,” as Luik suggested. Karoblis highlighted the need for “more precise defense planning,” a wish that has become controversial after a reported Turkish attempt to block new military plans for the Baltics and Poland until NATO recognizes Syrian Kurdish groups as terrorist organizations. Despite the supposed Turkish opposition, neither Luik nor Karoblis were concerned that the proposed plans would be blocked more than temporarily. “The discussions are going on all the time,” Luik explained, adding that “if we don’t find a compromise here, we hopefully will find it a bit later. But I am absolutely sure we will find a compromise.” Karoblis promised “we will find a solution to this.” Black Sea instability But while the Baltics may remain firmly in NATO’s sights, Romania’s defense minister Nicolae Ciuca warned that the Black Sea region, the other vital part of the Alliance’s eastern flank, needs to be accounted for as well. “NATO and the EU need to have a very coherent approach to the whole flank,” rather than just tailoring solutions to either the Baltics or the Black Sea, he argued. In the latter especially, he continued, “we need to focus on strengthening the NATO and EU presence and NATO and EU cooperation in order to support the partnership countries,” such as Georgia and Ukraine, who have both faced invasion by Moscow in the last decade. “Whether you like it or not, we defend your eastern flank,” Ukrainian foreign minister Vadym Prystaiko told the crowd in London, warning that the growing number of priorities for NATO in the Baltics and the Southern flank are causing the region to “believe that we are being left alone” despite being under daily pressure from Moscow. Georgian foreign minister David Zalkaliani agreed that the region must be one of importance for NATO because “without a secure Black Sea, there will be no security in the Euro Atlantic security space.” Zalkaliani particularly lamented the failure of NATO leaders to approve the accession of either Ukraine or Georgia to NATO despite pledging to do so at the 2008 NATO Summit. Despite the prolonged wait, “Georgia is already acting like an ally,” Zalkaliani explained, as his country has met the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal and has contributed troops to NATO missions in Afghanistan and Europe. “When a country like Georgia delivers it has to be reciprocated,” he argued. Prystaiko agreed, noting that the “indecisiveness” of NATO since the 2008 promise has given Moscow the greenlight to attack both countries. Russian President Vladimir Putin, Prystaiko argued, can only be deterred through the strength of NATO. “He still appreciates and respects the mightiness of the Alliance. That is actually the only language which Putin understands.”

#### Breaking NATO causes Russian aggression that escalates to nuclear war

Beauchamp 18 [Zack, senior correspondent at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, “How Trump is killing America’s alliances,” 6/12/18, <https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7>]

How **the weakening of American alliances could lead to a massive war.**There has never, in human history, been an era as peaceful as our own. This is a hard truth to appreciate, given the horrible violence ongoing in places like Syria, Yemen, and Myanmar, yet the evidence is quite clear. Take a look at this chart from the University of Oxford’s Max Roser. It tracks the number of years in a given time period in which “great powers” — meaning the militarily and economically powerful countries at that time — were at war with each other over the course of the past 500 years. The decline is unmistakable: [[TABLE OMITTED]] This data should give you some appreciation for how unique, and potentially precarious, our historical moment is. For more than 200 years, from 1500 to about 1750, major European powers like Britain and France and Spain were warring constantly. The frequency of conflict declined in the 19th and 20th centuries, but the wars that did break out — the Napoleonic conflicts, both world wars — were particularly devastating. The past 70 years without great power war, a period scholars term “the Long Peace,” is one of history’s most wonderful anomalies. The question then becomes: Why did it happen? And could Trump mucking around with a pillar of the global order, American alliances, put it in jeopardy? The answer to the second question, ominously, appears to be yes. **There is significant evidence that strong American alliances — most notably the NATO alliance and US agreements to defend Japan and South Korea — have been instrumental in putting an end to great power war. “As this alliance system spreads and expands, it correlates with this dramatic decline, this unprecedented drop, in warfare,”** says Michael Beckley, a professor of international relations at Tufts University. “**It’s a really, really strong correlation.”**A 2010 study by Rice’s Leeds and the University of Kentucky’s Jesse C. Johnson surveyed a large data set on alliances between 1816 and 2000. They found that countries in defensive alliances were 20 percent less likely to be involved in a conflict, on average, than countries that weren’t. **This holds true even after you control for other factors that would affect the likelihood of war**, like whether a country is a democracy or whether it has an ongoing dispute with a powerful neighbor. In a follow-up paper, Leeds and Johnson looked at the same data set to see whether certain kinds of alliances were more effective at protecting its members than others. Their conclusion is that alliances deter war best when their members are militarily powerful and when enemies take seriously the allies’ promise to fight together in the event of an attack. The core US alliances — NATO, Japan, and South Korea — fit these descriptors neatly. A third study finds evidence that alliances allow allies to restrain each other from going to war. Let’s say Canada wants to get involved in a conflict somewhere. Typically, it would discuss its plans with the United States first — and if America thinks it’s a bad idea, Canada might well listen to them. There’s strong statistical evidence that countries don’t even try to start some conflicts out of fear that an ally would disapprove. These three findings all suggest that **NATO and America’s East Asian alliances very likely are playing a major role in preserving the Long Peace** — which is why Trump’s habit of messing around with alliances is so dangerous. According to many Russia experts, Vladimir **Putin’s deepest geostrategic goal is “breaking” NATO.** The member states where anyone would expect him to test NATO’s commitment would be the Baltics — Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — small former Soviet republics that recently became NATO members. We can’t predict if and when a rival like Putin would conclude that America’s alliances seemed weak enough to try testing them. Hopefully, it never happens. But the more Trump attacks the foundations of America’s allies, the more likely things are to change. **The absolute risk of a Russian invasion of a NATO state** or a North Korean attack on the South is relatively low, but the consequences **are so potentially catastrophic — nuclear war! — that it’s worth taking anything that increases the odds of such a conflict seriously.** The crack-up of the West? The world order is a little like a game of Jenga. In the game, there are lots of small blocks that interlock to form a stable tower. Each player has to remove a block without toppling the tower. But each time you take out a block, the whole thing gets a bit less stable. Take out enough blocks and it will collapse. The international order works in kind of the same way. There are lots of different interlocking parts — the spread of democracy, American alliances, nuclear deterrence, and the like — that work together to keep the global peace. But take out one block and the other ones might not be strong enough to keep things together on their own. At the end of the Cold War, British and French leaders worried that the passing of the old order might prove destabilizing. In a January 1990 meeting, French President François Mitterrand told British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher that he feared a united Germany could seize control of even more territory than Hitler. Some experts feared that in the absence of the external Soviet threat, Western European powers might go back to waging war with each other. Thankfully, those predictions turned out to be wrong. There are multiple reasons for that, but one big one — one that also helped keep relations between other historical enemies, like South Korea and Japan, peaceful — is a shared participation in US alliance networks. The US serves as the ultimate security blanket, preventing these countries from having to build up their own armaments and thus risk a replay of World War I. But **if American alliance commitments become and remain less credible, it’s possible this order could crack up.**America’s partners aren’t stupid. They understand that Trump is the product of deep forces in American politics, and that his victory might not be a one-off. If they think that this won’t be the last “America First” president in modern history, depending on America the way that they have in the past could quickly become a nightmare. **The worst-case scenarios for a collapse in the US alliance system are terrible. Imagine full Japanese and German rearmament, alongside rapid-fire proliferation of nuclear weapons. Imagine a crack-up of NATO, with European powers at loggerheads while Russia gobbles up the Baltic states and the rest of Ukraine. Imagine South Korea’s historical tensions with Japan reigniting, and a war between those two countries** or any combination of them and China. All of this seems impossible to imagine now, almost absurd. And indeed, in the short run, it is. There is no risk — zero — of American allies turning on each other in the foreseeable future. And it’s possible that the next president after Trump could reassure American allies that nothing like this could ever happen again. But the truth is that there’s just no way to know. **When a fundamental force for world peace starts to weaken, no one can really be sure how well the system will hold up. Nothing like this — the leader of the world’s hegemon rounding on its most important allies — has ever happened before**. What Donald Trump’s presidency has done, in effect, is start up another geopolitical Jenga game. Slowly but surely, he’s removing the blocks that undergird global security. It’s possible the global order survives Trump — but it’s just too early for us to say for sure. **Given the stakes, it’s a game we’d rather not play.**

### Impacts --- Weak Deterrence = Extinct

#### Weak NATO Russian deterrence leads to extinction.

Nicholas Burns 18. Barbara Goodman Family Professor of the Practice of Diplomacy and International Relations, Harvard Kennedy School; Director, American Secretaries of State Project. “Assessing the Value of the NATO Alliance.” Harvard’s Belfer Center. 9/5/2018. https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/assessing-value-nato-alliance

Mr. Chairman and Mr. Menendez, you have asked for an assessment of NATO’s value to the United States. In my judgment, NATO continues to be of vital importance to American security interests in five principal ways. First, NATO is at the core of one of the most significant foreign policy accomplishments in American history—the creation of a long-term peace in Europe following the close of the Second World War. Because of NATO and the emergence of the European Union, Europe is united after centuries of division and war. NATO’s military strength has been a major reason for the absence of war with the Soviet Union and Russia since 1949. A recent Atlantic Council study reminds that America spent 14.1 percent of its GDP on defense during the First World War, 37.5 percent during the Second World War and 13.2 percent during the Korean Conflict. We spend nothing close to those levels now in large part due to the great power peace we have enjoyed for over seventy years. NATO has been a major factor in that peace. And due to the expansion of NATO and the European Union eastward after the fall of the Soviet Union, millions of East Europeans now live in free, democratic societies—a significant success for U.S. diplomacy. Second, NATO delivers additional benefits to U.S. military objectives and operations beyond our shores. NATO is at the heart of our defense of North America and Europe from nuclear and conventional threats. British and French nuclear weapons join ours in deterring aggression in the North Atlantic area. Since the late 1940s, every Administration has believed that the best way to defend our country is through American forces forward deployed in Europe with the NATO allies. This strategy remains right for today given Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, of Crimea and Eastern Ukraine in 2014 and its current pressure on Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland. NATO remains our primary vehicle for deterring Putin in Eastern Europe. The NATO allies host a great number of critical bases for U.S. forces—Ramstein in Germany, Aviano in Italy, Rota in Spain, Souda Bay in Greece and Incirlik in Turkey—that serve as a platform for our presence in Europe, as well as for U.S. force projection against terrorist groups in North Africa and the Middle East and for our continued military operations in Afghanistan. Europe is a critical link in the development of our Ballistic Missile Defense network focused on the Middle East with Turkey, Romania, Poland, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Denmark, the UK and other allies all hosting elements of this system. NATO allies continue to participate in the U.S.-led coalition against the Islamic State in the Middle East. Many of the allies play lead roles in other counter terror operations such as French forces in Mali supported by the U.S. In Afghanistan, the NATO allies remain with us in combat operations and in training the Afghan military. Over 1000 soldiers from European and other partner nations have died there during the last seventeen years. NATO continues to maintain the hard-earned peace in Kosovo with European troops bearing the large share of the burden. An EU-led force has taken on all of the peacekeeping responsibility in Bosnia, freeing up the U.S. for other activities. Third, the NATO allies are among our closest and most supportive global partners as we confront the great transnational challenges that define this century—the fight against terrorism, the entire complex of cyber threats, climate change, the risk of pandemics, mass migration and others. The NATO allies and our partners in the European Union act together with us on these and other issues. This is of incalculable benefit to the U.S. Neither Russia nor China have treaty allies. NATO is a significant advantage for the United States when it acts as a force multiplier for American interests.

### Impacts --- Deterrence k N/W

#### Refocusing on deterring Russia in NATO’s strategic concept prevents nuclear escalation.

Barranco et al. 22 [John B. Barranco, Senior US Marine Corps Fellow, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council. Hans Binnendijk, Distinguished Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Former Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control, US National Security Council: Former Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Ian Brzezinski, Senior Fellow, Transatlantic Security Initiative, Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, Atlantic Council; Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Europe and NATO Policy, US Department of Defense.; Defending every inch of NATO territory: Force posture options for strengthening deterrence in Europe”; Atlantic Council; March 9, 2022; https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/issue-brief/us-and-nato-force-posture-options/]//eleanor

We are now in a new era of sustained confrontation with Russia. It is not a broad-based competition for influence across numerous domains (e.g. economic), as is the case with China; rather, it is a dynamic confrontation throughout the transatlantic theater, most heatedly along NATO’s eastern flank from the Arctic in the north to the Black and Mediterranean Seas in the south. Russia wishes to push its influence or direct control of territory as far west, north, and south as possible, especially in the former Soviet states. Russia has now demonstrated both the intent and capability to mass forces to underwrite a sustained coercive-diplomacy campaign and invade the sovereign territory of another nation. Moreover, now that Russian forces have undertaken operations in Ukraine, Putin may decide to further threaten the territory and freedom of action of additional non-NATO members, such as Georgia, Moldova, and Finland—as well as NATO members themselves. Russia today has a preponderance of conventional combat forces in Eastern Europe. No matter what happens next regarding Russian military operations in Ukraine and Belarus, the security environment in Europe and adjoining regions has been structurally changed for the worse for the short to medium term. Thus, NATO’s approach of deterrence by punishment—conducted by rapid reinforcement to its frontline allies—can no longer be NATO’s sole model for deterrence. Deterrence by denial must now gain greater weight in NATO’s strategic concept. Based on Russian actions, the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act—and its restrictions on NATO’s eastern posture—is no longer relevant. We are in new, dangerous territory—a period of sustained tensions, military moves and countermoves, and major intermittent military crises in the Euro-Atlantic area that will ebb and flow for at least the remainder of the 2020s, if not longer. In this environment, military tensions will likely be exacerbated by increased, aggressive Russian unconventional activities in the homelands of NATO and European Union (EU) members. We should expect Russia, feeling the impact of coordinated Western sanctions and other diplomatic measures, will ramp up the level and intensity of cyberattacks, election meddling, online disinformation, covert activities, and support for extremists in homelands across the democratic world. On top of a local conventional-combat power imbalance between Russian and allied forces in Eastern Europe, and increasingly aggressive sub-threshold operations, the Alliance also faces a highly dynamic strategic-forces balance. Russia has undertaken a long-term, sustained nuclear-modernization program that has produced several new types of offensive nuclear weapons. These novel systems present new threats to NATO, its outmoded conceptual approach to nuclear deterrence, and its aging nuclear force inventories. In turn, the Alliance will need to assure its nuclear deterrent capabilities. Modernized and adapted NATO nuclear capabilities must be prioritized in order for the Alliance to effectively deter numerically superior Russian forces from attacking NATO’s eastern-flank members, from Norway in the north through Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Romania, and Turkey in the south. While this conclusion may run counter to the Biden administration’s initial proposition to reduce US reliance on nuclear weapons in its national security strategy, it would represent a clear-eyed reappraisal of the new security environment. That Biden administration commitment was made well before the ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine. If President Biden were to wisely decide to reassess this policy position, he would likely gain bipartisan and Alliance-wide backing.

### Impacts --- Focus/Deter k Escalation

#### Failure to refocus on deterrence emboldens Russian invasion of NATO countries – nuclear escalation.

O’Hanlon 6/21/22 [Michael E. O’Hanlon, Director of Research - Foreign Policy, Co-Director - Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, Africa Security Initiative, Senior Fellow - Foreign Policy, Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, The Sydney Stein, Jr. Chair; “Strengthening the US and NATO defense postures in Europe after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine”; Brookings; June 21, 2022; https://www.brookings.edu/articles/strengthening-the-us-and-nato-defense-postures-in-europe-after-russias-invasion-of-ukraine/]//eleanor

American strategists anxious to prioritize China as the “pacing challenge” for U.S. defense strategy may object to any increase in the resources devoted to European security. That would be a mistake. Ensuring that Russia does not further destabilize Europe will have to be just as high a priority in the years to come as the China threat. That is because any scenarios that could involve hostile threats to NATO territory could raise terrifying questions about possible escalation, even eventually to the use of nuclear weapons, and could have existential implications. Moreover, despite the ongoing emphasis on Asia as the most dynamic region on Earth, Europe remains the region where America’s preponderance of democratic, advanced, prosperous allies is found — and also the region where the world wars originated in earlier eras. Its strategic significance should never be doubted. What is more, Europe’s role in addressing the rise of China will be central to any successful effort. Finally, to the extent China is seen as a major challenge, it is all the more reason that European security must be stabilized as an anchor of the future global order. The United States and allies do not have the military, economic, or diplomatic bandwidth to address escalating crises and conflict in both Europe and Asia at the same time. New crises and conflicts in Europe must be prevented before they begin, to the maximum extent possible. I argue here that NATO should shift from what has been, in effect, a tripwire defense of the Baltic states and Poland since 2017 to a modest forward defense posture. Russian President Vladimir Putin must know of NATO’s unambiguous commitment to defend alliance territory and feel no doubt that the United States and its allies would do whatever it took to prevail in a war that he might initiate against one or more of the alliance’s members. The United States and allies should build facilities and position forces with the intent of making this forward defense enduring. The United States and allies should build facilities and position forces with the intent of making this forward defense enduring. The concept of rotational deployments is no longer appropriate given the scale of what is now needed, together with the severity and hostility of the Russian actions that have made such changes necessary. NATO should not adhere to its previous policy, dating to the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act, that ruled out permanent stationing of allied combat forces on the territories of new members. Those days are gone. Russia, with its attack on Ukraine, has now violated the foundational principle of that Act — the peaceful resolution of disputes. Nor is rotational presence less expensive than permanent basing. Indeed, by placing upward pressure on the size of the U.S. force posture, it risks being much more expensive, given the large number of units it inevitably entails. Thus, what has been termed NATO’s enhanced forward presence (eFP) will need to beef up. Rather than have small and disparate combat formations from many countries, NATO should establish enough combat punch in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania that it could credibly fight to protect these countries’ territories in a future war against Russia, while awaiting reinforcement from points further west. As the alliance’s military and strategic backbone, U.S. military formations must be an integral part of that NATO mix, to make the alliance’s commitment to successful defense and military victory absolutely unambiguous. That is the most promising way to make deterrence robust, given what we now know about Putin and his romanticized, twisted, dangerous vision of a greater Russia. The force packages need not be particularly large, but they should be combat capable, positioned in forward locations, and set up for the long term, given the likelihood that Putin or a similar successor will remain on the scene for many years.

### AT: China thumps Russia deterrence

#### China doesn’t thump Russia deterrence – the strategic concept will just mention it but focus on Russia.

Xu 6/25/22 [Yifan Xu is a reporter at China Daily; “Russia to dominate Western agenda”; China Daily; June 25, 2022; http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/25/WS62b624d5a310fd2b29e68796.html]//eleanor

However, Gupta said the summits would not greatly impact Europe-China relations. "There are very serious situations in Europe. And I think this is a serious situation in Europe that is going to force NATO to be less ambitious in thinking about China and more focused on how to safeguard security on the continent, the European continent," Gupta said. "Even China's inclusion in the strategic concept is just an initial marker, not really much more than that."

### Impacts --- Focus Deters China/China War

#### NATO is perfectly positioned to deter China

Brzezinski ’20 -- (Ian Brzezinski, 6-1-2020, "NATO's role in a transatlantic strategy on China," Atlantic Council, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/natos-role-in-a-transatlantic-strategy-on-china/, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

On the eve of the NATO Summit in London last December, the Alliance’s Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg addressed the need for a collective response to China’s emergence as a global power. “This is not about moving NATO into the South China Sea,” he stated, “but it’s about taking into account that China is coming closer to us—in the Arctic, in Africa, investing heavily in our infrastructure in Europe, in cyberspace.” At the summit, NATO heads of state diplomatically declared that China has become a concern: “we recognize that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.” Indeed, it is hard, if not impossible, for NATO to avoid China. Beijing presents a full spectrum challenge to the transatlantic community—a challenge whose potential mirrors, if not surpasses, that once posed by the former Soviet Union. China’s $14 trillion economy is expected to soon surpass that of the United States, and Beijing exercises that might in a predatory fashion around the globe, including in the United States and Europe. China threatens to boycott companies and countries that criticize its policies, leverages its debt instruments against poor nations, and is buying up critical infrastructure around the world. Its acquisition of European ports has raised concerns of top NATO commanders who warn that such ownership could adversely affect the Alliance’s ability to use those facilities in times of crisis. China is a technological challenge to the West. It is a leader in 5G communications, artificial intelligence, hyper-sonic weapons, and quantum computing. It has demonstrated repeatedly that it is willing to exercise that prowess against Western interests and security. Chinese cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns have become part of daily life for all NATO allies, including both their governments and private enterprises. Beijing’s military is a major driver behind China’s technological edge and is developing and exercising global reach. China’s $260 billion defense budget has a purchasing power estimated to equal or exceed 70 percent of that of the US defense budget. China’s military cooperation with Russia continues to expand and the two exercise not only in the plains of Central Asia but in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas. Chinese military forces are the pointy of end of the spear Beijing uses to undermine the rules based international order. Its maritime claims and aggressive activities in South and East China Seas stand among its more prominent actions. And, China’s leadership relishes its role as an ideological challenge to the West and the latter’s practice of liberal democracy. China usesits economic, technological, and military power to promote globally its form of national authoritarianism. Beijing even asserts that its political model has provided the most adept and agile response to today’s coronavirus epidemic. So how should NATO should respond to China’s growing global assertiveness? What should be NATO’s China strategy? When considering this issue, it is important to recognize that the foundation for a relevant NATO role in a transatlantic China strategy has long been established. For decades, the Alliance has been operating around the world. NATO has led the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan since 2003. Its naval forces have patrolled against pirates off the shores of Africa, commencing with operation OCEAN SHIELD in 2008. As a member of the Coalition to Defeat ISIS, NATO provides training to military establishments across the Middle East. And, on a daily basis the Alliance addresses terrorism, cyber-threats, disinformation, and other global issues. Most relevant to addressing China are the Alliance’s long-standing relationships with key democracies of the Indo-Pacific region. NATO established Global Partnerships with Korea, New Zealand, and Mongolia in 2012, Australia in 2013, and Japan in 2014. These relationships are predominantly consultative, but most of these partners have contributed to NATO missions, including in Afghanistan. As the transatlantic community’s lead instrument for security collaboration, NATO can contribute to the former’s relationship with China in three important ways. As a multinational security forum, it can foster among NATO allies and partners a shared awareness of China’s capacities and activities that generate risk to and opportunity for the North Atlantic community. NATO has long served as an important forum through which its Allies and partners share intelligence data and assessments needed to foster and facilitate collaborative action. Second, NATO can help develop and promulgate a transatlantic security strategy and posture regarding China. That strategy’s objectives should include the development of a cooperative relationship with China as well the dissuasion of China from undermining the interests of the transatlantic community. The latter would define the appropriate role and means for the Alliance to contribute to deterrence and when necessary defense against Chinese aggression that imperil those interests. Third, NATO’s civilian and military capacities should be used to facilitate the defense and security component of a Western strategy addressing China—including in the tasks of engagement, deterrence, and defense. The following are five actions NATO could undertake as part of its approach to China, none of which would require it to undertake a significant reprioritization of its current mission sets and all of which would support the aforementioned: The Alliance should offer to establish a NATO-China Council. This would mirror the NATO-Russia Council whose roots date back to 1997. Its establishment would recognize and respond to the realty of China’s growing influence and reach. This forum would spur Alliance members to more seriously and comprehensively address in a coordinated manner the challenges posed by China. Its establishment would underscore that this dimension of great power competition is not between China and the United States but between China and the transatlantic community, one bound by shared values, interests, and history. And this forum could be used to identify and foster opportunities for constructive collaboration with China, such as counter-piracy operations. Second, NATO should deepen its engagement with its Pacific partners, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Japan, and Mongolia. The consultative dimension of these relationships should be complemented with more regular and more robust military exercises (especially air, maritime, and special forces exercises) and operations, including those designed to ensure freedom of navigation. Such events under the NATO flag would be a useful complement to US maritime and air exercisers in the Pacific that have long featured the participation of European allies. Past US RIMPAC exercise series, for example, have included military aircraft, ships, and staffs from Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom. In less tense times, China even participated in RIMPAC events. Third, the Alliance should establish in the Indo-Pacific, perhaps in one of the region’s partner countries, a Center of Excellence (COE) and integrate officers and NCOs from selected partners into the Alliance’s Command Structure. Both initiatives would help increase the Alliance’s understanding of the Indo-Pacific region, institutionalize its presence in the region, and deepen these partners’ familiarization with NATO missions, structures, and protocols. The Alliance should also establish a small military headquarters element in the Indo-Pacific region, perhaps embedded in the COE or in United States Pacific Command to help facilitate and coordinate NATO exercises and operations. It, too, could contribute to Alliance’s awareness of developments in the region and, if the opportunity emerges, Alliance collaboration with China. These initiatives will take effort to launch and execute. Some allies will balk at adding additional missions to NATO and their own military forces when resources are already strained. But the aforementioned will not generate onerous costs and can build upon European, US, and Canadian military operations in the Pacific that are already the norm. Moreover, European attitudes toward China have significantly hardened. Eighteen months ago, many Europeans were content to regard China as an economic partner, notwithstanding its authoritarian political system and aggressive conduct in the Pacific. That has since changed as Europe has experienced with increasing frequency Beijing’s diplomatic and economic belligerence toward those that criticize its actions and policies. In March 2019 the European Union formally described China as a “strategic competitor,” “an economic competitor,” and “a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” Beijing pugnacious conduct during the coronavirus pandemic has only reinforced this new European perspective. Beijing will likely balk at the offer of a NATO-China council as it will oppose an increased NATO presence in the Indo-China, especially one that fosters deeper political-military collaboration among the region’s democracies. Even NATO Partners in Asia may balk at elevating their relations with NATO out of a desire to avoid further complicating relations with China. NATO may have to initiate its China strategy on its own, leveraging the territories Allies control in the Indo-Pacific and conducting its own operations and exercises in the region. That will demonstrate the commitment and determination necessary to earn the confidence and support of its partners for a more active Alliance presence in the region. China will then also be likely to demur, realizing that having regular communication with the world’s most powerful military alliance can be important means to avoid conflict, promote peace, and facilitate mutually useful cooperation. A NATO strategy for China alone will be not a sufficient solution to the West’s increasingly tense relationship with Beijing. A coherent and effective transatlantic strategy for China will have to be comprehensive, one that leverages the full complement of diplomatic, economic, technological, social, and military capabilities and dynamics that define geopolitical power. For it to have maximum success it will have to combine the capacities of both Europe and North America and be reinforced through collaboration with community’s democratic partners in the Indo-Pacific. As the institution that effectively marshals the military capabilities of the transatlantic community and one that has established relationships with the leading states of the Indo-Pacific, NATO is well positioned to foster that collaboration. Such NATO engagement would help underscore that Beijing’s belligerence risks provoking a geopolitically costly reaction from a vibrant and unified global coalition of democracies. NATO’s potential role in a transatlantic strategy regarding China should not be underestimated.

#### Reorganizing NATO priorities around deterring China/Russia is necessary and good – commitment and first steps happening now.

Moller ’21 -- (Sara Bjerg Moller, 3-12-2021, "China’s rise is exactly the kind of threat NATO exists to stop," Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/chinas-rise-is-exactly-the-kind-of-threat-nato-exists-to-stop/2021/03/11/c3adfad6-8211-11eb-81db-b02f0398f49a\_story.html, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

As promised, President Biden and his administration are moving swiftly to repair America’s damaged relationship with its NATO allies — following four years in which President Donald Trump bitterly complained that they weren’t pulling their weight. Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin’s first official call after his confirmation was to the long-suffering head of the NATO alliance, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg; Biden followed up by releasing a video of his own call with Stoltenberg, purposefully going beyond the traditional print “readout.” “We’ve got a mountain of work to do ahead of us, from covid to climate to tackling security challenges,” Biden told the NATO head. But once the “America is back” calls and speeches are finished, the Biden team must face the hard task of preparing NATO for its next chapter. Thirty years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the mission of this organization founded after World War II to safeguard the freedom of Western Europe and North America is no longer clear. Restoring European allies’ trust in U.S. competence won’t be enough to rehabilitate the transatlantic partnership if the allies don’t solve this identity crisis. With Trump gone, the alliance can’t simply go back to business as usual — because for some time now business as usual in NATO has meant taking on more and more roles and activities in a frantic quest for relevance. And while Trump absolutely damaged the alliance, it would be foolhardy to blame all of its problems on him: Mission drift, for instance, long predated his administration. A longer-term corrective may involve reorienting the security organization’s focus toward its traditional role of deterring and defending against strategic competitors: Russia, yes, but even more so China. That nation is the obvious successor to the mid-20th-century Soviet Union in harboring global ideological aspirations at odds with those of the major Western democracies The end of the Cold War understandably precipitated NATO’s identity crisis. With U.S. guidance, the organization pivoted away from its longtime focus on collective defense against Moscow — an attack on one member would be considered an attack on all — toward a global peace-enforcement role. The security of nations outside the alliance became a concern on the theory that instability and violence beyond NATO’s borders could spill over onto alliance territory, and because intervention to stop humanitarian catastrophes was seen as inherently right. (In the 1990s, then-Sen. Richard Lugar famously declared that the alliance must go “out of area” lest it risk going “out of business.”) This shift was accompanied by expansion: Since the late ’90s, NATO has nearly doubled its membership, from 16 to 30, incorporating states that were once part of the Soviet Union, like Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia, or members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, like Poland. Early examples of NATO’s new role included the bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 to halt violence against Kosovar civilians perpetrated by Slobodan Milosevic’s regime, followed by peacekeeping duties there. In 2003, NATO took on the task of enforcing peace in Afghanistan after the invasion by a U.S.-led coalition. In 2011, it intervened in Libya to impose a U.N. Security Council cease-fire resolution on the Moammar Gaddafi regime. Obama embraced ‘endless wars.’ Biden probably will, too. Civil strife and violence in these and other hotspots are unlikely to recede anytime soon, but NATO is ill equipped to fix such problems. Worldwide crisis stabilization is too open-ended a goal to serve as the organizing principle for a military alliance — and such ambitions stretch valuable NATO resources at a time when threats to the North Atlantic region are growing. Refocusing NATO to check the dangers posed by China’s rise would restore it to something closer to its original mission of safeguarding allies from strategic competitors. What about Russia? It remains meddlesome, but it is largely under control — and a shadow of its former self. Yes, Moscow retains the ability to wreak havoc in any manner of ways, but in conventional military terms it doesn’t pose the same threat to the alliance it once did, and NATO has moved swiftly to counter what threat there is. Following Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea, NATO established new commands and headquarters in Poland, Latvia and Romania — its biggest investment in force structure since the Cold War. There remain areas of internal disagreement: On matters like the spreading of misinformation in elections, some European members — France, for instance — seem inclined to shrug off President Vladimir Putin’s provocations. And Germany in particular is eager to embrace financial and energy collaborations with Russia (though it faces pressure to back off as Putin clamps down on dissidents). Putin will use these splits to try to divide the allies against themselves, but on the big question — checking and containing Russian military adventurism — NATO is united, and effective. It is China that represents the bigger menace over the long term to Western values and interests. At present, China is primarily an economic and political threat, not a military one, but NATO should prepare for the latter possibility, given Beijing’s increasingly assertive foreign policy. After all, it has cracked down on Hong Kong, clashed with India in the Himalayas, levied tariffs on Australia after officials criticized its handling of the coronavirus, and said Britain would “bear the consequences” for excluding telecom firm Huawei from its 5G network. China has been steadily investing in European infrastructure: State-run shipping companies own significant stakes in 13 European ports, for instance, and the telecom equipment company ZTE has a large presence in southeastern Europe. When countries cede control of their infrastructure, their “resilience,” or ability to recover from the shock of a natural disaster or armed attack, suffers. (Maintaining resilience is a core part of NATO’s mission statement.) Such developments also make it easier for Beijing to impose its will on NATO members — by threatening to end access to a port, say. China has already proved itself adept at using other tools in its arsenal — such as economic influence — to intimidate and coerce states, as when Beijing imposed an eight-year ban on Norwegian salmon in retaliation for the awarding of the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese dissident. To safeguard against a future when China decides to use its growing military power in similar fashion, NATO should invest more in military assets and planning today. Narrowing the alliance’s focus and prioritizing China hardly mean that NATO-flagged vessels would appear tomorrow in the South China Sea, where Beijing has been expanding its naval bases. The shift would, at least at first, represent more of a change in strategic mind-set. But China has already begun to encroach on the North Atlantic region. In the Arctic, for example, Beijing is working on liquid-natural-gas drilling projects with Russia; it is also sending icebreakers to the Norwegian Sea. To address these developments, NATO could start by formally including the “High North” in its strategic documents for the first time and by increasing its presence in the region. Biden certainly seems focused on China at the national level — promising to maintain Trump’s tougher stance, without the counterproductive measures (like tariffs) — but it is not clear that his administration has grasped the role NATO can play. When the president spoke with Stoltenberg, he proposed adding global issues ranging from democratic backsliding to climate change and the pandemic to the alliance’s agenda. Defense Secretary Austin similarly identified a laundry list of tasks, including tackling corruption and international criminal organizations, during the NATO defense ministers’ meeting in February. Still, at a Munich Security Conference event last month, Biden said that America and its allies “must prepare together for long-term strategic competition with China.” And there’s a growing movement in D.C. think tanks — from which Biden is drawing many of his advisers — arguing for such an orientation. Stoltenberg, an early and frequent advocate of having NATO address the implications of China’s rise, would be a key figure in the refocusing: In his own comments at the Munich gathering, he stressed that China is the “defining issue” for the transatlantic relationship. Stoltenberg and a group tasked with charting the alliance’s long-term course — the NATO 2030 working group — have recommended deepening and broadening relationships with partners in the Indo-Pacific region. By necessity, refocusing on China would involve curtailing NATO’s other sprawling activities — beneficial in itself. Beyond ending the training and advising missions in Iraq and Afghanistan, pausing NATO expansion would make sense, since it would be inadvisable to add new members — such as Ukraine and Georgia, thereby provoking Russia — as it works out its identity crisis. Russia is already pretty much contained; admitting Ukraine and Georgia, a move for which many Europeans have little appetite anyway, would doom arms-control and other negotiations with Moscow. Regrettably, as with Russia, Europe is divided over how to deal with China. Many European allies are wary of picking sides in the struggle for influence between the United States and its Asian rival. Some, like Germany, even appear outright resentful at the suggestion that they must choose. German Chancellor Angela Merkel rushed last year to conclude the E.U.-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment — even though the incoming U.S. national security adviser, Jake Sullivan, had strongly signaled that Europe should wait till Biden’s inauguration. China’s rise is indisputably the most significant geopolitical development of the 21st century. It would be strange for an alliance as potent as NATO to ignore the challenge. A Europe that continues to downplay the danger posed by China’s growing influence in the North Atlantic area could lead Xi to succeed where Trump and Putin failed: He could splinter the alliance. International organizations like NATO move slowly, and it will take time to lay the groundwork for tackling the security implications of China’s ascendance. By beginning that shift now, the alliance may avoid a greater challenge later.

#### NATO 2030 agenda and recent commitments to combatting China’s rise are effective and have broad support – solves China deterrence.

Brauss ’21 -- Senior Associate Fellow At The German Council On Foreign Relations (Dgap) and Former Nato Assistant Secretary General For Defense Policy And Planning (Heinrich Brauss, 6-17-2021, "Judy Asks: Is NATO Ready for China?," Carnegie Europe, https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/84798, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

At their recent meeting in Brussels, NATO leaders agreed an ambitious transatlantic agenda for the future: NATO 2030. The alliance is determined to address global developments relevant to its security by strengthening and broadening political consultations; further enhancing resilience; fostering technological innovation; tackling the implications of climate change as a threat multiplier; and increasing cooperation with partners, including in the Asia-Pacific. The vigorous implementation of these commitments will help NATO to deal with the strategic implications of China’s rise to world power status. For the first time, NATO acknowledges that China’s ambitions, strategy, and behaviour present systemic challenges to alliance security. It is determined to “engage China with a view to defending the security interest of the Alliance.” At the same time, Russia’s aggressive actions continue to constitute a threat to Euro-Atlantic security. Its growing cooperation with China carries the risk of concurrent strategic challenges in the Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific regions. The United States considers China its primary strategic competitor and is shifting its strategic focus to the Asia-Pacific. NATO must therefore ensure Euro-Atlantic stability. Credible deterrence and defense against Russia remain its priority task. The new Strategic Concept must address all these challenges, ensure a shared strategic vision, and strengthen alliance cohesion. KATE HANSEN BUNDTSECRETARY GENERAL OF THE NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE NATO’s joint statement on China as a systemic challenge to the rules-based international order and the summit’s approval of the NATO 2030 reform package were necessary steps in NATO getting ready for China. But this was far from saying that China is a challenge that will trigger conventional military use or out-of-area operations for NATO. NATO needs to confront China in areas where it poses a challenge to the alliance. Facing cyber, technological, and other asymmetric threats, such as disinformation campaigns and attempts to influence political decisionmaking processes, calls for action. And clearly, out-of-area does not apply to these threats. China is becoming a global power in terms of high technology. Chinese companies are already center stage when it comes to surveillance technology. And in the race to control and influence the global digital infrastructure, China is playing an increasingly bigger role in the development of technological standards. It is also expanding its nuclear programs. Together this is challenging alliance security and democratic values. In addition, China has been growing as a global economic superpower through its direct investments in European infrastructure, which also calls for allied awareness. If NATO members are to protect their common values, it is vital that they stand up against authoritarian forces that want to undermine the allies. Following the summit this week, NATO member states have jointly agreed that this is a battle they want to take on together. RALUCA CSERNATONIVISITING SCHOLAR AT CARNEGIE EUROPE The rise of China and the evolving Sino-U.S. great power rivalry are the defining geopolitical features of our time. They will unquestionably have a defining impact on NATO’s 2030 agenda and its new Strategic Concept. China’s rise as a high-tech great power and systemic challenger should be seen as an opportunity to remember NATO’s very purpose as a high-level political and military organization. But NATO requires the United States and the EU to come together and improve joint strategic awareness, encourage a coherent Euro-Atlantic approach for the Indo-Pacific, and recommit to the defense of common democratic values and a rules-based international order. A first step in the right direction was NATO leaders taking a tougher line on China at the Brussels summit. Details about a specific NATO China policy in the communiqué were sparse. But an emphasis on China shows that the alliance’s traditional and still almost exclusive Russia focus is slightly shifting. China’s military reach is getting closer to the Euro-Atlantic area. It will likely challenge the alliance’s ability to build collective resilience, safeguard critical infrastructure, address emerging and disruptive technologies, and protect sensitive supply chains. Such wide-ranging challenges are complex. They will require a comprehensive EU-U.S. NATO approach and a shared vision as well as a constructive dialogue with China where possible. The alliance will also need to overcome substantial and potentially show-stopping intra-alliance political and military organizational hurdles. Closer cooperation with the EU, given its regulatory, economic, and technological innovation instruments, would also enable NATO to respond to the multifaceted risks and threats of this new era. MARTA DASSÙSENIOR DIRECTOR OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS AT THE ASPEN INSTITUTE If “ready” means that NATO is able and willing to consider China as a potential security challenge, NATO is ready. China will figure prominently in the new Strategic Concept, to be approved in 2022. For the first time in a NATO communiqué, China’s military buildup is considered to be a systemic challenge to alliance security. And NATO’s new global agenda entails commitments in critical fields, amplified by or related to China’s rise: from value chains’ vulnerabilities in strategic sectors to the need to preserve a technology edge in defense; from countering cyber attacks—mostly from Russia but also from China—to reinforcing resilience of democratic societies. If, however, “ready” means that NATO will engage military in the Asia-Pacific region, this is not the case: NATO is not turning into a Sino-centric alliance. And Washington is not asking NATO to support the United States militarily in Asia. Joe Biden is suggesting, instead, a new transatlantic bargain: NATO, with renewed American commitment, will focus mainly on Europe and collective defense—and here Russia remains the main military threat for the alliance. At the same time, European allies will support Washington in containing China, first of all in diplomatic and economic terms. Is Europe ready to sustain its part of the bargain? This is the key question, to which Europeans still reply with some ambiguity.

#### NATO is investing in Russia and China deterrence now – solves

Garamone ’22 -- (Jim Garamone, 6-17-2022, "Stoltenberg Details NATO Progress in Deterrence, Defense," U.S. Department of Defense, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3067076/stoltenberg-details-nato-progress-in-deterrence-defense/, accessed 6-24-2022) -- nikki

Russia's invasion of Ukraine dominated the NATO defense ministers' meeting in Brussels, but the ministers — including Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin III — also considered a range of actions and programs in preparation for the Madrid Summit on June 29. Not since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 has there been as serious a threat as Russia's unprovoked invasion of neighboring Ukraine, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said yesterday at a press conference. This drastically changed the security environment in Europe and the globe, he said. "We must set out NATO's response for the longer term," he said. "At the summit, we will take decisions to make NATO even stronger and more agile in a world that is more dangerous and more competitive. I am confident that the Madrid Summit will be a transformative summit." The secretary general said there are a number of areas where the heads of state and government will make decisions in Madrid. He expects the 30 NATO nations to significantly beef up deterrence and defense. "We will also decide on a new NATO strategic concept, setting out our position on Russia, on emerging challenges, and — for the first time — on China," he said. "And in this context, I welcome that the leaders of our Asia-Pacific partners will take part in our summit for the first time." The Indo-Pacific nations that will attend the summit are Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. Spotlight: Focus on Indo-Pacific The leaders will also look at better burden-sharing and resourcing for the alliance. Finally, they'll discuss the historic applications for NATO membership by Finland and Sweden, he said. The defense ministers looked at all these areas and made progress, the secretary general said. The ministers met with Ukrainian Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov and got an update on the situation in the embattled country. "We addressed the imperative need for our continued support, as Russia conducts a relentless war of attrition against Ukraine," Stoltenberg said. "NATO allies and partners have been providing Ukraine [with] unprecedented support, so that it can defend itself against Moscow's aggression." Many NATO countries — including the United States — have announced additional assistance, including much needed heavy weapons and long-range systems. But as Russian President Vladimir Putin's war continues, the ministers discussed plans to support Ukraine for the long haul. "We are putting together a NATO comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, helping Ukraine improve interoperability with NATO, transitioning from Soviet-era to modern NATO equipment, and further strengthening security institutions," Stoltenberg said. Spotlight: Support for Ukraine "Russia's aggression is a game-changer," he said. "So, NATO must maintain credible deterrence and strong defense." The defense ministers addressed the scale and design of our future posture — the so-called footprint of NATO forces in Europe. They also discussed how the alliance can work in all domains of warfare: land, sea, air, cyberspace and space. On land, the idea is "more NATO forward-deployed combat formations to strengthen our battlegroups in the eastern part of our alliance," Stoltenberg said. He said there will be more air, sea and cyber defenses, as well as pre-positioned equipment and weapon stockpiles. The strategy calls for a new force model, "with more forces at higher readiness and specific forces pre-assigned to the defense of specific allies to enable much faster reinforcement," he said. "A number of allies have committed to contribute to our stronger presence in the eastern part of our alliance. But we still have some work to do as we look to the summit, where I expect further announcements."

#### Active denial solves China [short]

Heginbotham and Heim ’15 -- (Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, 06-03-2015, "Deterring Without Dominance," The Washington Quarterly, v.38, no. 1, Spring 2015, p.185-199, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external\_publications/EP50711.html, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

Even as events in Iraq, Syria, and Ukraine have captured the attention of U.S. foreign policy elites, the United States faces key questions about its military position in Asia. In the face of growing Chinese power, can the United States continue to provide a credible deterrent in Asia without either bankrupting itself or pursuing risky strategies that raise new questions about crisis stability? While other security issues remain important, none will have a more fundamental effect on the U.S. military budget or the way the United States does business overseas. Basic precepts of U.S. foreign and security policy are under debate. Notable commentators have recently argued that U.S. forward defenses in Asia are no longer viable and that the United States should transition to a less engaged strategy of “offshore balancing.” Others have countered that the right combination of new technologies and offensive systems might yet restore U.S. dominance. While we welcome the new debate, neither of the most prominent alternative approaches is advisable. The United States requires a new strategy, one that does more to assure U.S. partners than offshore balancing but that is also affordable and does not rely on a vulnerable hair-trigger offensive posture. Fortunately, the United States could realize such a strategy, though it would require significant diplomatic efforts as well as a variety of military adjustments. What we label an “active denial strategy” would maintain a forward presence but be oriented toward denying an opponent the benefits of military aggression, rather than trying to ensure a decisive defeat. The strategy would have three primary features: first, a resilient force posture and the exploitation of strategic depth; second, a focus on combat against offensive maneuver forces instead of strikes against home territories; and third, leveraging the capabilities of allies and partners. This active denial strategy aligns well with the status quo nature of U.S. interests and provides a cost-effective deterrent that would reduce rather than increase the incentives for pre-emption during crises. What follows is an outline of the challenges facing U.S. diplomats and commanders in Asia, the state of the debate on U.S. military strategy today, and an alternative to current options that offers a better combination of attributes.

#### Active denial strategy of deterrence effectively solves Chinese adventurism by flipping their cost-exchange ratio – prevents US-China war [long]

Heginbotham and Heim ’15 -- (Eric Heginbotham, Jacob L. Heim, 06-03-2015, "Deterring Without Dominance," The Washington Quarterly, v.38, no. 1, Spring 2015, p.185-199, https://www.rand.org/pubs/external\_publications/EP50711.html, accessed 6-25-2022) -- nikki

An active denial strategy seeks to deter Chinese adventurism by maintaining a capability to refuse China the benefits of military aggression. This is different than maintaining all-aspects dominance. Dominance is fast becoming prohibitively expensive and may well be inadvisable when confronting a nuclear-armed great power. Instead, active denial involves both defending the territory of U.S. allies and partners as well as making retaliatory strikes against Chinese combat forces involved in offensive operations. The active denial strategy differs from the offshore control strategy by meeting Chinese aggression directly, thereby making it more difficult for China to achieve a fait accompli. Unlike the alternative approaches outlined earlier, active denial offers a broad strategy that includes many branch options for a U.S. president. There are three mutually-reinforcing components of the active denial strategy. The first is resilient U.S. combat power, capable of surviving a pre-emptive Chinese strike; this will require a portfolio of adjustments to survivability and deployment patterns. The second is capabilities optimized for attacking Chinese forces directly engaged in offensive operations such as amphibious ships, aircraft, and landed forces. And the third is bolstering and leveraging the capabilities of allies and partners. The United States should assist partners in improving their defensive capabilities (create mini-A2/AD bubbles) as well as fully using the geographic advantages offered by partner states. A Resilient Force Surviving a pre-emptive Chinese strike requires that U.S. forces be resilient in the face of Chinese attacks. This includes a portfolio of measures including hardening airbase facilities; dispersing aircraft and other critical assets; prepositioning missile defenses; employing camouflage and concealment, electronic warfare, and rapid repair capabilities; as well as developing procedures and training for fighting under attack. Making aircraft carriers and air bases operationally resilient introduces risk into Chinese military options by denying the PLA confidence in its ability to suppress U.S. air power. Dispersal can take two forms. On-base dispersal spreads aircraft, maintenance equipment, and fuel supplies around a given base and minimizes the amount of damage that a single arriving weapon can do. Theater-level dispersal spreads aircraft across more locations in order to minimize the impact of losing any single location. U.S. Marine Corps concepts for distributed operations using the short takeoff and vertical landing F-35B from improvised bases offer an extreme example of theater-level dispersal. The Marines have also demonstrated their capability to operate conventional fighters from expeditionary airfields, for example during the 2012 Geiger Fury exercise held on the island of Tinian in the Northern Marianas. In a similar vein, the U.S. Air Force has developed a “Rapid Raptor” concept for quickly deploying F-22 fighters to austere locations for short periods. Dispersal will stress combat support capacity, likely requiring Army support for key enablers such as logistics, security forces, and combat engineers. All of these dispersal concepts would complicate Chinese targeting and offer survivability benefits. In addition to dispersal, the operational resilience portfolio will need to include some hardening of key facilities (air bases, command-and-control centers, and ports). Hardening key nodes at those facilities (e.g., communications, fuel storage, and aircraft) can be a cost-effective way to mitigate vulnerabilities. This could involve reinforcing existing buildings with steel or concrete or constructing new bunkers and underground facilities (if local geography permits). However, attempting to make entire facilities invulnerable is prohibitively costly, and probably unrealistic. Therefore, hardening efforts must pursue cost-effective ways of protecting critical capabilities. U.S. forces would come under the most intense attacks at the start of a conflict. Consequently, a resilient force posture would seek to exploit U.S. strategic depth in Asia. At the outset, relatively more U.S. forces might be deployed at a distance from China, rather than being concentrated overwhelmingly in China’s immediate periphery as they are today. Long-range bombers flying from lower threat areas, in conjunction with submarines firing cruise missiles, could provide a great deal of U.S. combat power during the opening phase of a conflict. Resilient air bases and carriers near conflict areas will generate sorties to support these other assets, and will become a primary means of attack as adversary surveillance capabilities are diminished and missiles inventories exhausted. Missile defenses (such as Navy ships armed with SM-3 interceptors and the Army’s Patriot air defense system) can intercept some portion of incoming ballistic missiles. These capabilities are far from perfect but they can reduce the number of missiles that could reach defended aircraft carriers and bases, forcing an adversary to expend more missiles to achieve its goals and drawing down its finite quiver of ballistic missiles more quickly. In the future, directed energy systems might augment these layered defenses.14 Camouflage, concealment, and deception could complicate China’s ability to locate U.S. forces. A final component of the resilience portfolio lies in rapid repair capabilities. The U.S. Air Force recently demonstrated a rapid runway repair capability able to fill dozens of craters in an air base’s runways and taxiways in eight hours.15 In the event of a conflict, this resilience portfolio would multiply targets and confuse PLA planners, thereby minimizing the damage that a Chinese attack could do and enabling U.S. forces to rapidly rebound from what damage did occur. Although U.S. forces would initially be deployed in greater depth than they are today, resilience would not require ceding ground to China from the outset. Some U.S. forces would remain in areas close to China during peacetime and at the outset of a conflict. And as the war progressed, the resilient force posture would permit U.S. forces to shift their center of gravity back towards the Chinese mainland. Countering Attacking Forces A robust ability to counter Chinese power projection will require another portfolio of capabilities. The United States must be prepared to counter power projection in three domains: naval forces, air power, and landed forces. The strategy focuses on defeating PLA assets beyond China’s shores, rather than on striking mainland targets. In countering Chinese naval forces, U.S. submarines will continue to have a significant advantage over Chinese anti-submarine warfare capabilities. But U.S. submarines have capacity limitations both in how many torpedoes each carries and how many submarines can operate in a given area. In addition to submarines, the military will need an expanded inventory of joint long-range anti-ship missiles. Integrating such missiles on U.S. Air Force aircraft will expand anti-surface warfare capacity. Land-based anti-ship cruise missiles, either operated by the Army or by U.S. allies, could also play a role, as could modern anti-ship mines. Expanding the ability to air-deliver mines from stand-off ranges would give the U.S. military additional flexibility and free up other highdemand assets such as submarines. In countering Chinese air power, the first line of defense would be provided by U.S. aircraft from aircraft carriers and resilient ground bases working in conjunction with allied air forces. Air defenses, in the form of U.S. Navy air defense destroyers and cruisers or land-based air defenses such as the Patriot system, could provide a second line of defense. Allies and partners could contribute to this second line of defense with their own assets. These could be bolstered by foreign military sales facilitated by the United States and possibly by Japan, which has recently relaxed its ban on arms exports. To defeat landed forces, a combination of capabilities would again be required. Many of the same weapons needed to attack adversary surface warfare groups could be used to interdict amphibious forces before they reached land. A suite of weapons could be used against beachheads, including air-delivered weapons optimized to attack ground forces (such as cluster munitions and sensor-fused weapons), naval fires (land-attack missiles and, in the future, perhaps rail guns), and ground-based fires (including artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, and anti-tank guided missiles). The ultimate means of reducing Chinese ground forces is through land power, ideally that of a partner or ally but potentially with U.S. support. Leveraging Allied Strengths The third component of a denial strategy is buttressing allied strengths and capitalizing on partner geography. One possibility is to assist allies and partners in creating their own A2/AD zones equipped with air defenses, anti-ship cruise missiles, mines, and sensor networks. By focusing on defensive weapons, the effort would seek to make U.S. partners and allies dangerous porcupines whose capabilities would only be a threat to an aggressor seeking to change the status quo. A second important facet will be improving partners’ ability to operate with U.S. forces. Measures could include combined training exercises, data sharing procedures, military advisors, embedded liaisons, and prepositioned supplies to enable U.S. forces to rapidly deploy into the country. During peacetime, the sales of key defensive systems and combined training exercises will demonstrate the challenges China would face if it attempted to change the status quo through force. Increasing the scope and frequency of exercises would also improve familiarity between the United States and its partners, enabling them to operate together better should deterrence fail. The April 2014 agreement with the Philippines regarding an expanded U.S. rotational presence is an important step in deepening contact between the U.S. military and key allies and partners.16 Shifting the Cost-Exchange Ratio All three elements of the denial strategy are designed to turn the tyranny of distance on its head, or at least to neutralize the most significant disadvantages posed by geography. China can, and likely will, build power projection forces (i.e. longer-range missiles, aerial tankers, longer-range bombers, and improved satellitebased communications and surveillance) to challenge the United States farther from its coast. But these systems will begin to place China on the losing side of cost-exchange ratios. The two-stage missiles required to strike targets beyond roughly 1,000 kilometers are more expensive than singlestage systems, and all other things equal, doubling the range of a bomber roughly doubles its cost. In summary, the resiliency measures described above make U.S. forces less lucrative targets against which China would have to launch more expensive missiles and bombers. If executed correctly, this strategy would proliferate targets more quickly and more cheaply than China could add to its missile inventory. On the U.S. side, although many of the capabilities required for an active denial strategy would be provided by legacy systems (such as Virginia-class attack submarines and long-range cruise missiles carried by B-52 and B-1 bombers) some new or expanded capabilities would be required. Improving the resilience of air bases and the survivability of aircraft carriers would require new spending in areas such as electronic warfare, rapid repair capabilities, and hardening. The most expensive element would likely be missile defenses with, for example, a single SM-3 interceptor costing approximately $10 million.17 Although some new capabilities would be required under an active denial strategy, their total costs would be far less than those associated with a strategy aimed at restoring all-aspects dominance. Moreover, the strategy would probably not require an increase in the overall defense budget. Curtailing investment in conventional prompt global strike and reducing the F-35 buy, which would become less critical under a strategy that does not depend on penetrating Chinese mainland air defenses, are savings that could pay for the active denial strategy. As of 2013, the total acquisition cost of the F-35 program was estimated at over $320 billion (in 2012 dollars).18 The F-35 will still be a key U.S. Air Force capability, and one that is critical for air superiority, but fewer of these aircraft would be required under a strategy predicated on a dynamic defense-in-depth, or active denial strategy.

## Cohesion Impacts

### Impacts --- Cohesion Turns Aff

#### Internal tensions collapse NATO military effectiveness

Morcos ‘21

(Pierre Morcos Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, “‘Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lifting-our-values-home-how-revitalize-natos-political-cohesion> //um-ef)

Finally, lack of respect for NATO principles has empowered member states to bring bilateral disputes into the alliance, as was the case in 2019, when Hungary accused NATO partner Ukraine of mistreating ethnic Hungarians living in western Ukraine based on Ukraine’s introduction of a restrictive language law. Rather than tackling the issue bilaterally, Hungary brought it into the alliance, blocking Ukraine’s NATO Membership Action Plan and cancelling meetings of the NATO-Ukraine Commission. Internal tensions can also negatively affect NATO’s military tasks, as recently witnessed when Turkey blocked a defense plan for the Baltic States and Poland on the grounds that NATO did not recognize the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) as a terrorist organization.

### Impacts --- Cohesion

#### Solves war with Russia AND China!

Marcus Kolga 21, Senior Fellow at the Macdonald-Laurier Institute Center for Advancing Canada’s Interests Abroad, “Improving NATO’s cohesion is critical to combat Russia and China’s threat,” <https://macdonaldlaurier.ca/improving-natos-cohesion-critical-combat-russia-chinas-threat/micahw> [GRU = Glavnoye Razvedyvatelnoye Upravlenie]

A united NATO is critically important to projecting credible deterrence. The erosion of domestic trust and confidence in the Alliance among its member states, including Canada, represents a threat to this cohesion. A proposal to withdraw Canada from NATO was tabled at a recent policy conference for one of Canada’s three major political parties. The proposal was defeated, but it represents a fringe anti-NATO narrative within Canada’s illiberal left; if left unaddressed, such a narrative could grow.

If countries like Russia perceive NATO as an atomized collection of states with varied priorities rather than a unified front, the Alliance is exposed to a significant risk of miscalculation in which a foreign adversary might believe they can cross a red line and only face a limited response. Thus, gaps in cohesion within the alliance directly threaten to undermine political and military deterrence. The Alliance and members states must work towards improving communications strategies to foster greater basic general understanding of NATO’s purpose, its missions and its role in protecting its members against external threats.

Similarly, if we see threats as atomized or disparate, we may lack the capacity to adequately respond. Organized GRU terrorist attacks in Czechia, the Salisbury poisonings, transnational repression and censorship, cyberwarfare, disinformation, and overt military posturing all pose threats that are aimed at the same essential goal: undermining and supplanting the power of liberal democracy and advancing authoritarianism. Through this lens, challenges posed by other actors, including China, must also be considered as part of the broader range of shared threats posed to the democratic community as a whole.

### Impacts --- Cohesion Good

#### NATO cohesion checks numerous existential crises.

Gallagher ’19 [Mike and Colin Dueck; January 2019; Representative for Wisconsin’s Eighth District in the U.S. House of Representatives; Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University; National Review, “The Conservative Case for NATO,” <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/>]

The conservative case for NATO is not that it strengthens liberal world order. Rather, the conservative case for NATO is that it bolsters American national interests. In an age of great-power competition, as identified by the Trump administration, America’s Western alliance provides the U.S. with some dramatic comparative advantages. The United States, Canada, and their European allies have a number of common interests and common challenges with regard to Beijing, Moscow, terrorism, cyberattacks, migration, nuclear weapons, and military readiness. NATO is the one formal alliance that allows for cooperation on these matters. It is also the only alliance that embodies America’s civilizational ties with Europe — a point forcefully made by President Trump when he visited Poland in 2017. Properly understood, NATO helps keeps America’s strategic competitors at bay, pushing back on Russian and Chinese influence. In all of these ways, the U.S. alliance system in Europe is a bit like oxygen. You may take it for granted, but you’ll miss it when it’s gone.

#### NATO cohesion solves a litany of existential threats.

Mike Gallagher & Colin Dueck 19. Represents Wisconsin’s eighth district in the U.S. House of Representatives. Professor in the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University, and a Kirkpatrick visiting fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. “The Conservative Case for NATO”. <https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/01/nato-western-military-alliance-bolsters-american-interests/>.

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Now consider the alternative. American withdrawal from NATO would be a grave error. Not only would it surrender the above advantages and undo existing progress in Europe. It would also have negative long-term implications globally pertaining to America’s foremost long-term strategic challenge: namely, the People’s Republic of China. As Beijing extends its influence worldwide, U.S. disengagement from NATO would send the signal that the United States is an unreliable friend. America’s allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific would have to rethink the integrated security architecture we have painstakingly built since Eisenhower’s day. This is not to mention the obvious and immediate tactical and operational military advantages that would accrue to Russia in Europe, shifting the balance of power against the United States.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k NATO Cred

#### Lack of unity causes competitors to exploit NATO --- collapses NATO credibility and effectiveness

Morcos ‘21

(Pierre Morcos Visiting Fellow, Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program, “‘Lifting Up Our Values at Home’: How to Revitalize NATO’s Political Cohesion,” pg online @ <https://www.csis.org/analysis/lifting-our-values-home-how-revitalize-natos-political-cohesion> //um-ef)

Any of these points of disunity could be used by strategic competitors as venues to destabilize individual allies or NATO as a whole. As highlighted by the 2020 NATO Experts Group report, “a drift toward NATO disunity must be seen as a strategic rather than merely tactical or optical problem.” Despite the importance of preserving NATO’s values base and, in turn, its political cohesion, allies have nonetheless lacked the political will or legal instruments to effectively address in-house tensions and divergences. In contrast to the European Union, which is arguably in a better position to address democratic backsliding through its rule of law mechanism, NATO has no legal provisions for suspending or expelling an ally who violates the alliance’s founding principles. Also, the fact that NATO operates by consensus means that any punitive action against the offending ally risks incurring retaliatory action on other NATO business. Yet however difficult, NATO can no longer afford to turn a blind eye on these internal strains. From its founding, it has been more than just a military alliance. NATO has embraced a political role built on a shared democratic identity. As the alliance seeks to exercise more fully the power of this political dimension, shoring up its values is vital to realizing the full benefits of collective security. A lack of response from NATO on these issues would ultimately undermine its reputation and credibility, most notably toward accession candidates and partners.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Deter China

#### NATO cohesion and efficacy -- specifically strong US-Europe relations -- is key to effective response to the rising threat of China.

Hodges ’18 -- (Ben Hodges, 12-7-2018, "Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO," GMFUS, https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato, accessed 6-19-2022) -- nikki

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior. The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater. The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges. The U.S. Priority: China A war between China and the United States is not inevitable, but the next 15 years could see the eruption of such a conflict. While this may not reach the threshold of full-scale war or a nuclear conflict, the leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have set their country on a trajectory that will lead to a strategic situation that may result in sustained armed conflict, potentially stretching across the Pacific region, in all domains. Furthermore, the combination of China’s huge population, export-oriented economy, and lack of natural resources could generate an inexorable push towards conflict. The CCP leadership has emphasized the development of military capabilities that could deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea, including long-range air and missile defense and anti-ship capabilities. This anti-access area denial (A2AD) capability does not depend on a large Chinese navy but instead uses well-protected, land-based systems. The creation of artificial islands in the region, most of which are already being armed and garrisoned with A2AD capabilities, are violations of international law and agreements that clearly demonstrate the CCP’s strategy and intentions. Enforcement of freedom of the seas and recognized international waters by the United States and others is necessary to counter these policies. In one recent demonstration of CCP intent, there was a near-collision incident between Chinese and U.S. Navy ships, caused by unsafe and unprofessional behavior by the Chinese one. Statements by the China’s minister of defense during his recent visit to the Pentagon, including demands that the U.S. forces stay away from the articifial islands, indicate that his country will continue to push aggressively its territorial claims. Meanwhile, in Europe China has become an increasingly significant and potentially divisive influence in a variety of aspects; especially in infrastructure, technology transfer, and trade. The Belt and Road Initiative has resulted in dramatic increases in Chinese investment in Europe, control of hundreds of European companies, and ownership or control of more than 10 percent of Europe’s ports. These developments, and the CCP’s strategy and behavior, are cause for concern about the potential for conflict with China within the next 15 years. They also show why the United States must prepare for this eventuality. During the Cold War, the United States used a “two and a half wars” framework for force structure. This was not a strategy, but rather a mechanism meant to assess how much capability and capacity its armed forces needed to deter effectively and, if necessary, win simultaneous conflicts in two different operational theaters and “hold” in a third, minor theater at the same time, for as long as necessary. Today, and for the foreseeable future, the United States can no longer exercise this capability and capacity. Therefore, in the event of conflict with China, it will need a strong, cohesive NATO as well as partnerships around the world in order to continue deterring a revanchist Russia and to carry on counter-terrorism operations in the Middle East while the majority of U.S. forces and capabilities are operating in the Pacific. The U.S. Commitment to Europe Many European leaders have expressed uncertainty about the United States’ commitment to Europe, based on President Barack Obama’s “pivot to the Pacific” and, more recently, President Donald Trump’s questioning of the relevance and value of NATO and the EU. The facts on the ground, however, demonstrate that the United States, including the current administration, is fully committed to its long-time allies and partners in Europe. Everything promised by the Obama administration at the 2016 NATO summit in Warsaw is being delivered by the Trump administration: a rotational armored brigade combat team, pre-positioned equipment for an army armored division, and the Enhanced Forward Presence battle group in Poland. The administration just announced an additional 1,500 soldiers in an artillery brigade and short-range air defense battalion that will be assigned to Europe. The operational contingency fund, known as the European Reassurance Initiative, which started during the Obama administration, has increased steadily over the last three years and is now known as the European Deterrence Initiative, reflecting U.S. backing for Europe and deterrence of Russia. Also telling was the Senate vote just prior to this year’s NATO’s summit in Brussels, which affirmed by a 98:2 margin U.S. support for Article 5. The United States’ commitment to European partners like Ukraine and Georgia also remains very strong, as evidenced by provision of the Javelin anti-tank weapon system, other equipment, and training, as well as continued support for these countries’ eventual membership in NATO and the return of their territories from Russia.

<https://www.lawfareblog.com/nato-must-get-resilience-right-withstand-russia-and-china>

#### Solves war with China

Ben Hodges 18, Pershing Chair in Strategic Studies at the Center for European Policy Analysis, “Why the United States Needs a Cohesive NATO,” <https://www.gmfus.org/news/why-united-states-needs-cohesive-nato/micahw>

If a conflict with China arises, the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond. The United States remains committed to Europe’s security and stability. But it also expects its European allies to pick up their share of the burden for collective security so as to help maintain order in the continent and around the globe. It is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

Several things remain to be achieved if Europe and the United States in this regard. First, they must build a common approach not only in defense, but across economic, information, and political domains. Second, they must solve the continued inequity in burden sharing that hinders a stronger relationship between them and erodes the confidence of many Americans in the efficacy of NATO. Third, it is necessary to achieve greater coherence on NATO’s eastern flank, particularly in the Black Sea region. Fourth, NATO must continue its efforts to improve its deterrence capability against Russia’s aggressive behavior.

The interests and responsibilities of the United States are global, with freedom of navigation on the seas and preservation of the global commons being prime examples. Its allies and partners benefit from these freedoms as well, but these have now come under threat, most notably in the South China Sea and with China’s growing control over much of the infrastructure of the world, particularly in Europe and Africa. The threat from China is real and growing, and if it materializes the United States will need a strong, cohesive NATO, as well as other partnerships around the world to maintain order and security in Europe’s neighborhood, and perhaps even beyond, while the majority of its forces and capabilities, particularly air and naval ones, are operating in the Pacific theater.

The stability, security, and economic prosperity of the United States are directly linked to that of Europe. The bulk of its global economic relationships are in North America and the European Union, and the majority of its most reliable allies and partners are in Europe. To give but one example, the shared intelligence obtained from Europe is essential to the implementation of the recently published U.S. National Defense Strategy. In this context, it is of vital importance to the United States that its defense and security relationship with European countries, especially within NATO, not only remains healthy but is correctly oriented to current and likely future challenges.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Baltics/Arctic

#### Solves war in Baltic Seas, North Atlantic, and Arctic.

Anders Ljunggren & Michal Jarmoluk 21, Ljunggren is the Swedish Ambassador to Estonia and Iceland, Jarmoluk is a political photographer, “Cohesion in the EU and Nato will keep the peace in Baltic Sea,” Frivarld, https://frivarld.se/sakerhetsradet/cohesion-in-eu-and-nato-will-keep-the-peace-in-baltic-sea/micahw

I would argue that in the situation we now are in, in the Baltic Sea Region, cohesion in the EU and in NATO is the most important challenge. The stronger the confidence in the cohesion of the EU and NATO, the lower the likelihood of military use of force in the Baltic Sea region.

Each state is first and foremost dependent on its own will and ability to assert its security. But all states depend on cooperation with others, especially in the case of a potential conflict with a country like Russia. This also applies to the militarily non-aligned states Finland and Sweden.

Sweden and Finland are now preparing for being able to give and receive support in crises, from each other, ”beyond peace”. No other partnership than that of Finland or Sweden has closer cooperation with NATO. The two non-aligned states also have special cooperation agreements with the United States and are increasingly participating in increasingly large-scale exercises with the NATO states.

During President Trump’s four years, the transatlantic link has been weakened. We have had a situation where not only Russia and China but also the United States have sought to divide EU and NATO member states. There is good hope that the link will be strengthened again under President Biden.

The transatlantic link is important. Security in the Baltic Sea region and the situation in the North Atlantic and the Arctic are closely linked. And vice versa. One challenge is to build transatlantic cooperation strong regardless of whoever is president of the United States. This means that European states need to take greater responsibility for the strength of the transatlantic link. The US, independently of the president, is said to have increased its focus on the Pacific. But the US will still be important for security in the Baltic Sea Region.

Unfortunately, the cohesion of the EU and NATO is not as strong as it should be in order to take greater responsibility for the transatlantic link. The situation is perhaps most difficult in the eastern Mediterranean. It is actually in the neighborhood of the Baltic Sea region. Already the Crimean War in the 1850s showed this.

In the EU, the challenge is to defend the Union as a community of values ​​and at the same time develop a real capacity to act as a foreign and security policy actor – especially in the geographical proximity of the Union.

The situation is not at all hopeless – but it is demanding. EU and NATO members, as well as NATO partners, in the Baltic Sea Region have every reason to contribute to a strong transatlantic link and to strong cohesion between member states in Europe.

Inevitably, the security situation in the Baltic Sea Region and in its immediate neighborhood is most important, especially with regard to defense policy. The lack of cohesion in a larger context only underlines this relationship.

**Thompson 16** [Loren B. Thompson is Chief Operating Officer of the non-profit Lexington Institute and Chief Executive Officer of Source Associates, a for-profit consultancy. Prior to holding his present positions, he was Deputy Director of the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University, “Why The Baltic States Are Where Nuclear War Is Most Likely To Begin”, July 20th, <https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-the-baltic-states-are-where-nuclear-war-most-likely-17044>]

While nuclear weapons could potentially be used in any number of future warfighting scenarios, there are multiple reasons to suspect that the greatest danger exists with regard to the three Baltic states. Here are eight of those reasons.

First, both Washington and Moscow assign high strategic significance to the future disposition of the Baltic states. From Moscow's perspective, the three states are located close to the centers of Russian political and military power, and therefore are a potential base for devastating attacks. For instance, the distance between Lithuania's capital of Vilnius and Moscow is less than 500 miles -- a short trip for a supersonic aircraft. From Washington's perspective, failure to protect the Baltic states from Russian aggression could lead to the unraveling of America's most important alliance.

Second, Washington has been very public about it commitment to the Baltic states. For instance, in 2014 President Obama stated during a visit to Estonia that defense of the three countries' capitals was "just as important as the defense of Berlin and Paris and London." That is an extraordinary assertion considering that the population of metropolitan London (about 8 million) is greater than that of all three Baltic states combined (about 6 million), and that the eastern coast of the Baltic Sea is so close to the Russian heartland.

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Deterrence

#### Strict capabilities aren’t enough for COMPLETE Russian deterrence --- Russia can collapse deterrence by creating openings in NATO disagreements --- Cohesion is the only way to ensure Deterrence

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

Chart removed for brevity The direct comparison between the military capabilities of Russia and NATO indicates that there is no real threat in terms of quantitative or qualitative advantage in Russia’s favour. On the contrary, NATO is in the lead, with a huge advantage of both equipment and personnel as well as technology, quality and quantity. However, there are areas in favour of Russia. These include WRE (radio-electronic warfare), aviation and air defence capabilities, radar systems as well as nuclear carriers and weapons. Needless to mention other types of mass destruction weapons which, according to the International Humanitarian Law of Armed Conflict (IHL), ought to cease to exist, whereas Russia is highly likely to possess them (chemical weapons were used in counter-terrorism operations and special combat operations). Over the past two decades, the Russian defence industry has developed, researched and introduced dozens of radio-electronic warfare systems capable of disrupting and completely immobilizing most of the forces in the areas of land, air and water. Russian technologies are effective at fighting aircrafts, cruise missiles, radars, conventional missiles and unmanned aircrafts. The latest implemented system is the Palantin system, which has been deployed in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea. This system is able to disrupt the operation of AWACS at a distance of 250 km. Probably, it is also able to disrupt all radio, GPS and mobile systems as well as create the so-called apparent targets that mask the correct flight paths of projectiles fired from the Iskander launcher. Thus, combating and destroying Iskander missiles have become even more difficult. Moreover, the system also functions as a reconnaissance platform (Cranny-Evans 2019; Hodges et al. 2019). The deployment of Iskander and Krasucha (Gawęda 2015), as well as Palantin and aeronautical defence systems in the Kaliningrad Oblast and Crimea, including the S-300 and S-400, create strong Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) nodes with the simultaneous capability to strike by means of airborne and land forces within the depth of their practical impact range (A2/AD nodes). Another threat worth noting, particularly important for NATO Eastern Wall states, is Russia’s conduct of operations which cannot be immediately repelled by the Alliance due to their little scale. They take place in the form of quick, limited or offensive operations giving Russia the advantage of “facts made” and allowing it to join into the peace talks from that position. Figure 4 presents the summary of the estimated military capabilities, presented earlier in individual innovation trends, of the Russian Federation’s Armed Forces in Europe at the end of 2019. It illustrates the deployment of the Strategic Connected Commands, the army and corpses as well as “inaccessible areas” and potential targets to be attacked in the event of a conflict (air bases, airports and radar systems). It is worth noting that almost the entire area of Poland is an anti-access zone (A2/AD) (Gawęda 2018), which means that any allied defence support from the air, at least in the first phase of a conflict, will be very difficult. Operations of the Polish aviation and capability to command them also seem highly problematic. Unfortunately, that confirms the likelihood of limited offensive capabilities as described above. \*\*Chart removed\*\* Russia’s significant asset is also the fact that it constitutes a single entity in contrast to NATO whose forces, which guarantee the security of Central and Eastern European states, are distributed throughout the world (including the US and Canada). Thus, the distance gives Russia a big advantage. The USA, being the major pillar of NATO, have several sensitive security spots and, therefore, have to operate on many levels, not just watching over their own national and NATO’s interests, but also, in particular, European states neighbouring with Russia. Moreover, the distance and response time create problems, while Russia has the freedom to choose the time and space to provoke and attack. However, it is not the military threat that is the most dangerous for NATO. The main threat are the attempts made by Russia to bring individual member states into conflict with each other in order to break down NATO’s cohesion. Success of such attempts could create a space for Russia to undertake possible military actions. The tools provided by the supplemented Gerasimov doctrine entitle Russia to use all methods and measures of combat such as: pre-emptive attacks, impacts on civilians and administration centres (psychological and information operations), as well as the use of nuclear weapons. In other terms, it entitles Russia to wage a total war at a convenient time and place.

### Impacts --- Deterrence/Cohesion up&effective

#### NATO cohesion and deterrence is up --- new command structure and troop adjustments

Mierzwa and Tomaszycki ‘21

(Danuta, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, Marek, Faculty of Management, General Tadeusz Kościuszko Military University of Land Forces, Wrocław, Poland, “Imperial policy of the Russian Federation versus cohesion and coherence of NATO’s new strategic concept,” International Politics, pg SpringLink //um-ef)

Summing up the provisions of the consecutive NATO Summits and the declarations in Brussels of 2018, it can be concluded that they were crucial to the strategy pursued by NATO nowadays. The Alliance’s new command structure has become more suited for undertaking effective joint defence operations. Definitely, assessing the consecutive provisions, it can be stated that by introducing the standby initiative, NATO has become capable of putting into operation a greater number of troops almost instantaneously. The Alliance’s forward-looking presence in Central and Eastern Europe has also been modified, which should translate into a major increase in the Alliance’s defence capabilities in the event of potential enemy aggression (Graf 2018). The most recent NATO Summit in London of December 2019 reaffirmed the Alliance’s unity and commitment to Article 5 of the Washington Treaty stating that an attack on one ally would be considered an attack on all. “In difficult times, we are stronger as an Alliance, and our citizens are safer. Our bond and mutual commitment guarantee our freedoms, our values and our security for 70 years to come. We are working to ensure that NATO guarantees these freedoms, values and security for future generations”.—The Alliance’s declaration proclaims.Footnote17 The leaders reaffirmed that NATO guarantees security and fundamental human rights as well as the rule of law on the territory of the Member States for the people living there. “Solidarity, unity and cohesion are the fundamental principles of our Alliance. As we are working together to prevent conflicts and preserve peace, NATO remains the foundation of our collective defence and the basic forum for consultation and security decisions among the allies. We reaffirm the lasting transatlantic relationship between Europe and North America, the observance of the objectives and principles of the United Nations Charter and our solemn commitment as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty that an attack on one Ally will be considered an attack on all of us”—they reaffirmed in the declaration. Most importantly for Poland and the Baltic states, NATO leaders agreed on the updated defence plans for Poland and the Member States. They also expressed their criticism of Russia’s aggressive actions (Gotkowska and Szymański 2017).Footnote18

### Impacts --- Cohesion k Taiwan War

#### NATO cohesion spurred by Ukraine and Russia prevents Chinese invasion of Taiwan

Feng 3/9/22

(John, “China Is Learning Lessons From West's United Response to Russia,” pg online @ <https://www.newsweek.com/china-learning-lessons-wests-united-response-russia-ukraine-invasion-1686259> //um-ef)

China is watching the West's collective response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine and is learning lessons that may change its own calculations as it seeks to annex Taiwan, according to senior officials in Washington and London. When the threat of economic sanctions failed to deter Vladimir Putin and the first of Russia's 150,000 troops began pouring into Ukrainian territory on February 24, Taiwan became a trending topic as observers feared China's President Xi Jinping would be emboldened to make good on his vow to capture the democratic island of 23.5 million people. However, as Putin's forces failed to achieve their blitzkrieg goals and the war entered its second week, the thinking changed. Ukraine's leaders remained in Kyiv; its armed forces fought back and ordinary civilians joined the resistance. A galvanized NATO and the early effects of the West's unprecedented punishment on Russia's economy began to give China watchers pause. Taiwan's Foreign Minister Joseph Wu called the Ukrainian resistance an inspiration for the Taiwanese people. Taipei joined several Asian governments in imposing export controls on Russia and landed on Moscow's list of "unfriendly" countries this week. Russia's forces continue their march toward Ukraine's capital and may eventually achieve their military objectives even as political goals—regime change and the submission of its public—remain out of reach. But the events of the past days have already made China more reluctant to invade Taiwan than just several months ago, Avril Haines, the director of national intelligence, told the House Intelligence Committee on Tuesday. "The view is both that it is likely to reinforce China's perspective on the seriousness with which we would approach an infringement on Taiwan and in the unity that they've seen between Europe and the United States, particularly in enacting sanctions," she said. "Not just that unity, but the impact of those sanctions I think are both things that are critical to their calculus and something that will be interesting for us to see how they learn those lessons." In her opening remarks, Haines said China—"an unparalleled priority"—would prefer "coerced unification that avoids armed conflict." The Chinese government has been working to isolate Taiwan and undermine its elected leaders for years, she said. "At the same time, Beijing is preparing to use military force if it decides this is necessary." In answer to a similar question, CIA Director William Burns said he "would not underestimate President Xi and the Chinese leadership's determination with regard to Taiwan." However, Burns said Beijing has been "surprised and unsettled" by the difficulties the Russians have encountered in Ukraine. "Everything from the strength of the Western reaction, to the way in which Ukrainians have fiercely resisted," he said. "I think there's an impact on the Chinese calculus with regard to Taiwan." Lt. Gen. Scott Berrier, who heads the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency, told lawmakers at the Russia-focused hearing that Taiwan and Ukraine were "two different things completely." He then hinted at the considerable U.S. military presence in Asia. "I also believe that our deterrence posture in the Pacific puts a very different perspective on all of this," said Berrier. "We do know that [China] is watching very, very carefully what happens and how this plays out." At a similar briefing of the U.K.'s Foreign Affairs Select Committee on Monday, British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss said Beijing "does not want to associate too closely" with Russia's new status as a "global pariah." She left little doubt that NATO was setting a precedent with its united response and sending a message to China in the process. "There's also the issue of the importance of showing strength as NATO," Truss said, "because the rest of the world will be watching, including China, on how the West continues to respond." "Of course, if we see a weak NATO, that is likely to embolden China. So I see a tough policy on Russia and a tough policy on China as being complementary," she said.

#### US-China nuclear war over Taiwan likely and causes extinction – deterrence and no first use don’t apply

Littlefield and Lowther 15, Alex Littlefield is Senior Editor at Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, Adam Lowther is a Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute (AFRI) at Maxwell Air Force Base, (8/11/15, Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America, The Diplomat, http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/)

For the United States and its allies and partners in Asia, China’s aggressive efforts to assert questionable claims in the South and East China Sea, enforce a disputed Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), build the rocket/missile and naval capabilities needed to invade Taiwan, and build a substantial ballistic missile capability all work to create a situation where conflict between the U.S. and the PRC could occur and rapidly escalate. Given that American political and military leaders have a poor understanding of Chinese ambitions and particularly their opaque nuclear thinking, there is ample reason to be concerned that a future conflict could escalate to a limited nuclear conflict. Thus, it is worth taking a look at the PRC with an eye toward offering insight into Chinese motivation and thinking when it comes to how a possible crisis over Taiwan could escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Chinese Capabilities In their latest estimate, Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris assess that the Second Artillery Corps possesses forty long-range nuclear missiles that can strike the United States if fired from China’s eastern seaboard and an additional twenty that could hit Hawaii and Alaska. The challenge for China, is reaching the East Coast – home to the nation’s capital and largest economic centers. To overcome this challenge China is also developing its JL-2 submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is a sea-based variant of the DF-31 land-mobile long-range missile that will go to sea on Jin-class submarines. China may also be developing a new mobile missile, the DF-41, which will carry multiple warheads, giving the Chinese a way to potentially defeat an American ballistic missile defense system. It is worth noting that the quantity, though not the quality, of China’s nuclear arsenal is only limited by its dwindling stock of weapons grade plutonium. This raises the question; to what end is China developing and deploying its nuclear arsenal? Chinese Motivation The textbook answer is straightforward. China seeks a secure second (retaliatory) strike capability that will serve to deter an American first strike. As China argues, it has a “no-nuclear-first policy” which makes its arsenal purely defensive – while its other capabilities such as cyber are offensive. Potential nuclear adversaries including Russia, India, and the United States are fully aware that China’s investment in advanced warheads and ballistic missile delivery systems bring Delhi, Moscow, and, soon, Washington within reach of the “East Wind.” While not a nuclear peer competitor to either Russia or the U.S., China is rapidly catching up as it builds an estimated 30-50 new nuclear warheads each year. While American leaders may find such a sentiment unfounded, the PRC has a strong fear that the United States will use its nuclear arsenal as a tool to blackmail (coerce) China into taking or not taking a number of actions that are against its interests. China’s fears are not unfounded. Unlike China, the United States maintains an ambiguous use-policy in order to provide maximum flexibility. As declassified government documents from the 1970s clearly show, the United States certainly planned to use overwhelming nuclear force early in a European conflict with the Soviet Union. Given American nuclear superiority and its positioning of ballistic missile defenses in Asia, ostensibly to defend against a North Korean attack, China sees its position and ability to deter the United States as vulnerable. Possible Scenario While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan. If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation. In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China. It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States. In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

## Euro War Impacts

### Impacts --- Euro/Russia War Escalates

#### WWIII

Adrian Bonenberger 17, Vocativ Staff, Where Could The European Cold War Go Hot Again? Think a war in Europe won't happen? Here's a look at the issues most likely to spur a military confrontation, 1-27-17, <http://www.vocativ.com/397190/europe-cold-war-military-conflict/>

Since 2014, however, and the West’s failure to protect an avowedly pro-European Ukraine, it has become increasingly popular to describe the West’s relationship with Russia as a new Cold War. Reading the headlines, it certainly seems like Moscow and Europe are one badly-aimed missile or bomb away from World War III. As political realities in the US and abroad are challenged, what are the lines or issues most likely to lead to war in Europe? Imperial Russia By A Different Name One variable that seems constant right now is Russia. Whether one sees things from Russia’s perspective (wherein Russia is surrounded by hostile neighbors intent on its destruction) or those of its nearest neighbors (which see Russia as an aggressive and expansive imperial bully), Russia’s actions are indisputable. It has invaded and occupied portions of Ukraine and Georgia. It has countenanced cyberattacks on Estonia, Ukraine (which included the first deaths attached to cyberwarfare), the U.S., Georgia, Azerbaijan and NATO. It is pursuing a long game to undermine and destabilize any and all political alliances that do not include it, as well as those that do include it. The weaker everyone else is, the greater the room for Russian opportunism. Russia has also taken the side of America’s primary antagonists in the Middle East. This has made it the friend of isolationists, nationalists, and left-wingers who (paradoxically, given Russia’s own actions) oppose an American and European hegemony, backed by the increasingly questionable threat of military intervention. Whether it is lashing out in righteous self-defense or as part of an unethical attempt to grow larger and more powerful at the expense of its smaller and weaker neighbors, there is no question that Russia is looking to expand its brand. The Return Of Nationalism Across Europe, explicit nationalism is on the rise at levels unseen since the early 20th century. While hard to quantify, the success of so-called “populist” political parties with nationalist agendas suggests a growing dissatisfaction with NATO, the EU, and the U.S.. Over the last two years, far-right parties have won political power, gained credibility, or advanced substantial nationalist agendas in Poland (Law and Justice), Hungary (Jobbik), Romania (the recent founding of a new nationalist party) Austria, Italy (rejection of judicial and legal reform), the U.S. (Trump/Alt-Right), Germany (Alternative for Germany), UK (Brexit), France (Le Pen’s National Front) and others. Nationalism overlaps well with Russia’s agenda, because it erodes federalism—the idea that different people in different countries could lay aside tribal instincts like linguistic or ethnic affinities to cooperate. This makes it easier for Russia to project power at a local or regional level without sacrificing much in the way of money or manpower. Even nationalists like those in Poland and Germany who tend to dislike Russians for a variety of actual and perceived historical slights seem to receive financial support from Russia. This seems based on the principle that a Europe of many countries will be less unified in opposing Russia’s agenda. In principle, those countries that have a strong nationalist political voice end up pursuing policies that strengthen (relatively) Russia. For people who believe that NATO, the U.S., or the EU are too strong, that may not be a particularly troublesome issue. Immigration There are at least three different types of national responses to the question of (largely Middle Eastern and African) immigration into Europe. The first draws on 20th century legal precedents guaranteeing humans fair and dignified treatment regardless of their national background. This response, exemplified by Germans and Scandinavians, tends to view immigrants as refugees fleeing war or economic oppression for which Europe or the West have some kind of responsibility given the global economy. Nations like Germany, Denmark and Sweden are considered among the most generous to refugees. Germany especially has embraced modern attitudes toward immigration, in the wake of its catastrophic spasm of ethnic cleansing during WWII. Other countries with colonial legacies have maintained generous post-colonial policies. Absent active restitution, countries like France, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Portugal—any country that had its finger in the exploitative pie that was 17th-20th century Africa, South America, and Asia—provide expedited or dual-citizenship options for many people living in countries formerly touched by European sails and soldiers. This is similar to the posture of countries like Germany. It also results in specific ethnic and religious traffic flowing from the formerly colonized to the colonizer. A critical difference between the experience of countries like Germany and those like France or the UK (for example) is that Germany’s posture toward immigration and citizenship embraces an assumed modern, cosmopolitan future, and exists without any natural enemies safe for the white supremacists and Neo-Nazis who nearly destroyed Europe during World War II (until recently, not a credible source of dissidence). Colonialism did not die easily in the UK, France, or other similar countries, and much military blood and cash was expended in attempting to keep colonial holdings within the fold. Groups nostalgic for former imperial glory tend to see immigration as an affront to national dignity, beyond being unwise policy. Groups that evaluate immigration through the lens of colonial nostalgia are not Nazis or necessarily white supremacists, though the practical implications of their attitudes end up being similar enough to warrant comparison. Finally, there are nations in Central and Eastern Europe whose attitudes on immigration were shaped by their experiences in WWI and WWII, as well as life behind the Iron Curtain. Ethnic cleansing and population movements by the Nazis and the Kremlin-led USSR left countries with the idea that ethnic homogeneity was an absolute good, and ethnic diversity was an existential threat. During the first part of its life, the USSR viewed ethnicity as threatening to the ideal of a classless society, although that slowly devolved into a view that non-Russian ethnicities were dangerous. This is not to diminish or excuse a powerful racial element in resistance to immigration, simply to frame it in the context of places that experienced the Holocaust firsthand, often actively participating in it in a way that ended up shaping every subsequent generation. Religion The European immigration “crisis” is complicated by the issue of religion. There are two key fault lines at play here: Orthodox versus non-Orthodox, and Christian versus Islam. Countries like Germany, Hungary, Croatia, Poland and Slovakia tend to be Catholic. The primary factor in considering their political preferences is their experience with Soviet-style governance, wherein Orthodox Christianity was a proxy for Russian intelligence agencies, and Catholicism was part of resistance to totalitarianism and Russian nationalism. Orthodox countries tend to be pro-Russian: Greece, Bulgaria Macedonia and Serbia all share religious and cultural affinity for one another, as well as Russia. They tend to be hostile to the idea of immigration from the Middle East and Africa based on religious grounds, given the relationship between church and state. This has been the case for centuries. Religious constituencies within all European countries tend to view the EU’s stance toward religion with skepticism, and see efforts to resettle non-Christians within their borders as direct attacks on both their Christianity and ethnicity. Still, there are substantial differences between Orthodox countries (which tend to be pro-Russian) and Catholic countries that spent time behind the Iron Curtain (which tend to be anti-Russian). Countries Formerly Occupied Or Annexed By Russia Polish voters empowered the “Law and Order” party based partly on its promises to block non-Christian (most importantly, Islamic) immigration and the expansion of EU power at the expense of Polish autonomy. At the same time, Poland is among the most staunch and enthusiastic NATO member-states. Its army is the fourth largest in Europe behind Russia, Ukraine, and France. Its chief foreign policy priorities have nothing to do with Middle Eastern immigration, and everything to do with preventing a repeat of the 20th century, where Poland was occupied by Russian soldiers on three separate occasions, and forced to adopt Soviet governance at bayonet-point. Similar in their opposition to recent Russian militancy to Poland are the Baltic States, as well as countries like Sweden, Finland, and Romania. The fate of the Baltics and Finland were determined as part of agreements between Nazi Germany and the USSR to enforce German and Russian “spheres of influence” according to Hitler and Stalin’s vision for Europe. The Baltics were made into independent SSRs within the USSR, while Sweden maintained its independence. Finland was invaded and had large portions of territory annexed into Russia, and Romania was partitioned before and after WWII, first by agreement between the USSR and the Nazis, and later by conquest. Within the Baltics, anti-Russian attitudes are tempered by former Russian citizens of the USSR who lost their national standing when the USSR collapsed. This is most conspicuous in Latvia, but is also true for Lithuania and Estonia. Broadly speaking, any country with an ethnic or Russian-speaking population that borders Russia or was part of the USSR’s sphere of influence. It is a visible reminder of Russia’s de facto colonization of other nations within the USSR, the consequences of which—the current war in Ukraine, as well as the past war in Georgia—explain why national security is among the most urgent priorities for these countries now (satirically represented here, though more recent developments suggest that Germany would remain part of the EU and France perhaps would not). Another way of stating this European dynamic would be thus: countries with no direct experience of the USSR tend not to see Russia as an imminent military threat. Those with direct experience of the USSR (and which therefore have vocal Russian-speaking minorities as viable political entities) see Russia as an existential threat. Economic Ideals Those countries that have had difficulty adjusting their economies to meet the EU’s standards, or which have not prospered during their time in the EU have become powerful passive allies of Russia. Greece, Italy, Spain and Bulgaria have all come to view sanctions on Russia as damaging to their own economies. They view competition with Russia as harmful to their economic interests, either “someone else’s problem” or somehow the fault of the U.S.. The EU’s structure (exposed during Greece’s economic crisis of 2012) does not privilege every country equally, nor is it designed to—its design offers benefits to those countries that are best able to leverage Europe’s many markets and industries. Those in favor of the EU would stress that each country that joined the EU did so transparently and freely, and expected to benefit from its structure by investing time and energy—these people would say that countries failing to maximize their income within the EU have themselves to blame. Those opposed to the EU (many Greek nationalists) believe that it is an exploitative system. Energy Dependence The final factor that determines a country’s relationship with Europe versus Russia is its dependence on Russian oil and gas. After the fall of the USSR, some countries that had existed behind the Iron Curtain were able to maintain privileged relationships with Russian energy producers. Dependence on the Russia used to be the single greatest European weakness, and still is for certain countries (most conspicuously Hungary, which goes out of its way to propitiate Russia, but also other Central European powers as well as Ukraine itself). Lately, though, low oil prices, longtime pushes for energy independence using renewable sources, as well as the opening of alternate energy markets in the Middle East have made it increasingly difficult for Russia to monopolize Europe’s energy, and therefore have reduced its political influence there. This places Russia in a serious bind, as the US’s development of new technology to access additional energy reserves means that as the price of oil and gas rises, it becomes profitable for it to reenter the energy market—meaning European countries will never again be entirely dependent on Russia for energy. The Prospect of War Although there are many fault lines that could lead to conflict, it still seems unlikely that European war will spread west from Ukraine. Still, it’s worth paying attention to these various collisions between Russian and European countries. No century in history has seen a Europe free from war—the question is always one of degree and intensity. So far, the 21st century still has all the elements in place for a truly epic struggle between European countries and Russia. And this conflict, unlike those of the last century, may be adjudicated by nuclear weapons.

### Impacts --- Goes Nuclear

#### Extinction

Jeffrey M. Elliot 7, North Carolina Central University and Robert Reginald, California State University, San Bernandino, The Arms Control, Disarmament, and Military Security Dictionary, p. 19-20

Escalation of War (15)

Increasing, enlarging, or intensifying the nature, magnitude, or parameters of a war. Escalation may entail an increase in troops, additional third party involvement, the use of deadlier weapons, or a change in political or military objectives. Escalation may be likened to a ladder, in that the level of coercion and force tends to increase as the war becomes more costly and uncertain. In a limited war, states can employ sundry military measures to challenge one another’s resolve and capabilities. in such conflicts, the goal of escalation may be to defeat or force the surrender of an adversary, or to mete out increased punishment to pressure a foe to negotiate or terminate the action that originally precipitated the conflict. In a limited war, military objectives tend to escalate rapidly. In a nuclear confrontation, however, the stakes are far greater—rapid escalation must be avoided, as it could spell instant disaster or extinction. In a nuclear age, most experts believe there is no such thing as a “limited” nuclear war. For example, if one side initiated a war in Europe, even with conventional weapons, it is highly likely that it would escalate inevitably to a global strategic nuclear war, since neither side would be willing to accept defeat in such a critical arena. See also BALANCE OF POWER, 4; CONFLICT, 10; ESCALATION, 71; LIMITED WAR, 20; TOTAL. WAR. 32.

## Ukraine Impacts

### Impacts --- Ukraine win k prevent Russia Invade

#### Ukraine can win --- that’s critical to prevent Russian aggression vs. NATO

Hooker 7/20/22

(R.D. Hooker Jr. is a nonresident senior fellow with the Atlantic Council. He previously served as Dean of the NATO Defense College and as Special Assistant to the US President and Senior Director for Europe and Russia with the National Security Council, “Ukraine can win,” pg online @ <https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraine-can-win/> //um-ef)

In all likelihood, the appetite for international aid and support for Ukraine would wane over time, abetted by declining interest in sanctions against Russia. In this circumstance, the prospects for eventual EU and NATO membership for what remained of Ukraine would also fade. Instead, Ukraine would fall inexorably into the Russian orbit. Nor would “peace” follow. As Putin has stated many times, Russia has larger foreign policy ambitions that extend far beyond Ukraine. It is certainly true that as matters now stand, Ukraine probably cannot “win,” if victory is defined as recovering all internationally recognized Ukrainian territory and dealing a decisive defeat to Russia in the field. Western financial and security assistance has helped Ukraine to inflict heavy losses on the Russian military in the air, at sea, and on land. However, conscious Western policy decisions to withhold airpower, self-propelled artillery, long range precision fires and main battle tanks from Ukraine are having the intended effect. Without them, Ukraine cannot transition to offensive operations and drive the invaders out. Almost certainly, the West has collectively determined not to “humiliate” Putin. When Latvia is providing more military equipment to Ukraine than France, Italy and Germany, the true intentions of major European states emerge powerfully. The logic of this approach, however, collapses when confronted with the strong probability of further Russian aggression on NATO territory. When that happens, there will be much hand-wringing about “missed opportunities” and “miscalculations.” It is far better to confront the threat now while Russia is reeling from high casualties, depleted stocks of high-tech munitions, low morale, severe losses among senior commanders, and inferior generalship. A careful assessment suggests that given essential capabilities, Ukraine can win. In terms of manpower, President Zelenskyy can eventually put up to a million trained soldiers in the field, despite heavy losses to date. This is far more than Russia can likely generate.

### Impacts --- Deter k Ukraine/Russia

#### Concept signals shift to deterrence and defense --- resolve is key to win in Ukraine and Deter Russia from larger escalation

Davis 7/3/22

(Malcolm Davis is a senior analyst at ASPI, “NATO Needs To Mobilize For A Possible War With Russia,” pg online @ <https://www.19fortyfive.com/2022/07/nato-needs-to-mobilize-for-a-possible-war-with-russia/> //um-ef)

The recognition of Russia’s broader strategic ambitions beyond Ukraine, as noted by Sanders, reinforces the importance of NATO’s decision to return to its traditional role of deterring major-power aggression, specifically as posed by a revanchist Russia. NATO must make firm commitments to avoid the worst-case outcome—a Russian attack on a NATO member such as a Baltic state or Poland. Russia cannot be allowed to achieve any degree of victory in Ukraine, and it’s vital for NATO and its partners across the globe, including Australia, to sustain and expand military support to Kyiv to blunt Moscow’s ability to sustain operations in key areas. This will be challenging given the very long timeframe now emerging. US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines suggests the war will continue and Putin’s objective is still to capture most of Ukraine, with immediate Russian efforts focused on the Donbas. A failure of Western resolve to sustain support for Kyiv and expand the shipment of materiel to defeat Russian advances would probably see a Russian breakout from the Donbas and a renewed offensive towards Kyiv. Defeat for Ukraine would be catastrophic for European security. Accepting any degree of Russian success, including by offering ‘off ramps’ as part of efforts towards a negotiated settlement, would embolden Putin to launch further acts of aggression. And with that requirement to ensure Russia is decisively defeated, NATO must consider a growing risk that Putin will be tempted towards either vertical escalation, by using weapons of mass destruction in Ukraine, or horizontal escalation, by attacking supply lines of NATO support, including those beyond Ukraine’s borders. Moscow could also continue to make implicit and explicit nuclear threats to coerce NATO, such as Putin’s announcement that Russia will transfer nuclear-capable Iskander-M ballistic missiles to Belarus, while also raising the threat of hybrid warfare against NATO members. Lithuania and Norway are already coming under cyberattack from Russian-based hackers and Putin is set to ruthlessly exploit food and energy as weapons to coerce NATO states into stopping support for Kyiv. NATO needs to mobilize for possible war by deploying sufficient force to deter Russian aggression across its eastern frontier while strengthening resilience against hybrid and grey-zone threats. It also needs to boost the credibility of its nuclear deterrence against Moscow. The naming of ‘Operation Mobilise’ is apt, but NATO must face down Russia to avoid an even larger and more disastrous European war.

### Impacts --- Deterrence k Stop Russia

#### Deterrence focus stops Russia lashout and expansion

Wojick 6/28/22

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NATO’s Madrid summit will consider (June 28-30) its most consequential defense posture and readiness options since the Cold War. A paradigm shift seems afoot, and robust forward defense along NATO’s eastern front is the top priority.

There is a growing transatlantic awareness that the NATO response after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and illegal annexation of Crimea was inadequate and has failed to stop Russian aggression against its neighbors. While Russia has not yet attempted open military aggression against alliance members, it is more frequently threatening to do so — most recently it officially menaced NATO ally Lithuania over its enforcement of EU sanctions, while state-controlled media openly talked of war. Russia meanwhile maintains a steady drumbeat of nuclear and other saber-rattling in the borderlands and beyond.

Until Russia commenced its full-scale 2022 war on Ukraine, many Western leaders had convinced themselves that its continued aggression and its self-proclaimed revisionist mandate required only incremental responses. An unofficial doctrine emerged; firstly, do not “antagonize” Russia too much, coupled with, secondly, let’s not invest too much on NATO’s eastern front (since no one wanted the expense of a second Cold War.) Even a week before the invasion, many did not believe that Putin would start a major war in the heart of Europe. These ideas and false assumptions, particularly since 2014, have led the West to a strategic situation unseen in Europe since World War II. Russia only understands strength. It is a lesson the West is having to relearn, at speed.

The conflict is inflicting untold costs, both human and financial. Estimates for humanitarian relief, war damage, and operations reach as high as $1 trillion. In comparison, the US Department of Defense spends about $25bn annually to maintain 175,000 American troops deployed around the globe. That is more than the total number of troops in all 10 US Army divisions. Thus, war costs so far could fund the equivalent of 175,000 US troops on NATO’s eastern front for 40 years and would deter Russia from threatening NATO allies and attacking its neighbors.

NATO does not need that number of American troops on its eastern front, but it does need to establish a 21st-century version of the Cold War forward defense of Western Europe. During that period, the US maintained hundreds of thousands of troops in Europe. In 1989, there were 250,000 American troops, just in Germany — not to mention 55,000 British troops in Rhine Army, with additional French, Canadian, Dutch, and Belgian allies alongside. Add in the West German Army and almost a million allied troops were toe-to-toe with the Russians in forward defense (with more divisions ready to reinforce from Europe and North America). The US Air Force (USAF) maintained four Fighter Wings, close to the front in Germany, and six others around Europe. The US Navy had no less than two separate fleets focused on Europe during the Cold War.

NATO’s strong Forward Defense was instrumental in defeating Soviet Russia. After the Cold War, NATO enlarged, and its “front line” shifted eastwards, but Western allied forces did not. During the 1990s, there was a sense that all was, and would remain, quiet on the eastern front. The NATO-Russia Founding Act (NRFA) limited the Western troop presence in the former Warsaw Pact nations of Central-East Europe (CEE.) US and Western NATO allies mostly returned their divisions home, or decommissioned them. By 2013, the last US Army tank departed Europe, something celebrated as an “historic moment” Just a year later, in another historic moment, American Army tanks returned to Europe after Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine. But even after this, Germany still pointed to the NRFA as a key reason why NATO should take the minimalist route on Kremlin aggression. The US pushed the alliance to bolster its defenses, but not that hard; an indication of German sensitivities and its desire to keep talking to Vladimir Putin. Meanwhile, Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania were sounding the alarm, to little effect.

A simple recreation of allied forward defense as seen during the Cold War is not what’s called for today. Equally, it’s clear that NATO’s unconvincing adjustments on its eastern perimeter since 2014 are not getting the job done. Allies must upgrade the current, small tripwire deployments and harden the Eastern Flank, using its determined allies in Poland and Romania as regional bulwarks as the anchor.

Strong US leadership is essential. A respected senior allied leader told this author: “The United States organized NATO for the United States to ‘lead’ NATO, there is no other option. Please lead!” Almost every ally makes this fundamental point in this era of renewed great power competition. The US cannot just be a nuclear backstop, or a cheerleader on Europe’s periphery. It must lead from the front with a strategy, along with permanent troop commitments and capabilities to ensure robust and credible deterrence.

The NATO Russia Founding Act must be formally scuttled.

Western allies must organize transatlantic schemes based on the Lend-Lease Act and Marshall Plan not only for Ukraine but also for vulnerable nations on the eastern front — Poland, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria Hungary and NATO partners like Georgia and Moldova. These efforts must focus on rapid modernization and Westernization of Eastern Flank militaries; massive “no-strings” Western financial investments in the infrastructure-development Three Seas Initiative (3SI). Importantly, the 3SI fosters energy resilience and military mobility for NATO.

The alliance must urgently update its Maritime Strategy (which is now several years behind.) And, the US administration must organize a Black Sea strategy, in coordination with allies, synchronized with the pending 2022 US National Security Strategy.

Permanent brigade-sized formations (with enabling units) should be assigned to all eight of NATO’s forward presence battle groups (these are currently slightly larger than battalion-size formations, with about 1,000 troops) – i.e., they are only tripwire forces.

Permanently assign the US Army V “Victory” Corps full Headquarters (HQ) to Poland. Currently, the V Corps forward HQ is assigned to Poland, separated from its main HQ, making V Corps less effective. The Corps needs to be consolidated in one location, planning operations, and working daily on allied readiness with Poland and regional allies.

Permanently assign a US heavy division to Poland, and a second US heavy division to Romania. The US and NATO are fortunate to have such stalwart allies and both are ready to help anchor the eastern front. They are modernizing rapidly (though severe budget pressures mean the US and Western NATO allies must assist.) Both are increasing defense spending and force structure. Poland intends to become NATO’s second-highest per GDP defense spender (after the US.) Its already significant plans to increase its armed forces rose again on June 27, when it was announced personnel would increase to 400,000 from 150,000, but that and associated equipment plans will take at least 10 years to implement. The US and NATO can meanwhile help Poland and Romania (which is raising defense spending by 25%) to develop highly capable divisions. There is no better way to do this than to have a US division permanently on the ground in these nations, building capabilities, “training as we fight” and together providing real warfighting capabilities to NATO and its entire eastern front.

Permanently assign a USAF fighter-wing to Poland to support the region. Additionally, Western-NATO allies should permanently assign fighter squadrons to the Baltic/Black Sea regions.

Upgrade NATO Baltic and Black Seas Air Policing missions to Air and Missile Defense (AMD) missions, with new rules of engagement for allied fighters, and robust ground AMD capabilities.

Increase the number of Standing NATO Maritime Groups (SNMGs) from two to five. This will provide for 24/7, 365-day, NATO Baltic and Black Sea maritime defense patrolling, and the ability to cover other SNMG requirements in the Mediterranean and Atlantic. There are 29 US warships, assigned to NATO’s Maritime Command (MARCOM), and the US could fill the five-SNMG requirement on its own. But that would detract from other MARCOM responsibilities. Therefore, the US should provide up to two SNMGs, while other NATO nations should provide the other three to four SNMGS. The Montreux Convention limits deployments in the Black Sea, but non-littoral NATO has never maximized its Black Sea patrolling opportunities. That has allowed Russia to turn the Black Sea into a de facto Russian Lake, and create a global food crisis, through its blockade of Ukraine.

NATO must permanently position the necessary wartime stocks of equipment, ammunition, spare parts, rations, and other logistics.

Faced with an alternative of an increasingly aggressive Russia terrorizing its NATO neighbors, a robust forward defense on the eastern front makes its own case and is worth the investment. It provides credible deterrence with real warfighting capabilities. Most importantly, it is the best way to avoid a ruinous future war.

### AT: Russia Wont Attack NATO

#### Assumptions that Russia wont attack NATO are based on faulty logic --- Deterrence by Denial is ESSENTIAL to stop conflict --- wont cause it

Stoicescu 7/14/22

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What is the myth? Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has reminded NATO that President Vladimir Putin sees military aggression as a rational means to achieve his foreign policy aims. It has also triggered widespread discussion of the implications if Russia were to follow this with an attack on a NATO member state. The prevailing view is that this is highly unlikely, because Russia must realize the devastating implications of the entirety of the Western alliance joining the conflict and inflicting intolerable damage on Russia. However, this view is based on a number of questionable premises, and in fact a Russian attack on a NATO member state should not be ruled out. Who advocates or subscribes to it? A wide range of political figures, analysts and commentators have discounted the likelihood of a Russian attack on a NATO member state. This is primarily because, in their view, NATO’s deterrent message of unity is strong, and Russia is fully cognizant of the fact that an attack on one NATO member state would inevitably bring the rest of the alliance into the conflict. Other Western commentary suggests that there is no evident benefit to Russia in an attack on the Baltic states or Poland. Russia, too, has added its assurances that it has no hostile intent against NATO – although these assurances are now recognized as valueless, since the same promises were made regarding Ukraine in the lead-up to the 2022 invasion. Indeed in March 2022 Russia’s foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, stated once again that Russia had no plans to attack other countries, but in the same interview also claimed that Russia had not attacked Ukraine. Why is it wrong? There are several reasons why it is incorrect to assume that Russia would not attack NATO members. The first lies in the term ‘attack’. Ordinarily, this is understood as the ‘armed attack’ specified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty – implying an overt use of force which would clearly and unambiguously breach the definitional threshold for armed conflict. However, this narrow definition overlooks both the fact that many other forms of coercion have already been practised by Russia against NATO member states in the sphere of warfare commonly referred to as ‘hybrid’, ‘sub-threshold’ or ‘grey zone’, and that Russia has already used military assets to carry out actions against NATO member states that are indistinguishable from those conducted during wartime. In 2014 Russia sent military intelligence officers to the Czech Republic and Bulgaria to sabotage munitions depots. More recently, Russia has persistently used its military electronic warfare assets to trigger disruption in the Nordic and Baltic areas. In fact, the narrower sense of ‘armed attack’ is one of the few ways in which Russia has not already attacked NATO members. Russia has already used military assets to carry out actions against NATO member states that are indistinguishable from those conducted during wartime Second, the entire principle of NATO deterrence rests on an interpretation of Article 5 which does not stand up to close scrutiny. Senior NATO figures and politicians from member states focus on the part of Article 5 which states that an attack on one NATO member state is to be considered an attack against all of them. But this is ordinarily coupled with the assertion, or assumption, that all other member states are obliged immediately to join the conflict by contributing forces to aid the victim of aggression. Yet this is not what Article 5 actually stipulates, and it is highly probable that, unlike many Western politicians, Russia’s military planners have in fact read it. The actual text of Article 5 provides plenty of leeway for any member state that might wish to avoid entering a conflict with an aggressor. The requirement only to take the action that each member state ‘deems necessary… to restore and maintain’ security is far more vague than the clear and direct requirement to support the victim of aggression that is ordinarily assumed. The implication is that Russia might be unlikely to attack a NATO member state if it were indeed convinced that this would trigger retaliation from the rest of the alliance. But there are many circumstances in which Moscow could make a calculated assessment that it could target an individual country while ensuring through other means – political, diplomatic or subversive – that one or more major NATO allies could be effectively deterred from responding, or induced or persuaded not to respond. Third, the assessment that Russia would not attack a NATO member state rests on the assumption that decision-makers in Moscow are assessing their options using the same framework of reality and rationality as the Euro-Atlantic community. However, both the shifting rationales for the invasion of Ukraine and the counterproductive nature of the invasion itself show that this should not be relied on. Many of Russia’s recent actions have achieved the exact opposite of what they were intended to do because of Moscow’s faulty understanding of events and processes in the outside world. For example, Russia makes military threats and launches military action in order to dissuade neighbours from joining NATO – with the only result being to demonstrate to those neighbours precisely why they need to join. The most recent examples are Finland and Sweden: the former a long-time exponent of stable relations with Russia, and the latter a country that enjoyed military neutrality for more than two centuries. Similarly, the possibility of misguided actions by the Russian leadership in the future should not be ruled out solely on the basis of what appears rational based on Western assumptions and the Western understanding of recent history. Fourth, President Putin has clearly laid out the extent of his ambition to roll back history and the borders of the West. He has set out his task as correcting the ‘catastrophic mistakes’ of the end of the Russian empire, and redrawing the international borders that he says came about as a result of those errors. But restoring Russia’s former imperial boundaries can only come at the expense of those nations and peoples that were formerly dominated by Russia and now live in independent sovereign states. That list includes NATO member states, such as Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and – soon – Finland. Given both Russia’s and Putin’s track record of strategic patience and nurturing grievances, and widespread support within the country for wars of reconquest, even military defeat in Ukraine would only postpone, rather than deter, Russia’s next attempt to achieve Putin’s vision. What is its impact on policy? The results of a misguided default assumption that there will be no Russian attack on a NATO member state are inimical to timely and appropriate preparation for that eventuality. Paradoxically, throughout most of NATO’s recent history, failure to prepare adequately for conflict with Russia has resulted not solely from the assumption that Russia did not intend to attack, but also from the self-deterring idea that Russia could be ‘provoked’ into attacking through defensive preparations by NATO. Major European NATO allies therefore self-deterred from doing anything which Russia described as provocative. NATO’s limited contribution to the security of the Baltic states and Poland, the so-called ‘enhanced forward presence’ (eFP), came about only after extensive wrangling over whether this might trigger a Russian attack – a striking indication of the dominant position of Russian narratives about the nature of the security threat in the region. Today, this same pattern of assumptions has deterred a wide range of meaningful and timely assistance to Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression. Germany in particular has shown extreme reluctance to provide weapons to Ukraine, or even to allow third countries to do so, using the argument that this – rather than Russian intent – could be the trigger for war with NATO. In addition, despite widespread recognition of the key role played by tactical nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine, nuclear deterrence policy, capabilities and decision-making processes have been allowed to atrophy within NATO because of a preference to treat nuclear use as ‘unthinkable’. This is a highly dangerous assumption when Russia devotes a great deal of thought and resources to the possibility of nuclear use, in addition to extensively employing nuclear rhetoric for intimidating the West. What would good policy look like? Preparations by NATO nations for potential conflict with Russia cannot be premised on the assumption that it will not happen. The defence of NATO nations need not be hostage to interpretations of Article 5. The Joint Expeditionary Force – a coalition of 10 like-minded northern European states that share a similar viewpoint on the threat from Russia – provides a template for cooperative organizations that can respond to aggression by Moscow without relying on support from every member of the alliance. And the existence of NATO does not preclude regional defensive alliances of this kind, tailored to the specific nature of the threat, which varies across Europe. The forward presence of troops and assets from major NATO allies in the front-line states is an essential element for the conventional deterrence of Moscow The forward presence of troops and assets from major NATO allies in the front-line states is an essential element for the conventional deterrence of Moscow. Until now, initiatives such as eFP in the Baltic states and Poland have been sufficient to deter an attack, by eliminating the element of doubt as to whether other allies would respond. But the new situation following the invasion of Ukraine demands forward-deployed forces that are militarily as well as politically significant, in order to offer deterrence of Moscow by denial in addition to the promise of deterrence by punishment. Overall, defensive preparations by NATO must reflect the reality of a belligerent Russia whose hostile intent is no longer in doubt, and NATO’s forward presence in the eastern flank must become a robust forward defence posture.

## Impacts --- NATO Good

### Impacts --- NATO k Hard Power

**An integrated NATO is key to numerous existential threats**

Goldgeier 10 – James M. Goldgeier, James Goldgeier is a Professor of International Relations and Robert Bosch Senior Visiting Fellow at the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution. He was a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations from 2017-19 and in 2018-19, he held the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in U.S.-Russia Relations at the John W. Kluge Center. Ph.D., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; M.A., Political Science, University of California, Berkeley; A.B., Government, Harvard University, Febuary 2010,“The Future of NATO,” Council on Foreign Relations Press, <https://www.cfr.org/report/future-nato>

If the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) did not exist today, the United States would not seek to create it. In 1949, it made sense in the face of a potential Soviet invasion to forge a bond in the North Atlantic area among the United States, Canada, and the west European states. Today, if the United States were starting from scratch in a world of transnational threats, the **debate** would be **over whether to follow liberal and neoconservative calls for an alliance of democracies** without regard to geography or to develop a great power concert envisioned by the realists to uphold the current order. The United States is not, however, starting from scratch, and **NATO should not disappear. While the bonds across the Atlantic may be frayed**, **they are stronger than those tying the United States to other parts of the world. Common history and values matter**, as do the resources (both financial and military) that Europe possesses. The **NATO allies share a common interest in preventing disruptions to the global economy**, **including attacks on freedom of navigation. As a community of democracies**, the member states are **threatened by forces such as Islamic extremism and** the **rise of authoritarian states**. For the United States, **the alliance is a source of legitimacy for** actions in places like Afghanistan. For Europe, **NATO is a vehicle for projecting hard power**. While **NATO** alone cannot defend against the range of threats facing the member states, it **can serve as the hub for American and European leaders to develop the ties with other institutions and non-European countries** necessary to provide for the common defense. For all its faults, **NATO enables the United States to partner with close democratic allies** in ways that would be **difficult without a formal institution** that provides a headquarters and ready venue for decision-making, as well as **legitimacy and support for action that ad hoc U.S.-led coalitions do not.** As has been true since the fall of the Berlin Wall two decades ago, the United States (and Europe) should want **NATO** to succeed. After the Cold War, the alliance dramatically redefined itself. In the 1990s, it **fostered stability across Europe** by beginning its process of enlargement to the formerly communist east and by intervening to stop genocide in the Balkans. In the 2000s, **it broadened its scope through** the mission in Afghanistan as well as a **counterterrorist operation** in the Mediterranean and counterpiracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden and off the Horn of Africa (in addition to continuing the enlargement process). But as NATO has broadened its scope, some members have grown concerned that the alliance is shifting its attention away from Europe. These members seek to return NATO to a more traditional understanding of its role defending against threats on the continent, particularly as an increasingly authoritarian and assertive Russian government has sought to reclaim a sphere of influence lost in the Soviet collapse. In November 2010, NATO will release a new “strategic concept” to guide the alliance going forward. That document must state clearly that providing for collective defense in the twenty-first century goes well beyond defending against the “armed attack” of Article V. To remain relevant, **NATO** must expand its traditional understanding of collective defense to **confront the twenty-first-century threats of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to both states and nonstate actors, and cyberwarfare.** By necessity, the United States has turned its attention away from Europe in order to **counter these modern threats**, which largely emanate from Africa, the broader Middle East, and Asia. **If NATO fails** to accept a growing global role, **then the United States will lose interest in investing** in the alliance’s future. But Europe faces these threats too and must recognize that a more **robust NATO offers** it **the chance to counter them.** Given the varied nature and source of threats today, NATO can be successful only if the Europeans agree to stronger NATO-European Union (EU) cooperation and to closer ties with major non-European democracies, particularly those in the AsiaPacific region.

## Impacts --- Emerging Tech/Turns & Solves

### Impacts --- DIANA Solves Case

#### DIANA increases innovation now

Maria Vitoria Santana, 3/8/21,”Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA),” *European Army Interoperability Centre,* https://finabel.org/defence-innovation-accelerator-for-the-north-atlantic-diana/

When the Covid-19 crisis led to a lockdown of all activities, the lack of digital literacy from governmental bodies and defence personal exposed both a new threat and an opportunity. Bearing this situation in mind, NATO members (NM) have agreed at the 31st annual summit, held in June 2020 in Brussels, to initiate the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) that aims to reach full operability capacities by 2023. DIANA is NATO’s version of the U.S Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). It will reinforce transatlantic cooperation regarding critical technologies to assure the security and defence digital literacy of NM.

This initiative is a joint effort between private-sector entities, non-governmental entities, and academia. NATO’s Assistant Secretary-General David van Weel explains that although financial support from companies and start-ups are crucial for funding the research projects, intellectual property will not be requested (Vivienne Machi, 2021). This is where academia joins the operation, providing the necessary technical knowledge for the development and creation of technologies to improve Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs): Artificial intelligence (AI), quantum-enable technologies, and big-data processing. This takes place on top of supporting the remaining EDTs: Data and Computing, Autonomy, Biotechnology and Human enhancements, Hypersonic technologies, and Space (Tania Latici, 2021).

Assistant Secretary-General van Weel also pointed out that the defence community has a wide range of technological needs that go way beyond the expected ones. Interested start-ups and Small to Medium-sized Enterprises (SME’s) are welcome to get to know the project. Thus, they can enter a trusted capital marketplace that connects qualified investors pre-selected NATO with start-ups, generating a strong network crucial for the development of DIANA. Assistant Secretary-General van Weel further explained that SME’s and start-ups would not solely provide funds, as NM have exceptionally agreed on building a venture capital fund for providing economic support to companies that develop dual-use and key technologies that could be of use for NATO. The NATO Innovation Fund is a bold optional investment on a 15-year time plan with an expected budget of €70 million annually (Vivienne Machi, 2021). Nonetheless, as van Weel stated, “I read somewhere that NATO is not a bank — we are not, but it will be a country that will fund and give a general direction.” This fund was inspired by the US Department of Defense project “Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)” established in 2019 that has proven to be an efficient financial mechanism (Fuentitech, 2021) and aims to provide extra financial aid to DIANA.

By investing in disruptive technologies, NATO expects to be ready for the emerging security challenges facing the NM in this new era of warfare. By joining forces, efforts, and funds with SME’s, investors, and start-ups, NATO focuses on enhancing technological and digital defence mechanisms. These can create more independence and self-sufficiency, allowing NM to achieve the competitive military technological level of the United States and China. The Assistant Secretary-General argued that defence innovation has come a long way since the 1970s. The lack of proper investment in the field has put NM in a dependent relationship with the current world leaders in the area, namely the United States and China. In this sense, the DIANA initiative is presented as an alternative solution that will boost economic, military, and technological development for NM (Maija Palmer, 2021).

DIANA also aims to decrease the gap between SME’s and investors, positively affecting an economic exchange that will impact future disruptive technologies investment as a whole, benefiting all seven areas: artificial intelligence; quantum-enabled technologies; big data processing; hypersonics; biotechnology; space and autonomy not only the military and defence inclined ones (Jane Edwards, 2021). DIANA combines a multitude of strategic needs: the start-up function for trustworthy stakeholders while developing new technologies, the academic content producing function that provides the intellectual and technical support to the creation and analysis of imminent technologies, and the funding function from government and stakeholders that hold the capital power but lack the creational capabilities.

After reaching its full capacities, DIANA is scheduled to become the focal point for NM to cooperate and coordinate the development of new military technologies through the offices and tests centres that will be placed in the Alliance countries (Antonela Ionita, 2021). DIANA will have two headquarters, in North America and Europe, that will work closely together with their subordinated centres. Alongside this, the maintenance of the network line that will connect start-ups, academia, and stakeholders will be thoroughly coordinated by DIANA. Contrary to some doubts raised, DIANA does not present a threat to the NATO Industry Forum (NIF), but is instead a completely different community aiming to adapt NM’s military strategies to the challenges imposed by the new era of warfare (Fuentitech, 2021).

NIF and DIANA will operate independently and will both abide by the Secretary-General (SACEUR), Supreme Allied Commander Transformation (SACT), and NATO. It is key to allow both projects the freedom to create and innovate that comes with the risks of not always achieving a successful outcome. The world’s most impactful defence organisations and leading start-ups have embedded risk-taking in their culture, as it is the only way to assure innovation, even if it is not necessarily the safest. This is why the funding for this project is a collaboration between government and non-government actors, to allow the enhancement of military technology and disruptive technological advances of NATO Allies (Nicholas Nelson, 2021).

#### NATO is already involved in setting Allied targets for emerging technology and building industry partnerships – solves the aff better while avoiding direct engagement.

Shea ‘16

(Jamie Shea, 3-30-2016, "Resilience: a core element of collective defence," NATO Review, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2016/03/30/resilience-a-core-element-of-collective-defence/index.html, accessed 6-18-2022) -- nikki

In a globalised but also more confrontational and complex world, resilience will remain an ongoing concern for Allies, requiring constant adaptation as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge. Virtual vulnerabilities Cyber space is perhaps the most extreme form of this vulnerability as it interconnects the entire planet in real time, making it possible for anybody to attack any electronically operated target from anywhere at any moment. This vastly complicates the task of defenders, who can rarely know in advance that an attack is being launched, where it will strike or where it will originate. So the defender has to try to protect every important part of the national economic or military infrastructure all the time, while the attacker can choose the individual segment or vulnerable fault line that he wishes to disrupt. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are just one example of how infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is increasingly automated, remotely controlled or integrated into ever more complex networks, which are vulnerable to attack. As we move from the internet of things to the internet of everything, more and more of the infrastructure that we depend on for the normal functioning of our lives is being automated or controlled from remoter distances or integrated into ever more complex networks. The SCADAs – or automated control systems for electrical grids or energy pipelines – are but one example. So are cross-border grids which means an energy blackout in Italy can immediately turn off the power in parts of Switzerland, or an overload at one transmission plant in India can plunge 400 million people into temporary darkness, to cite just two recent examples. The globalisation of networks and the increasing integration of physical infrastructure into the virtual world, for instance the storage of data not in machines but in ‘clouds’, has certainly brought about efficiencies and savings. But it has also greatly magnified the consequences of a disruption and the number of key nodal points and attack surfaces that malevolent actors can exploit. Civil preparedness A second tendency increasing the sense of societal vulnerability is the state of civil preparedness within the Alliance. The delivery of forces and military capabilities that NATO needs to uphold collective defence or to project forces beyond its territory relies on civilian resources. During the Cold War, many of these, such as railways, ports, airfields, grids or airspace were in state hands and easily transferred to NATO control in a crisis or wartime situation. Today, by contrast, 90 per cent of NATO’s supplies and logistics are moved by private companies and 75 per cent of the host nation support for NATO forces forward deployed on the territory of the eastern Allies comes from private sector contracts. Similarly, when facing distributed denial of service cyber-attacks against its outward-facing networks, NATO has relied on cooperation from the telecoms sector and the internet security companies to filter and capture data, identify malware and provide extra bandwidth. Without doubt the transfer of ownership and responsibility to the private sector has brought cost-efficiencies; but the quest to reduce costs and overheads to increase profitability has also led to less redundancy and less resilience. In addition, as hybrid threats below the threshold of NATO’s collective defence clause (Article 5 of its founding treaty) blur the traditional distinction between peace and war, government special powers based on wartime emergency legislation have become less practical to implement or even obsolete. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. Whether it be for mobilizing troops for collective defence or to strengthen the ability to defend against – or recover from – hybrid attack, NATO is increasingly dependent on infrastructure and assets in the private sector. As a result, NATO faces two distinct but inter-related resilience challenges: first, to ensure that it can speedily move all the forces and equipment required to any part of the Alliance facing an imminent threat or attack, ensuring full and unimpeded access to all the infrastructure it needs for this purpose; and second, to be able to anticipate, identify, mitigate and recover from hybrid attacks with minimum disruptive impact on the Alliance’s social, political and military cohesion. Civil preparedness is, above all, a national responsibility, in the same way that Allies must ensure adequate cyber defence for their critical information technology networks, especially the ones that NATO depends on for its own operations. This said, Allies’ security relies on individual nations upholding this commitment; and NATO has an interest in obtaining as much transparency as possible, so that it can assess potential vulnerabilities or gaps and accurately measure progress. Avoiding unpleasant surprises in crisis situations when the Alliance needs swift and reliable information and the capacity to analyse, decide and respond swiftly has to be the goal. Consequently, the theme of ‘resilience’ – how to define it, assess it and enhance it across the Alliance – has become a leading topic for the NATO Summit in Warsaw, in July. Resilience is increasingly seen as the corollary of deterrence and reassurance measures in the classical military sphere as part of a comprehensive security strategy for the Alliance. The seven baseline requirements to be assessed are: 1) assured continuity of government and critical government services; 2) resilient energy supplies; 3) ability to deal effectively with the uncontrolled movement of people; 4) resilient food and water resources; 5) ability to deal with mass casualties; 6) resilient communications systems; and finally 7) resilient transportation systems. These seven areas apply to the entire crisis spectrum, from an evolving hybrid threat all the way up to the most demanding scenarios envisaged by Alliance planners. So how can NATO make its contribution to improving resilience within its 28 Allied nations? Five specific areas come to mind: Cyber defence The first is cyber defence. NATO experiences 200 million incidents on its networks every day and around 200 more serious intrusion attempts every month. This level of hostile activity is also what Allies are experiencing as the ‘new normal’ in the cyber domain. NATO’s first task has been to upgrade the protection of its own networks by giving the NATO Cyber Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) additional capabilities for earlier detection and more rapid response to cyberattacks. Two Rapid Response teams have also been created to assist Allies, as well as to manage incidents affecting NATO itself. NATO has now moved on to help Allies improve their cyber resilience by introducing capability targets into the NATO defence planning process and devising a new memorandum of understanding between NATO and individual Allies to establish secure connectivity and arrangements for information-sharing and crisis management. A number of Allies have come together to develop specific capabilities in fields such as a malware information-sharing platform, training and education, and systems configuration for effective decision-making. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence in Estonia has helped NATO to organize state-of-the art annual exercises to improve the skills of cyber operators using a cyber range that Estonia has transferred to NATO. Finally, and given the importance of industry that owns 90 per cent of the networks NATO and the Allies depend on, the Alliance is developing a NATO-industry cyber partnership to encourage information-sharing and best practices. This will give NATO a better grasp of the rapid pace of innovation in the sphere of information technology and how it can better integrate emerging technologies and new concepts into its cyber defence. The proposal to create an ‘innovation hub’ at the NATO Communications and Information Agency should facilitate this dialogue and mutual understanding between NATO and the small-and-medium-size technology providers that are often the most innovative in this area. As the Alliance looks towards the Warsaw Summit, some further measures are on the table. One is a ‘cyber defence pledge’ or commitment to speed up national implementation of the NATO capability targets, which requires sustained national focus and adequate resources. A second idea is to look into the political, legal and operational consequences of declaring cyber as a domain, as many Allies have done already in terms of their national cyber strategies. This reflects the increasing awareness that most conflicts and crises these days have a cyber dimension and that – as NATO increases the momentum of its military activities for collective defence – NATO commanders need the requisite tools and authorities to defend against advanced cyberattacks and to operate across the cyber spectrum. Hybrid threats A second area of resilience is a strategy to respond to hybrid warfare which NATO foreign ministers approved last December. NATO is improving its intelligence-sharing and early warning processes in order to better anticipate and map hybrid warfare activities. It is developing in this respect a set of early warning indicators that can trigger a number of crisis-response options. This is because rapid identification of a hybrid attack (as opposed to an isolated or random incident) and speedy decision-making are essential to nip these attacks in the bud and block escalation. NATO ambassadors and defence ministers have held simulation and scenario-based exercises to fine-tune their situational awareness and responsiveness vis-à-vis threats, which are specifically designed to be ambiguous and difficult to attribute. Effective strategic communications to dispel false information, propaganda, lies and myths is also an essential part of coping with hybrid attacks that seek to confuse public opinion, aggravate social tensions and undermine trust in governments. All this does not mean that Allies are as vulnerable to a hybrid attack as Ukraine proved to be during Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. However, Allies are now encouraged to map potential vulnerabilities that can arise from Russia’s involvement in business, financial, media or energy concerns, for example, and to share the lessons learned from resilience stress testing more broadly within NATO. Civil-military readiness A third area under discussion concerns NATO’s ability to fully implement its Readiness Action Plan for the reinforcement and defence of Allies, whether to the east or to the south. NATO members have to adjust their territorial defence mechanisms and infrastructure to the new security environment and revive the planning fora that existed during the Cold War. In particular, NATO planners require cross-border transit arrangements for the rapid deployment of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force and NATO Response Force. As new Graduated Response Plans for detailed collective defence arrangements are adopted, the Allies must ensure that elements such as transport, flight corridors, civil-military airspace coordination, fuel stocks, pre-positioned equipment, port access and legal agreements are fully integrated into military planning. Crisis-response measures to activate civil emergency measures will need to be updated and civil defence requirements will need to be given more attention, based on the military requirements for the Readiness Action Plan and associated capability packages for its deployment. A more sustained dialogue between military commanders and national civil emergency authorities is now being established. Stepping up cooperation with the EU A fourth area is the relationship between NATO and the European Union (EU). The two organisations occupy different parts of the resilience spectrum but there is also considerable overlap in the middle. A joined-up approach based on a shared situational awareness and coordination of responses is key to a successful response. Currently NATO is talking with the EU on enhanced cooperation in four areas: civil-military planning; cyber defence; information-sharing; and analysis and coordinated strategic communication to spot disinformation and communicate a credible narrative. One early deliverable is a technical arrangement between the NATO NCIRC and the EU Computer Emergency Response Team (EU CERT) for the exchange of information, which was concluded in early February. Up to the Warsaw Summit, NATO and the EU are continuing their discussions at the staff level, as the EU finalises its own strategy to respond to hybrid threats. The aim is to harmonise procedures and to support each other’s efforts in responding comprehensively. The ambition is to identify pragmatic, flexible approaches which could be reflected in a joint declaration by NATO and the EU at the Warsaw Summit. NATO and the EU are also developing compatible ‘playbooks’ to ensure more participation in each other’s activities, such as exercises and training. It is also important that NATO and the EU work together to tackle other resilience challenges that do not result from deliberate attacks. The most urgent of these is the migration crisis. NATO has recently deployed a maritime task force in the Aegean to work with Greece and Turkey and the EU border agency, Frontex, to monitor the flow of refugees and migrants and in this way help to curb the illegal activities of smugglers and traffickers. Working with partner countries Finally, NATO’s partners can also help to improve the Alliance’s overall resilience. Not only Ukraine but many other partners have been the victim of hybrid operations. Their experiences and lessons learned can help NATO to better understand the type and impact of hybrid tactics. More information-sharing and early warning can help NATO decision-makers to identify incipient attacks that could start in a partner country but rapidly spread to NATO territory. Conversely, NATO’s experience and expertise can help partners improve their own capacity for resilience. Unsurprisingly resilience areas like cyber defence and civil emergency planning are increasingly featuring in defence capacity building packages for partners such as Georgia, Moldova, Jordan and Iraq. In the Baltic region, Sweden and Finland – two of NATO’s most active partners, which have enhanced opportunities for dialogue and cooperation – have also faced hybrid pressures from Russia. These Nordic partners have drawn closer to NATO through consultations, training and exercises, including the conclusion of host nation support arrangements for crisis assistance. In conclusion, Allies need to adapt constantly as new vulnerabilities and threats emerge from non-state actors such as so-called Islamic State, as much as from state actors like Russia. Resilience is here to stay as a core element of collective defence. That is why NATO will stay focused on reducing its exposure to threats to its cohesion, independence and security.2

### Impacts --- DIANA solves Case (biotech/ai)

#### Specifically solves AI and Biotech---it’s a new shift on innovation.

Goda Naujokaitytė & Fintan Burke 22, Senior Journalists for Science|Business, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies/micahw

NATO has launched a new research programme called DIANA to bring industry, start-up companies and academia together to research new dual-use technologies that address both societal problems and national security issues.

The Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) is focusing on technologies such as artificial intelligence, big data processing, quantum-enabled technologies, autonomy, biotechnology, novel materials and space.

In its initial stage, DIANA will run a network of more than 10 accelerator sites and over 50 test centres in innovation hubs across NATO alliance countries. The aim is to give innovators the means to bring dual use technologies closer to the market. No budget for the network has been announced yet, but pilot activities will start as early as summer 2023, with the aim of being fully up and running in 2025.

There is also a complementary €1 billion venture capital fund for early stage start-ups.

Tomas Jermalavičius, head of studies at the Estonia-based think tank International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS), says this marks a notable shift in the alliance’s stance on innovation.

“It‘s almost a revolutionary step. Creating this NATO structure shows flexibility and ability to take advantage of all the capacities that exist in the private sector, where innovations are born,“ he said.

Until this point, the alliance has only supported applied research through the Collaboration Support Office in Paris, leaving a gap in support for translating technologies to the market.

The bid to spruce up its innovation capabilities predates the Russian invasion and was agreed on at the 2021 NATO Summit in Brussels. The fleshed out plans for DIANA were published last week, following a meeting of NATO defence ministers. This is not the only military research announcement to pop up in the past weeks, with the US, Australia and UK setting out the AUKUS Quantum arrangement which eyes expanded quantum, hypersonic and other joint weapons research.

### Impacts --- Solves Aff (DARPA)

#### DIANA solves the aff but is SEPARATE from NATO command --- driven by private companies to advance EDT for NATO use --- STRICTLY for defense purposes

Machi ‘21

(Vivienne Machi is a reporter based in Stuttgart, Germany, contributing to Defense News' European coverage. She previously reported for National Defense Magazine, Defense Daily, Via Satellite, Foreign Policy and the Dayton Daily News. She was named the Defence Media Awards' best young defense journalist in 2020, “NATO hopes to launch new defense tech accelerator by 2023,” pg online @ https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/06/22/nato-hopes-to-launch-new-defense-tech-accelerator-by-2023/ //um-ef)

STUTTGART, Germany — In less than two years, NATO hopes to have its own, modified version of the U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) up and running. Alliance members agreed at the 31st annual summit, held June 14 in Brussels, to launch a new initiative dubbed the Defence Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic, or DIANA, meant to speed up trans-Atlantic cooperation on critical technologies, and help NATO work more closely with private-sector entities, academia and other non-governmental entities. The goal is to have DIANA reach initial operating capability (IOC) by 2023, David van Weel, assistant secretary-general for emerging security challenges, said at a Tuesday virtual roundtable with reporters. By next year, the hope is to have “the initial parts … starting to come up into fruition,” he added. In the long term, DIANA will have headquarters both in North America and in Europe, and link to existing test centers throughout NATO member countries that will be used for “validating, testing, and co-designing applications in the field of emerging and disruptive technologies,” van Weel said. DIANA will also be responsible for building and managing a network meant to help relevant startups grow and support NATO’s technology needs via grant programs. The focus will be on national security and defense purposes, and DIANA will not ask for or solicit companies’ intellectual property, van Weel noted. While he singled out artificial intelligence, big-data processing, and quantum-enabled technologies, DIANA is meant to support all seven of the key emerging and disruptive technologies — or EDTs — that NATO has identified as critical for the future. The other four include: autonomy, biotechnology, hypersonics and space. Sometimes a technology company may not realize that their product could be viable for the defense community, he added. One key component of DIANA will be a trusted capital marketplace, where smaller companies can connect with pre-qualified investors who are interested in supporting NATO’s technology efforts. Ensuring that investors are vetted ahead of time will allow NATO to ensure “that the technology will be protected from illicit transfers,” van Weel said. The fund is modeled after a The U.S. Defense Department set up its own trusted capital marketplace in 2019 as a tool that then-DoD acquisition czar Ellen Lord said could help encourage domestically based venture capitalists to fund national security and defense projects. That marketplace served as inspiration for the announced NATO trusted capital marketplace, per the alliance. Members also agreed for the first time to build up a venture capital fund to support companies developing dual-use and key technologies that could be useful to NATO, and which will be optional for member-nations to participate in. The NATO Innovation Fund, as it’s called, would have a running time of about 15 years to start, and would be underwritten by about 70 million euro (about $83 million) per year, per van Weel. The goal is not for NATO headquarters or for its member-nations to run the innovation fund, he noted. “The actual running of a venture capital fund, we believe, should be done by companies that have a broad range of experience in the field.” He cited the U.S.-based capital venture firm In-Q-Tel as an example of the type of partner NATO would seek to run the “day-to-day” business of the fund. “I read somewhere that NATO is not a bank—we’re not,” van Weel said. “But it will be the nations providing the funds, and giving the general direction.” These two initiatives of a technology accelerator and innovation fund are “hopefully going to … bring the alliance forward into the 21st century,” van Weel said. NATO has previously invested in information technology (IT) and software through the NATO Communications and Information Agency (NCIA), but the difference with the innovation fund, and DIANA, is that the alliance wants to better connect with early-stage startups, rather than larger software companies or traditional defense firms, van Weel said. “DIANA is not about taking over innovation for the NATO enterprise,” he said. “It’s a different community, and requires different funding mechanisms and different types of engagement.” These two initiatives have been long awaited and demanded by NATO observers, and versions of both a “DARPA-like” technology accelerator and an alliance-wide investment bank were included in a 2020 list of recommendations by NATO’s advisory group on emerging and disruptive technologies. But it is still early days. While the IOC goal is 2023, “step one is we want to know from allies what they want to offer to DIANA,” van Weel said. Once the NATO Innovation Fund has its participating members, for example, a charter will be set up that will lay out the funding models, rapid contracting processes, and leadership guidelines. “We are trying to do this as fast as we can,” van Weel assured, but then noted, “we do want to get it right, because … with the startup community, you only get one chance.”

#### DIANA will solve the aff, but early stages now

[Goda Naujokaitytė](https://sciencebusiness.net/author/goda-naujokaityte) and [Fintan Burke](https://sciencebusiness.net/author/fintan-burke) 22, Goda holds a bachelor’s degree in communication from the University of Nottingham and a master’s degree in data journalism from Cardiff University, Fintan have a BSc in Biotechnology and an MSc in Science Communication, both from Dublin City University, 4/12/22, “NATO to launch €1B fund for high tech start-ups in dual use technologies,” *Science Business*, <https://sciencebusiness.net/news/nato-launch-eu1b-fund-high-tech-start-ups-dual-use-technologies>, JH

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Technology dominance

The nine technologies NATO wants to advance are AI; data and computing; autonomy; quantum-enabled technologies; biotechnology and human enhancements; hypersonic technologies; space; novel materials and manufacturing; and energy and propulsion.

These are all strategic for NATO if it is to maintain technological dominance. Losing grip was one of the drivers for DIANA, Jermalavičius says.

The bid for technology dominance over countries like China and Russia is also a driver for DIANA‘s goal of shortening the technology development cycle, especially when it comes to software, AI and quantum. “It’s a long horizon, but capabilities do not appear overnight,” said Jermalavičius.

The plan is for DIANA to launch challenge calls for non-dilutive financing that does not require start-ups to give up equity or ownership in their company. Mentoring, technology testing and potential contract opportunities will be available to go hand in hand with the financing.

This will be delivered through network of innovation hubs across the alliance. One such site is the Big Data for Smart Society Institute (GATE) based in Bulgaria. An official at GATE said that the institute’s work in DIANA will focus on digital health, intra governmental communications and using data in industry and city infrastructure. One focus will be on disinformation research.

However the official noted DIANA is still in its early stages. Talks are ongoing with NATO to flesh out exactly how cooperation will work between research centres, the national government, and the NATO secretariat.

The approved charter stipulates some details, though others are still to be discussed, for example the affiliated centres of the network and the points of contact between them. The official said that many of these are likely to be finalised at a meeting at the end of June.

#### Private investment solves in DIANA

By [Heiko Borchert](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/heiko-borchert/), [John Allen](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/john-allen/) and [Marcin Zaborowski](https://www.euractiv.com/authors/marcin-zaborowski/) 21, Borchet directs Borchert Consulting and Research AG, a consulting boutique focusing on strategic affairs, John Rutherford Allen is a retired United States Marine Corps four-star general, and former commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force and U.S. Forces, Marcin Zaborowski is the Former Executive Director of the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM), 12/13/21, “Emerging technology, the geo-economic Achilles’ heel NATO needs to address,” Euractiv, https://www.euractiv.com/section/defence-and-security/opinion/emerging-technology-the-geo-economic-achilles-heel-nato-needs-to-address/

To ensure NATO’s relevance and to keep “our people safe”, the Alliance “must continue to strengthen and modernize our deterrence and defence,” NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said at the Riga Summit on 30 November 2021. Innovation plays a critical role in modernizing armed forces amid a complex strategic environment.

To this purpose, Stoltenberg unveiled the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) on 22 October 2021. DIANA shall bring defence and commercial companies together with military users to develop novel solutions that meet the needs of the future battlefield. He also launched the NATO Innovation Fund to invest up to €1bn to support innovators developing emerging technologies.

The announcement comes at a time when the Alliance is working on a new Strategic Concept. Innovation will be key to preserving NATO’s edge, as the Secretary-General pointed out in his 2030 food for thought paper. Although NATO is a potent defence organization, emphasis on emerging technologies reveals its Achilles’ heel.

Artificial intelligence, autonomy, biotechnology, quantum technology, and other technologies are at the heart of geoeconomic competition. Geoeconomic competition unfolds around the projection of economic power within and across the domains of land, air, sea, space, and cyberspace to achieve political goals.

Today’s geoeconomic dynamic defines winning business models amid a growing dichotomy between market-driven and state-driven nations. It aims to set the rules, principles, and standards that guide economic activities and access to and ownership of emerging technologies.

NATO’s current emphasis on emerging technologies with defence and commercial applications risks making the Alliance subject to this new geoeconomic dynamic. This dynamic can undermine NATO’s innovation agenda and endanger its strategic edge. Therefore, NATO needs to respond.

First, NATO will embrace the realities of economic security seriously. This call flows logically from Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, encouraging allies’ economic collaborations.

In our view, economic security combines national security and economic policy with technology and innovation policy to identify economic disruptions. It also prevents these disruptions from arising and strengthens a coping capacity to deal with economic emergencies.

Economic security requires allies, for example, to engage on defence-critical standards, advancing transparency for defence supply chains, and considering the interplay between technology development, foreign direct investment, and export control. Therefore, the new Strategic Concept should incorporate economic security as an essential element.

Second, economic security requires NATO to shape mindsets about defence investments and sustainability. Already today, defence companies face financial challenges as banks cancel bank accounts or refrain from covering export risks.

The emphasis on environmental, social, and governance criteria (ESG) that increasingly shapes and determines financial investments will reinforce these problems as defence is considered toxic. But a narrow interpretation of ESG that considers defence incompatible with the world view underpinning ESG is detrimental to NATO’s ambition to invest in companies. It also means other investors will likely shy away from investing in the same companies.

Therefore, the Alliance needs to step up activities with the European Commission, which works on a classification system to identify ESG-compliant activities, to make defence investments compatible.

Third, business is the first line of defence in a geoeconomic world, and NATO needs a platform to discuss geoeconomics with business.

Today, the NATO Industry Forum is the leading gathering to address defence industrial matters with defence companies. However, the emphasis on emerging technologies underlines the importance of non-defence companies.

Therefore, NATO should envisage a new special format of the North Atlantic Council to meet with the NATO Industry Forum members – and possibly also the European Commission – to allow state and corporate leaders to jointly engage on the proposed economic security agenda.

Fourth, strategic-level public-private dialogue also breathes new life into deepening cooperation with the private sector. NATO should become an early adopter of the solutions developed with allied money.

Making NATO the launch customer sends important market signals and provides companies with an initial track record confirming the relevance of their solutions. In addition, the Alliance should step up efforts to incorporate business into military operations. Logistics companies already play a crucial role, and traditional defence businesses provide frontline support.

The next stage comes with closely integrating digital companies to leverage their contribution. But for non-defence companies to provide frontline support, NATO not only needs the right mindset, but the Alliance also needs to think about incentives such as covering personnel risks on overseas deployments.

Finally, NATO’s ability to stimulate innovation and ensure economic security also depends on how it does business.

Critically, NATO needs to strive for a mission and capabilities-based innovation portfolio that maximises the value of allied money. NATO may take a page from the financial services industry and use a real options approach to manage technological risk and drive technology development. This approach prices technology building blocks like financial options, advances risk mitigation, speeds up technology adoption and gives force planners and developers more leeway to maximise input and output.

In addition, NATO should offer strategic hedging solutions for defence critical raw materials by combining corporate demand estimates with AI-based insights on financial and raw material markets. This will facilitate optimal, company-tailored hedging strategies to mitigate the corporate security of supply and price risks.

Overall, NATO’s relevance in the 21st century remains tackling defence challenges in a new strategic environment, increasingly defined by emerging and rapidly changing technologies and the profoundly important role of the private sector. To this purpose, NATO has embraced innovation and emerging technologies.

### Impacts --- DIANA Now Solves

#### DIANA now solves AI breakthroughs

Christie ‘22

(E. H. Christie, Finnish Institute of International Affairs, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” European View 2022, Vol. 21(1) 13 –2 //um-ef)

Investment challenges go beyond issues of scale. The US also has greater experience in the setting up and operation of structures to promote both military and dual-use innovation. While the best-known institution is the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, other US government structures are also relevant in discussions on fostering innovation in AI for military applications. A much-discussed example is In-Q-Tel, which was originally set up as the state venture-capital arm of the Central Intelligence Agency. To illustrate the influence of the In-Q-Tel example, one may note that both its current Chief Executive Officer, Chris Darby, and one of its former Chief Executive Officers, Gilman Louie, served among the 15 commissioners of the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.4 This was a temporarily created expert commission mandated 18 European View 21(1) by the US Congress to provide policy recommendations for a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach for US AI policy.5 With In-Q-Tel, the idea is to learn from private-sector practices in the area of venturecapital investment and repurpose them for state needs and more patient time horizons. A supported company should pursue product development strategies aimed at serving both civilian markets and government needs. In this way, rather than effectively taking over a commercial company and limiting its growth potential to future government contracts alone, the government body encourages an intermediate trajectory made up of mixed revenue streams, in the hope that this will generate greater returns to scale and higher efficiency thanks to the disciplining effect of private-sector competition. Conversely, the advantage of this approach as compared to not intervening at all is that the commercial company will integrate current and likely future government needs into its product and business-development strategy, rather than ignoring them and finding itself, at a later date, unable to supply the government sector according to the latter’s requirements. A related issue which falls between what can be achieved with new investment instruments and new protections that can be assured through the screening of foreign direct investment is the provision of investment from trusted private investors to the technology sector. Certain technology companies that are not part of the traditional defence industry may be developing dual-use products that are of potential interest to the defence sector while having limited awareness of national security concerns. This may make them vulnerable targets for both licit and illicit attempts to acquire their technologies on the part of foreign state actors. At the same time, their business development needs may lead them to seek investment from any potential source, thus exposing them to potential risks. To respond to this challenge, the US Department of Defense has launched a scheme called the Trusted Capital Marketplace (US Department of Defense 2021a). Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into. DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and Christie 19 finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities. Regarding the NATO Innovation Fund, 17 Allies had opted into the Fund as of the date of its announcement in October 2021. The participating Allies will inject up to €1 billion into Allied innovation ecosystems over the next 15 years. The Fund aims to attract additional private investments due to the de-risking effect, both financial and technological, thanks to state co-funding and diligence and screening efforts. The funds are intended to be used for long-term support of ‘deep tech’ innovative companies, that is, for advanced research into AI, quantum and related technologies that may have both military and civilian applications. Due diligence and security screening practices will aim to ensure that both private investors and fund recipients are trusted entities.

### Internals --- Must be OUTSIDE Mil-Mil

#### DIANA and Innovation fund part of Strategic Concept now --- funding and support must occur OUTSIDE institutional structures

Nelson ‘21

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The Defense Innovation Accelerator and NATO Innovation Fund announced at the NATO Summit are welcome developments, but they require new authorities and differentiated talent. Swift technological change has meant governments and the military created new organizations and approaches to innovation and rapid acquisition. Unfortunately, many do not have the necessary authority, budget, or workforce to succeed, meaning that meaningful change and impact have been sacrificed for theater. For the newly announced Defense Innovation Accelerator North Atlantic (DIANA) – with planned locations in Toronto and Cambridge, UK – and the NATO Innovation Fund (NIF) to succeed, they must address authority and budget concerns, and then bring in the right personnel to lead and staff them. Authorities There are three key authorities that NATO must get right for DIANA and NIF: reporting lines, patience (or willingness to accept failure), and decision making. First, DIANA and NIF should operate independently with a direct line into the most senior decision-makers (the Secretary General, SACEUR, Supreme Allied Commander Transformation — SACT, etc). Second, they need to be allowed to fail. The most impactful defense organizations (and indeed commercial organizations, particularly in the startup world) normalize taking big bets, with the knowledge that many will likely fail, and even the ones that succeed may take years to realize their full impact. Third and finally, these new NATO bodies need to invest in or provide support to initiatives and startups without requiring external permission or consensus. At the same time, they also need a clear transition partner for promising capabilities to be handed off to (e.g. DARPA transitioning tech to the U.S. Department of Defense), which can move from development to deployment. This will enable the Alliance to more readily identify, develop, and deploy emerging and disruptive technologies. Similar efforts including the U.S. Department of Defense’s DARPA and Defense Innovation Unit, CIA’s In-Q-Tel, and USAF’s Strategic Capabilities Office, are effective because they exist outside of traditional bureaucracies, leverage non-traditional talent strategies, and have consistent budgets. Budget Allocating funding seems obvious, but too often limited forethought is given to this issue. To ensure success, organizational funding must be significant, multi-year, and consistent or include inbuilt annual growth. A number of high-potential initiatives have either been announced with no dedicated funding or have had sizable funding gaps in subsequent years damaging their brand and relationships with defense companies and startups alike. The NIF in particular will likely rely on the willingness of Alliance members to make contributions beyond other NATO obligations. If so, multi-year commitments are crucial, as are success metrics, such as return on investment, which are rarely used within NATO or national government departments. Talent Finally, and most overlooked, is getting talent right. External talent is crucial. It is not enough to simply construct new organizations staffed in the traditional manner. To realize their full potential, NATO must attract talent with startup and/or venture capital (VC) experience, and pair them with top subject-matter experts from R&D communities, both government, and commercial. This cannot be done with NATO’s current Byzantine, long, drawn-out hiring process, which can last six months or even longer, and advantage insiders versus external candidates. As such the Alliance must engage and attract this talent. The good news is NATO has a number of potential examples to draw on for potential hiring pathways. In the U.S. the Defense Digital Service hires design and technical experts for one-to-two “tours of duty,” using their skillsets and operate outside the traditional civil service. In the UK, strategy and technology professionals are seconded into the Ministry of Defence, the Department of Trade, and intelligence organizations such as GCHQ, to provide experience or skills that may not exist within the current civil service workforce. But providing pathways alone is not enough: attracting this talent to apply and convincing them to join is just as important. This requires identifying areas where they might work, including industry, academia, and startups, and VC. At the same time, other steps are needed. Upskilling existing NATO civilians – among the international and international military staff (IS and IMS) — and Alliance service members are needed to address this skill and understanding gap. To do so, it is helpful to expose them to startup and VC environments. Programs like Shift’s Defense Ventures Program in the U.S. have succeeded in building understanding between the Department of Defense’s civilian and military workforce and startups and VCs. They’ve done so by bringing in high-performing defense personnel for eight-week immersions with growing venture-backed startups or VC firms. This cultivates the necessary connective tissue between startups, VCs, and the military. NATO could readily follow a similar process by providing its highest performers the opportunity to temporarily work alongside leading North American and European startups and investors. What’s Next? Accelerating the development, deployment, and integration of emerging and disruptive technologies into the strategic and tactical environments is at the core of future NATO operations. The Alliance’s move to build DIANA and NIF, along with incorporating the right language into strategic documents are significant first steps. But building these initiatives from scratch will require significant planning to establish the right authorities, budget, and talent environment to enable these organizations to thrive. In order to do so, they need to build outside of traditional NATO structures and models while creating a differentiated talent and organizational culture.

### Internals --- Unity over DIANA

#### DIANA is really good---every NATO member likes it.

Edward H. Christie 22, Defence Economist and Deputy Head of NATO’s Innovation Unit, lead author of NATO’s policy White Paper on Artificial Intelligence and lead consultant to NATO for the development of the Alliance’s Artificial Intelligence Strategy, “Defence cooperation in artificial intelligence: Bridging the transatlantic gap for a stronger Europe,” *European View*, Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 13–21, doi:10.1177/17816858221089372/micahw

Building on these considerations, the NATO Innovation Unit has developed two new instruments for Allied use which were announced to the public in October 2021 (NATO 2021a; 2021b). Both instruments aim to foster technological innovation with a deliberate focus on dual-use applications and on enterprises with mixed (potential) revenue streams. The first instrument is the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA), which is a NATO instrument, that is, it involves the participation of all 30 NATO Allies. The second instrument is the NATO Innovation Fund, which in NATO terminology is a ‘multinational’ instrument, namely one that Allies freely opt into.

DIANA will aim to accelerate the adoption of dual-use technological solutions through several interlocking components.6 First, it will develop a network of national organisations, in particular test centres and innovation accelerators. Second, it will competitively select private-sector innovators and allow them to use national organisations in the network to interface with military end users and military capability-development specialists. Third, it is envisaged that DIANA will provide mentorship and education services for private innovators to familiarise them with the opportunities and responsibilities inherent to the defence and security sector. Fourth, DIANA will develop a database of trusted financial investors from Allied nations and support matchmaking between investors and innovators. Fifth and finally, DIANA will also provide expert advice on defence and security innovation to all relevant stakeholders, including private-sector and academic entities.

# Aff Answers

### 2AC---NUQ

#### It’s non-unique.

NATO 6-30-2022. "NATO 2022 Strategic Concept". https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/. DL

24. We will expedite our digital transformation, adapt the NATO Command Structure for the information age and enhance our cyber defences, networks and infrastructure. We will promote innovation and increase our investments in emerging and disruptive technologies to retain our interoperability and military edge. We will work together to adopt and integrate new technologies, cooperate with the private sector, protect our innovation ecosystems, shape standards and commit to principles of responsible use that reflect our democratic values and human rights.

25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.

#### And climate, authoritarians, and non-military threats.

RANE 6-30-2022. Risk Assistance Network + Exchange, risk intelligence company used by 400 corporations, government agencies, academic institutions and over 1.5M members. "Placing NATO’s New Strategic Concept in Context". Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/placing-nato-s-new-strategic-concept-context. DL

The 2022 Strategic Concept highlights new cybersecurity, climate change, authoritarian governance and other non-military threats as well. Climate change was mentioned only once in the 2010 Strategic Concept. But in the 2022 version, it is mentioned 11 times, including the ambitious statement that NATO should “become the leading international organization when it comes to understanding and adapting to the impact of climate change on security.” Additional attention is also given to cyberattacks. The alliance reaffirmed its longstanding policy that a “single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space” could prompt NATO to trigger its Article 5 mutual defense clause — another measure directed first and foremost toward Russia and China and intended to deter cyberattacks causing physical damage, as otherwise the alliance would be skeptical of triggering Article 5 because of a cyberattack. Finally, the 2022 Strategic Concept on several occasions notes the challenge to the alliance’s interests and values posed by advancing authoritarianism — a threat not acknowledged directly in 2010.

NATO’s updated Strategic Concept acknowledges non-military threats such as identifying and mitigating strategic vulnerabilities and dependencies, including with respect to critical infrastructure, supply chains and health systems. These new threats underscore the increasing importance of reliable partners in geographies outside the NATO alliance such as in Asia, from where the alliance must ensure the stability and security of supplies of critical components and resources.

### 2AC --- L/T --- NATO Solves Disagreements

#### NATO can spearhead quick adoption of EDT that reduces use of resources and disagreement

Koegler et al ‘18

(Torsten Gojowsky, Sebastian Koegler, Bernardus Haspels, Flemming Haar, and Sverre Wetteland,Torsten Gojowsky is a U.S. Army officer. Ben Haspels is a Royal Netherlands Army officer. Flemming Haar is a Danish Navy officer. Sebastian Koegle is a German officer. Sverre Wetteland is a Norwegian officer. All are students at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, “Resistance to Innovation in NATO,” pg online @ https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/8/16/resistance-to-innovation-in-nato)

Innovative technologies face the dilemma of military leaders who are uncertain of their possible benefits versus their potential risks. Yet the pacing gap has kept military leadership from confronting this dilemma in a timely manner. Tactical Assault Kit can form the base of a future communication platform for NATO SOF. However, this vision for the future will only be feasible if the need for connectivity among NATO special operations forces is persistently socialized and eventually accepted. NATO Special Operations Headquarters can function as a key hub of this socialization process. As a premier NATO special operations schoolhouse, it trains and educates member states special operations soldiers in areas including communication technology. Such education can focus on learning the basics of emerging technology and how to employ those unique technical capabilities. By creating a consensus for a way ahead and also facilitating basic courses via their schoolhouse in Belgium, NATO special operations forces as a whole might be able to step into the future outfitted with the best possible means of fighting in an increasingly complex world of near-peer competitors and hostile networks.

### 2AC --- Unity = Fake

#### Stratcon unity is a facade

Lee 7/1/22 [James, reporter for Express UK; “NATO cracks exposed: Call for members to be KICKED OUT as alliance 'only inch deep'”; July 1, 2022; DOA: 7/4/22; <https://www.express.co.uk/news/science/1633935/nato-cracks-exposed-alliance-members-kicked-out-security-defence-news>; Lowell-ES]

However, the cracks are beginning to show with one commentator suggesting the thinly veiled family photo may not be one of a happy alliance. Matthew Karnitschnig, Politico's chief European correspondent who was at the summit, said: “Look beyond the staged backslapping, bonhomie and self-congratulation in Madrid, however, and one can see that while the alliance’s unity might be a mile wide, it’s also only an inch deep, its collective sense of purpose as varied as its 30 members.” Much discussion has arisen over the financial commitment seen by NATO members. In fact, at one point, Mr Trump threatened to pull out of the alliance as a matter of point, resulting in a quick pledge by members to increase their spending. Germany, France and the UK have all hinted at increasing defence spending over the next decade, with the UK aiming to hit 2.5 percent of GDP following pressure by Defence Secretary Ben Wallace to increase the budget. The US is still by far the largest contributor to the alliance, with around 3.5 percent of its GDP dedicated to defence.

### 2AC --- Aff Solves Cyber OStretch

#### NATO coop on cyber solves cyber overstretch

Maigre 4/6/22

(Merle, senior cybersecurity expert at e-Governance Academy in Estonia. In 2017–2018, she served as director of the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence (CCDCOE)in Tallinn; in 2012–2017 as the security policy adviser to Estonian Presidents Kersti Kaljulaid and Thoomas Hendrik Ilves; and in 2010–2012 in the Policy Planning Unit of the Private Office of NATO Security General Anders Fogh Rasmussen. She is a member of the Executive Board of the Cyber Peace Institute in Geneva and the International Advisory Board of NATO CCDCOE, “NATO’s Role in Global Cyber Security,” pg online @ <https://www.gmfus.org/news/natos-role-global-cyber-security> //um-ef)

More operational- and technical-level joint activities should be practiced among allies and with like-minded partners in order to contribute to imposing costs to malicious actors in cyberspace. Given that NATO’s cyber response teams are stretched thin due to protecting NATO’s own networks, bi- and multilateral collaboration enables countries to share best practices and, in the event of an emergency, provide mutual rapid assistance in crisis response.

### 2AC --- N/L --- Spending

#### $1B in cyber and AI now – aff is a part of the budget

Miller 6/29/22 [Maggie, cybersecurity reporter for POLITICO; “NATO establishes program to coordinate rapid response to cyberattacks”; 06/29/2022; DOA: 7/5/22; <https://www.politico.com/news/2022/06/29/nato-cyberattacks-russia-00043149>; Lowell-ES]

NATO member countries on Wednesday agreed in Madrid to create a new program to quickly respond to cyberattacks.

Russian threat: The “virtual rapid response cyber capability” comes after months of Russian cyberattacks in Ukraine as part of the war and amid concerns that Moscow may target the United States and other NATO countries in retaliation for assistance to Ukraine.

The program is voluntary. According to a fact sheet put out by the White House on Wednesday, the U.S. will offer “robust national capabilities” to support this program.

There’s more: NATO also announced a separate package of cyber assistance to Ukraine. Neither NATO nor the White House immediately responded to questions about the scope of the new programs.

New strategy: In a new strategy document, NATO reaffirmed a 2021 commitment that a cyberattack could (but would not automatically) trigger Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which would make it an attack against the alliance as a whole. It also pledged to work with the private sector to counter threats, formally recognized threats in cyberspace posed by Russia and China, and promised to update NATO’s command structure to reflect new cyber threats.

More research funds: Officials speaking prior to the strategy’s release on the condition that they not be identified told POLITICO that NATO’s new strategy will include over $1 billion to fund research into emerging technologies including quantum computing and artificial intelligence..

### 2AC --- N/L --- Stratcon

#### Aff proves implementation of stratcon

NATO 6/29/22 [North Atlantic Treaty Organization; “NATO 2022 STRATEGIC CONCEPT”; June 29, 2022; DOA: 7/1/22; <https://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/2022/6/pdf/290622-strategic-concept.pdf>; Lowell-ES]

25. Maintaining secure use of and unfettered access to space and cyberspace are key to effective deterrence and defence. We will enhance our ability to operate effectively in space and cyberspace to prevent, detect, counter and respond to the full spectrum of threats, using all available tools. A single or cumulative set of malicious cyber activities; or hostile operations to, from, or within space; could reach the level of armed attack and could lead the North Atlantic Council to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. We recognise the applicability of international law and will promote responsible behaviour in cyberspace and space. We will also boost the resilience of the space and cyber capabilities upon which we depend for our collective defence and security.

### 2AC---N/L---AI Logistics

#### AI logistics uncontroversial

Franke 21 [Ulrike, Senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations; “ARTIFICIAL DIVIDE: HOW EUROPE AND AMERICA COULD CLASH OVER AI”; January 2021; DOA: 7/23/22; <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep29123>; Lowell-ES]

However, military AI includes many non-controversial uses, such as ‘sustainment’, which encompasses logistics as well as support activities such as financial management, personnel services, and health care. AI helps make these services more efficient and cost-effective; for example, predictive maintenance helps in monitoring a system, such as an aircraft, and can do things such as use various sensory inputs and data analysis to predict when parts of a system will need to be replaced. Equally, AI can help improve logistics’ efficiency by, for instance, ensuring that supplies are delivered in appropriate quantities and at the right time. Transatlantic cooperation in this field is uncontroversial, but extremely useful – especially when carried out within NATO, as this could help bring allies closer together, establish joint procedures, and thereby ensure interoperability.

### 2AC---N/L---Pressure

#### US pressure undermines cohesion – the plan pushes the fine line

Schnaufer 21 [Tad, doctoral candidate in Security Studies at the School of Politics, Security, and International Affairs at the University of Central Florida ; “The US-NATO Relationship: The Cost of Maintaining Political Pressure on Allies”; January 15, 2021; DOA: 7/18/22; <https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2021/01/15/the-us-nato-relationship-the-cost-of-maintaining-political-pressure-on-allies/>; Lowell-ES]

It may seem that these tensions and fears will only lead to negative outcomes, but some disunity within an alliance can yield positive results. Several articles researching the implications of free-riding and burdening-sharing in alliances have supported this notion. In Olson and Zeckhauser’s seminal article on burden-sharing, they wrote, “This fact leads to the paradoxical conclusion that a decline in the amity, unity, and community of interest among allies need not necessarily reduce the effectiveness of an alliance…” and “The United States, at least, should perhaps not hope for too much unity in common ventures with other nations. It might prove extremely expensive.” Similarly, Plumper and Neumayer note in reference to the smaller allies (non-US allies), “Unless the interests of alliance members are independent, the existence of NATO allows the smaller allies to free-ride to some extent.”

### 2AC---AT: I/L---Forward Defense Fails

#### Current NATO policy doesn’t solve Ukraine – only the aff does

Mengelkamp et al 7/27 [Lukas Mengelkamp, historian based at the University of Marburg / Alexander Graef, Researcher at the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy / Ulrich Kuhn, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; “A CONFIDENCE-BUILDING DEFENSE FOR NATO”; JUNE 27, 2022; <https://warontherocks.com/2022/06/a-confidence-building-defense-for-nato/>; Accessed 7/23/22; Lowell-ES]

The problem with forward defense, however, is that while it sounds good, it is not clear what it would mean in practice, or how it would play out against the many divergences and disagreements between NATO members. Instead, allies should embrace a strategy of confidence-building defense. To revive this late Cold War concept, NATO’s eastern members would create a highly mobile net of dispersed artillery, while more powerful European allies would build and supply heavy weapons depots in those countries, then prepare to rapidly deploy significant forces in case of a crisis. This approach would enable European allies to contribute to their own security, lessen first-strike pressures, and avoid deepening a dangerous new security dilemma with Russia.

No matter how confident allies seem to be about NATO’s current unity, there are a number of key uncertainties that could make forward defense difficult to implement effectively. If Russia’s military continues to struggle in Ukraine, or if America’s commitment to European security falters again, NATO would benefit from a more flexible, less forward strategy.